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Preface | i
Preface
The genesis of this research lies in a quickly aborted desire to integrate a bunch of modeling
languages in order to create a holistic method for enterprise modeling (not entirely unlike
UEML). It was quickly realized that such additional new efforts, while interesting from
an academic point of view, have little practical value, or indeed, lastingness (as can be
seen from the myriad of attempts lingering out there). From those initial forays into
the analysis of conceptual modeling language semantics an idea was born that, perhaps,
we should focus on techniques that give us more understanding into the users of these
modeling languages languages, not the language itself.
The integration of multiple languages (say, one for goal modeling and one for value ex-
changes) is of course done for a good reason: because those two aspects need to meet, and
their meeting will give rise to something more than just the sum of their parts. As such,
the integration of languages is not a useless effort in itself. But what is really desired here,
in a practical sense, is for the people from these different worlds to be able to relate to
each other (at least for those models where the goal is to capture knowledge and reason
about it together).
Along these lines we decided to forego the typical approach of defining yet another mod-
eling language, or building yet another framework for integration. Instead, we opted to
perform empirical work to focus on the knowledge questions that underlie many of these
integration efforts: how do we know whether modelers understand each other, and how do
we make such (converging or dissenting) understandings explicit? As a result, this thesis
came from a couple of desires: the desire to add some insights to the field of conceptual
modeling and its languages, and the desire to do empirical research instead of stipulating
the latest and greatest way to do work, research, business, or just about anything.
We started eliciting the conceptual understanding modelers had of their modeling con-
cepts, and began to refer to these individual understandings as ‘personal semantics’. This
was, as could have been expected, quickly dismissed. These quick dismissals of the mere
notion of ‘personal semantics’ as being unnecessary because “people simply have the right
or wrong understanding of modeling concepts” and it is in any sense trivial “because we
can just define the right semantics” were the final stimuli we needed to focus and get
down to work. With the additional studies we performed, the empirical data we have
available, and the discussion of what consequences these have for modeling we hope to
have convinced at least some modelers (researchers and practitioners alike) that insights
into the way people think about modeling concepts are worthwhile.
The research reported on in this dissertation would not have been possible if not for the
involvement of a diverse number of people. My co-supervisor, Stijn Hoppenbrouwers,
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always stimulated me to think of modeling languages from a linguistic point of view
and treat them as actual languages, which led to the strong focus on as-used semantics.
Whenever I was stuck in a conceptual dead-end or lost in my data an hour of critically
thinking aloud at Stijn’s whiteboard always led to new clues and angles to pursue.
Later on in the project, someone who I had been working with on and off for some time
became more involved as my second co-supervisor. Sybren de Kinderen spent a significant
amount of time with me editing this dissertation and gave invaluable input on many of
the studies and articles themselves. The fact that this dissertation is at least slightly more
readable than a collection of random research articles can be attributed to his diligent
and at times hounding input on the coherence of everything you are about to read.
The different studies, papers, and ideas benefited greatly from the many discussions with
my colleagues, friends and critics (often some combination of the three). I am indebted to
all of them for their inspiring comments and discussions. Whether they were the inspiring
academics I met at conferences, the friends that suffered reading through my writings, or
my colleagues who were always there to discuss and critique my ideas and explanations,
like Georgios Plataniotis and Marc van Zee while they were suffering and sweating with
me in the pool and gym. My parents Hans and Jose´ gave me ample exercise in trying to
explain what my research was actually about, which helped a lot to actually understand
myself just what I was trying to do. The empirical work itself owes a lot to the insights
Alina Lartseva gave in our many discussions on the empirical methods that would actually
be feasible to use among practitioners in the field of conceptual modeling. The studies
we performed would not have been possible without the many practitioners and students
who participated in our studies. For their time investment, especially those students
consistently participating in the longitudinal study performed at Radboud University the
work itself, and I, are indebted to them.
Finally, I would like to thank my supervisor, Erik (sorry, Henderik) Proper for all the
usual stuff: allowing me the freedom to set out my own research, spending a lot time on
discussions and critiques of my work, and knowing when to give me the freedom to find
my own way. But more importantly: for stimulating me to work on other things than
just my mind, doing a lot of swimming and running. I would like to make it be known
that at the time of writing I could easily outswim him in the pool (thanks to my good
friend Herve´ Fokan). I consider it one of, if not the, crowning achievements of my time of
doctoral research.
Luxembourg, Dirk van der Linden
December 15, 2014
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Abstract. In the introduction of this dissertation we set out the main subject by way
of introducing Enterprise Modeling and some of its inherent challenges. We explain how
those translate to the quest of integrating different Enterprise Models. We argue for the
need to understand how individual people involved in the modeling process view the lan-
guage constructs of the modeling languages they use, and relate this to existing work
on ontologies. We then discuss more general aspects of conceptual models and concepts
themselves necessary to understand our research objectives, and the research questions
we will treat in the rest of this dissertation.
The content of this chapter is based on work published as:
Dirk van der Linden, Stijn J.B.A. Hoppenbrouwers, Alina Lartseva, Wolfgang Mol-
nar: Beyond Terminologies: Using Psychometrics to Validate Shared Ontologies.
In: Applied Ontology, vol.7, no.4, pp. 471-487, 2012
Stijn J.B.A. Hoppenbrouwers, Wim van Stokkum, Maria-Eugenia Iacob, Ilona
Wilmont, Dirk van der Linden, Chintan Amrit, and Maarten Joosen: Stake-
holder Communication in Service Development. In: M.M. Lankhorst et al.
(Eds.): Agile Service Development – Combining Adaptive Methods and Flexi-
ble Solutions, Springer, Heidelberg, 2012
1.1 Different understandings of modeling concepts
Enterprise Modeling (EM) is the quest to model an enterprise in all of its complex-
ity (e.g., describing its activities, people and their behavior, regulations, processes, re-
sources, goals), and to understand how all those different aspects interrelate and affect
each other (cf. Fox and Gruninger 1998, Dalal et al. 2004). Doing so supports the commu-
nication between (people working in) these different aspects, and the potential for linking
between them in order to optimize the enterprise’s overall behavior (Frank 2002). It is
done both to describe and understand (i.e., the current state of an enterprise) and to
stipulate and steer (i.e., towards the desired state of an enterprise).
The modeling of an enterprise thus typically comprises the modeling of many aspects
(e.g., processes, resources, rules), which themselves are typically represented in a spe-
cialized modeling language or method (e.g., BPMN (Object Management Group 2010a),
e3Value (Gordijn et al. 2006), RBAC (Ferrariolo et al. 1995)). Most of these languages
Different understandings of modeling concepts | 5
share similar language constructs, or meta-concepts (e.g., processes1, resources, re-
strictions). However, from language to language (and modeler to modeler) the way
in which meta-concepts are typically used (i.e., their intended semantics) can differ. For
example, one modeler might typically intend restrictions to be deontic in nature (i.e.,
restrictions that ought to be the case, but can be violated), while a different modeler
might typically consider them as alethic conditions (i.e., rules that are strict logical ne-
cessities and cannot be violated). The modelers could also differ in whether they typically
interpret results as being material or immaterial ‘things’. Even for scenarios as simple
as the delivery of a pizza these differences become apparent, as a pizza delivery can in-
clude alethic restrictions in order to observe temporal dependencies (“A pizza cannot be
delivered before it is made.”), deontic restrictions (“A pizza should be delivered within 30
minutes of its order.”), and the result of the delivery can be a material thing (a certain
amount of notes and coins of the local currency) or an immaterial one (a confirmation of
payment on a debit card machine).
If one is to integrate or link models describing these individual aspects (i.e., the integrative
modeling step in enterprise modeling (Lankhorst 2004, Ku¨hn et al. 2003, Vernadat 2002b,
Opdahl and Berio 2006, Delen et al. 2005)) and ensure the consistency and completeness
of the involved semantics, it is necessary to be aware of the exact way in which such
a meta-concept was used by the modeler. If this is not explicitly taken into account,
problems could arise from, e.g., treating superficially similar concepts as being the same
or eroding the nuanced view from specific models when they are combined and made
(internally) consistent.
This challenge follows from the inherent collaborative nature of enterprise modeling (Sse-
buggwawo et al. 2009, Rospocher et al. 2008, Frederiks and van der Weide 2006, Hoppen-
brouwers et al. 2006; 2005), as it involves different people specialized in different aspects
of the enterprise. These aspects have to be elaborated on to deal with the complexity of
(re)designing modern day enterprises, with the added difficulty that it is up to the “people
within the business to express their views in terms of a modeling language” (Barjis et al.
2009). Collaborative modeling in general deals with challenges like these (Rouwette et al.
2008, Hoppenbrouwers et al. 2009, Rittgen 2009) that arise because of the different people
involved, such as optimizing the actual modeling process (Bidarra et al. 2001), ensuring
its effectiveness (Dean et al. 2000) and dealing with problems that arise when integrating
models made by different people with different viewpoints (Renger et al. 2008).
The particular EM challenge we are concerned with in this dissertation is the potential of
mismatched understandings between different modelers and stakeholders (Kaidalova et al.
2012). Note that mismatched understanding does not only refer to misunderstandings
1To distinguish concepts from words used for them we print concepts in small caps.
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that the involved parties might be aware of. It explicitly also refers to the (more dam-
aging) misunderstanding that the parties involved might not be aware of. People might
disagree on what words to use, what they should mean, or use the same words without
realizing they talk about different things. When these apparent or hidden disagreements
extend to the words used by a modeling language (i.e., the meta-concepts), the produced
models themselves might no longer reflect correctly or fully the conceptualization of the
individuals involved. As models should be there to support the building of knowledge and
its exchange (Stahl 2000), any threat to the validity and integrity of the models is a threat
to the knowledge exchange itself. An often used strategy to deal with this is a priori agree-
ing on or working towards a set of standardized terminology and semantics. However, it
is neither safe nor effective to simply assume that such expressed agreements, or even the
models themselves, express correctly and completely the way a modeler conceptualizes
them given that they are necessarily incomplete overviews of someone’s conceptualiza-
tion (Guarino et al. 1994).
1.2 Enterprise models
In this section we discuss in more detail the different understanding people can have of the
language constructs of the models created to deal with their particular aspects. To deal
with this challenge of mismatched understandings later on in the EM process we discuss
how attaining an insight into the way in which people understand (their) conceptual
models could be used to support the integration of (conceptual) models capturing various
different aspects of an enterprise, originating from different stakeholders. Creating an
overall enterprise model (or architecture) requires a deep understanding of not only of
what the words used in models mean to their creators, but also how the various modelers
interpret the meta-conceptual constructs they use (i.e., types in the modeling language).
We argue this cannot be achieved by assuming a priori consensus on the used semantics
(as is common practice), but that we need to incorporate methods that let us discover
the existing conceptual understanding individual people, and perhaps communities (of
particular kinds of modelers, practice, etc.). Thus, we propose that conceptual integration
in enterprise modeling, and perhaps also in other fields, would strongly benefit from
insights that are more concerned with figuring out how people actually understand their
models than with stipulating how they ought to.
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1.2.1 Integration of functionally distinct aspects
Holistic models, as discussed before, are needed to deal with the interplay between the
various aspects of enterprises that cannot be determined solely from the partial, specialized
(aspectual) models. For instance, strategic decisions, the analysis of emergent effects that
are irreducible to constituent models and optimizing the interplay between the various
aspects, all require an integrated model. Syntactically speaking, the integration of such
models (i.e., model transformation) is less of a big issue. However, when it comes to
semantics, a correct integration of the model that respects the understanding people have
of both the domain concepts and the language constructs used to express those domain
concepts (i.e., the meta-concepts) is far less trivial.
Most proposed solutions attempting to deal with this issue of integration in EM for focus
on the (semantics of) the modeling languages. They generally either propose model-
ing languages as such (albeit with a wide scope meant for holistic models, e.g., Archi-
Mate (Jonkers et al. 2003); UEML (Vernadat 2002a, Opdahl and Berio 2006)) or they
are methodologies that facilitate the integration of models (Ku¨hn et al. 2003). However
useful they can be, most of these solutions suffer limitations because of their focus on the
modeling languages (a stipulated set of integrated definitions) instead of the modelers and
how they actually interpret and use conceptual constructs. This stipulative focus causes
them to be dependent on the explicitly expressed semantics of the language (assuming it
is perfectly communicated to users and retained by them). In addition, every time the
semantics of any modeling language involved changes, the solution (language, mapping)
has to be revised as well, resulting in a never-ending update loop. Furthermore, the focus
on the modeling languages becomes even more problematic if those languages have no
agreed-upon standard semantics (e.g., i* (Ayala et al. 2005)) or suffer from underspeci-
fied or inconsistently defined semantics, e.g., BPMN (Dijkman et al. 2008a)) and UML
(Breu et al. 1997). A focus on the modeler would counteract these issues by avoiding
the problem of not knowing what (standard) semantics have been selected and to what
extent someone adheres to them. Thus for the integration of enterprise models, in ad-
dition to the semantics of modeling languages it is important to have insight into the
conceptualizations and interpretations of the various individual modelers.
1.2.2 Integration requires a focus on people
The need for insight indicated above should provide some of guidance for the process in
which the enterprise modeler integrates models. Pre-defined specifications of either the
modeling languages as such, or of the aspect-specific concepts used are not sufficient to
understand the fine points of modelers’ interpretations. Specification documents, whether
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they are ‘simple’ lists of the terminology used, or more detailed, formal structures (like
the often invoked type of ontology suggested by Gruber (1993)) still only talk about
pre-existing, agreed-upon meaning. But agreement is not the same as commitment, and
agreement may be quite superficial (e.g., because of political reasons, for saving time,
because people feel things could still be changed later on). While specification documents
can be updated, they will rarely reflect or keep track of personal insights gained by a
specific modeler in a specific context. Thus, one can never be entirely sure that someone
claiming to understand a certain term by a certain definition actually does so. Rather
personal insights are what actually shapes the semantics someone attributes to his mod-
els, as people tend to think and work in the semantics of their natural language and
environment, not in what is dictated by a given formal specification (Sowa 2010).
Furthermore, the primary focus of communication for a given model in most modeling
discussions is centered around the clarification of instance-level concepts (i.e., the concrete
‘things’ domain experts talk about). However, when we integrate models, we look at the
semantics of the type-level concepts: the modeling language’s constructs. For example,
if we have two models that both speak about users, we do not integrate the ‘John Doe’
and ‘Jane Doe’ instances they contain, but the underlying construct that represents those
instances, e.g., ‘Person’, ‘Actor’, ‘User’. For this reason our focus on explicating meaning
should be on those constructs (i.e., the meta-concepts) and how they are interpreted.
Thus, the kind of insight into different modelers required by an integrating enterprise
modeler should focus on the personal semantics of the type-level meta-concepts they use.
The need to understand the way in which language constructs are used intuitively leads
us to some form of linguistic analysis. The simplest, and perhaps most obvious one would
be some kind of terminological analysis. However, this involves the very problem we are
trying to deal with: we cannot be sure any terminologies (i.e., specifications, agreements,
standards) were properly adhered to, so we would have to ask each modeler to explicate
their own terminology. Even assuming such a terminology would be conscientiously given,
there is still no guarantee it would explicate every part, leaving the issue unsolved.
A better option might be some form of corpus analysis. We can define the corpus as the
collection of (textually represented) models and related documents and process them to try
and find useful information. Unfortunately, this kind of analysis will not necessarily render
the meaning of the words as intended by the modeler: at best we can focus on collocation,
figuring out which words are often used together with certain other words. While the idea
that words that occur together in a similar context mean similar things (Harris 1954) is not
bad per se, focussing on the models themselves implies that we really only find information
about the co-occurrence of the words that were used, but not necessarily about how the
modeler personally understood and intended them to be used.
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Such a Firthian “you shall know a word by the company it keeps” (Firth 1957) view only
works in our case if we actually relate these words and their company to the modelers and
ask them what they actually mean for them. That, however, defeats the point of doing the
corpus analysis, since if the lexicon we are interested in (i.e., the notation constructs) is
small enough we can directly ask for the meaning of all of them right away. Furthermore,
the corpora we can construct on the basis of models and related documents may very likely
be too small for any useful analysis, given that we already have a fragmented playing field
with each aspect modeling their small part of the total enterprise.
The strongest issue here is, as we said before, the focus on models instead of their modelers.
Trying to deduce any detailed semantics from a model is a doubtful enterprise because,
as Guarino (1998) puts it:
“A set of intended models is [...] only a weak characterization of a conceptual-
ization: it just excludes some absurd interpretations, without really describing
the “meaning” of the vocabulary.”
We cannot reason about things that are not in the model, as obvious as they might
seem. If a certain modeler always uses an ‘actor’ construct to model human beings,
e.g., they instantiate it with such terms as ‘John Doe’ or ‘Business User’, we know they
find it permissible to see human beings as actors. But the fact that they never once
instantiated it with terms like ‘Sun Blade V100’ or ‘Dell Server’ is simply not enough to
conclude they find it impermissible to ever do so. Therefore we have to focus on finding
the meaning at the source, i.e., in the modeler. For that, we will need a different kind
of investigation than a purely linguistic one that bases itself on only partially expressed
stipulative ‘meaning’. What we need to know is what a construct actually is for people,
i.e., how they conceptually understand it, and for this investigations into the conceptual
understanding (e.g., psychometrical analysis) are needed to provide us with answers where
sole terminological analysis cannot.
Focusing on how people understand modeling constructs is a more stable measure of
what they mean than textbook definitions, that is, if we measure this kind of conceptual
understanding instead of postulating it. We presume cognitive science’s suggestion of
a tight relationship between thought and the world, but a loose one between language
and thought, cf. Wolff and Holmes (2011). What this means is that the language, in
relation to the concepts it describes, changes far more rapidly and unpredictably than the
actual concepts in relation to the world that it helps categorize and make sense of for a
person. Focusing on measuring the conceptual understanding is therefore a safer bet for
an understanding of what people mean than attempting to derive it from the language
they use.
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There is a strong analog to the (applied) ontology community here, as the measuring
or explicating of such understandings is essentially the creation of personal ontologies.
However, are ontologies not supposed to be a “formal explicit specification of shared
conceptualization” (Gruber 1993) (emphasis added), instead of the personal conceptual-
izations we advocate? It is quite true that the eventual goal of most ontologies is to
reflect and support the shared conceptualization. However, this can rarely be done ef-
fectively without first being aware of the personal conceptualizations of the individuals
involved. The (applied) ontology community seems to agree that individuals have their
own ontologies:
“Every person (. . . ) has an [often tacit] ontology (. . . ) these ontologies per-
vade and underpin our deliberations, inform our decisions and guide our ac-
tions . . . ” (Uschold 2011)
Furthermore, it is also understood that these personal ontologies are an important asset
in validating and strengthening the quality of (amongst others) shared ontologies:
“it has become ever more important to make explicit these implicit ontologies
thereby easing interoperability and improving operational effectiveness” (Uschold
2011)
It thus seems evident that explicating the conceptual understanding of individual people
is a useful venture (cf. other research which explicitly uses personal ontologies to map or
construct shared ontologies such as Dieng and Hug (1998) or Lacher and Groh (2001)).
Furthermore, following on the argument from Sowa (2000) that “independently developed,
but convergent theories that stand the test of time are a more reliable basis for standards
than the consensus of a committee”, we would argue that having an understanding of
people’s independently developed conceptualizations, or personal ontologies, may be a
more reliable basis for understanding their semantics than ‘agreed ontologies’.
1.3 Conceptual models
Because the different models used in Enterprise Modeling (used to capture and describe
information of their relative aspects) are essentially conceptual models we will reflect on
the structure of conceptual models, what is contained in them, and what in particular the
referents of these models are. Since we want to investigate the conceptual understanding
people have of the language constructs contained in them, it would do well to know just
what we want to measure.
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Conceptual modeling deals with the creation of models that describe a particular domain
from the point of view of a number of involved stakeholders. At least: since recent times
this has been the predominant use, while earlier it was predominantly used for information
modeling in the scope of database design, before moving onwards to different aspects like
processes, ontologies and other specializations (Wieringa 2008, Henderson-Sellers 2011).
While conceptual modeling can also include e.g., models of solutions (software, tools, im-
plementations) and their impact (Wieringa 2011), our focus is on domain models, those
used to model and capture the information some people (stakeholders, observers, model-
ers, etc.) have of a particular domain under the spotlight.
Creating such models can be done both to facilitate communication between these peo-
ple, to capture (current) knowledge of that domain, to reason with those models, and so
on (Mylopoulos et al. 1990). In order for such models to be useful it is important they are
of a high quality, which entails first and foremost that they are conceptually valid repre-
sentations of what the stakeholders and modelers intended to represent (Robinson 2006).
As modeling in this respect is such a human activity, it is important to be aware of all
the personal factors that play into encoding such conceptualizations. For example, while
a particular financial domain might have such concepts like ‘insurance policy’, ‘payout
regulation’, and ‘financial means’, we need to use modeling concepts – the types from a
modeling language – to capture them. For example, by modeling a ‘payout regulation’
as a specific type of restriction. Because people also have their own conceptualizations of
these language types, where most discussions on clarification of terminology center around
those from the domain, we need to be extra careful that a model truly represents what is
meant by the modelers. Two modelers might for instance differ on their typical view on
restrictions, the one seeming them as alethic conditions (i.e., statements of what logically
has to be), and the other as deontic conditions (i.e., statements of what optimally should
be). If left unspoken, and unresolved during the modeling sessions, this can lead to models
that do not fully represent the original modeler’s intent anymore.
1.3.1 What is modeled in a conceptual model?
Since we want to understand how people understand their models, especially the language
constructs used by them, we need to focus on just what is contained in those models. What
is the actual content of a conceptual model (i.e., the referents of the terms used in the
model)? While intuitively one would assume that the referents here are concepts, hence,
conceptual modeling, there are many people who seem to think such models refer either
to mathematical objects, physical reality, or other like-wise interpretations. With the
advent of the use of conceptual modeling shifting towards modeling domains and people’s
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conceptualizations of the things therein, it seems to be valid to assume that concepts
are the referent given the high focus on eliciting the understanding people have of some
domain. This particular interpretation has been established as early as in the 1980s in
fundamental reports that laid the basis for many conceptual modeling efforts (cf. Jardine
1984).
While we now can safely assume that it is concepts that are modeled in conceptual
models, there is still a distinction we need to make that has been implicitly referred to so
far. Essentially, models will contain at least two levels of concepts:
1. the domain concepts, and
2. the meta-concepts (i.e., the language constructs).
The domain-level concepts are the actual things from the ‘Universe-of-Discourse’ that are
modeled (e.g., financial policies, types of money, the people involved in insurance payout
claims). The language-level, or meta-concepts, however, are the actual concepts from the
language that are used to express these concepts.
1.3.2 The distinction between concepts and meta-concepts
Let us explain the difference between domain concepts and meta-concepts a bit more
clearly with some examples of how models are created.
To ensure the validity of domain models modelers often already attempt to reach consensus
on what meta-concepts to use to represent elements from the universe of discourse, and
what to call those representations. However, such discussions often take the form of
agreeing on the concrete language construct to be used for such meta-concepts (e.g, “Let
us model this pizza as a resource.”, “Let us model the delivery of the pizza as a
process.”), while not necessarily going into detail on just what that construct (‘resource’
or ‘process’) actually is in this context. Instead, the deeper semantics often stay implicit.
For example, the business process for pizza deliveries might involve restrictions that are
logical necessities and cannot be broken (e.g., a pizza can not be delivered before it is made,
thus correctly observing temporal dependencies) but also restrictions that can be broken,
but perhaps ought not to because of moral or financial constraints (e.g., a pizza should
be delivered within 30 minutes of its order). It is thus important that whatever meta-
concept we choose to represent these restrictions accommodate the conceptual distinction
between alethic (i.e., logical necessity) and deontic (i.e., how the world ought to be)
modality. But, if we only agree that we model these kinds of restrictions as “rules”, we
leave this distinction implicit and depend on the (selection of the) modeling language to
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dictate what exactly the semantic status of both of these rules can be (let alone that
users at times deliberately or unconsciously ignore a language’s semantics and invent
their own, not always explicit, semantics (Henderson-Sellers 2005)). As some languages
accommodate less conceptual distinctions than others, that means relevant information
might be lost.
Let us consider actors. If a modeler typically conceptualizes actors as human beings
who take actions on their own accord, and wishes to model them so, it is necessary for
whatever meta-concept is used from the modeling language to support the relevant parts
of that conceptualization. In this case, making it explicit that any instantiation of an
actor needs to be a single human being, and more specifically, a (in the given context)
autonomous human being, for instance when modeling social decision making processes
in an enterprise. If the produced model, however, is not explicit about these distinctions,
there can be a host of conceptually related, but invalid, instantiations (e.g., an employee
who needs permission for every action and can thus not be considered autonomous, a
department with multiple persons). Such problems can be prevented by either using a
modeling language that accommodates the necessary conceptual distinction, or by explic-
itly modeling such distinctions manually (e.g., by using unary constraints on the language
construct for each necessary semantic feature). However, being aware of the relevant and
necessary conceptual distinctions before the model creation process is often still lacking.
Thus, in order to ensure that a model can clearly and completely communicate its in-
tended meaning, regardless of who is interpreting it at what time, a certain degree of
conceptual alignment is needed. Specifically, an alignment between the conceptualiza-
tion the original modeler has of their meta-concepts (i.e., the types used by a modeling
language to represent the domain concepts) and the ‘official’, used, semantics of those
modeling concepts (i.e., the semantics as found in the specification of the used language)
makes it easier to ensure that the modeling language (or dialect thereof) which will be
used accommodates the needed conceptual distinctions. To do so it is thus necessary to
understand how the modelers (and stakeholders) involved in the modeling process under-
stand the meta-concepts. Such understandings can be of value to the modeling process
by e.g., providing model facilitators with input for the facilitation process (Rosemann
et al. 2011), or by providing explicits focus points for annotations in the model, and could
help enhance the quality of created models and improve consensus amongst stakehold-
ers (Stirna et al. 2007). Or, as Wieringa (2008) put it: “The meaning of a notation must
be appropriate for the intended use of the notation”.
In our context of conceptual modeling the difference between a concept and a meta-
concept is thus the level of abstraction and domain-specificity at which they are used,
concepts being those things specific to a domain (e.g., combinatorial rules set for pizza
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toppings to ensure flavors complement each other), whereas meta-concepts are the more
abstract, and general concepts used to reason about such concepts (i.e., the general notion
of restrictions). The conceptual understanding a person has of the meta-concept
restriction here thus likely affects the way they will reason about the concept of pizza
topping combinatorial rules, for instance by assuming that rules are typically of a
deontic nature and can be broken, even if they should not be.
1.4 Concepts
Before we continue discussing why two modelers can differ so significantly on their under-
standing of the same concept we should more clearly define what we understand under
the term ‘concept’, as even the field of conceptual modeling itself is often vague and leaves
implicit just what concepts are. There is a wealth of discussion on concepts, their na-
ture, whether they are useful in the first place, and why everybody (else) is wrong about
them (cf. Fodor 1998, Laurence and Margolis 1999, Rosch 1999). Given that we do need
to deal with them, whatever they are, we will take as a basis (fully understanding the
irony) a definition given arguing for the abolishment of concepts by Machery (2009):
“A concept of x is a body of knowledge about x that is stored in long-term
memory and that is used by default in the processes underlying most, if not
all, higher cognitive competencies when these processes result in judgments
about x.”
The concepts we have of things are thus strongly individual, being the main component
of the way we make category judgments (i.e., categorize and judge everything around us
from physical objects to the conceptual and the emotional). This strongly emphasizes
the human side, as the categorization is primarily influenced by the personal experiences
a person has in the world. The body of knowledge that we gather for each concept is
derived from our interactions in the real world, as Geeraerts (2010) put it that:
“. . . semantic memory for concepts is based on a subject’s memories of past
experiences with instances of those concepts.”
Such judgment processes are thus influenced by the personal experiences we have in the
world, and in their own turn again influence the judgment processes as they become
participatory in reality (Gabora et al. 2008). This re-iterates the need to study how
people understand the concepts in their models, as the different personal experiences that
each modeler and stakeholder had forms and shapes the way they will interpret it, subtly
or less so changing the meaning of its content for them.
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1.4.1 On the structure and representation of concepts
Fundamental to any means of measuring the conceptual understanding people have of
some particular concepts should be the question of the structure of those concepts. As we
are dealing with categorization by human beings, we do not adhere to the discrete struc-
ture used so much in computing science, but instead to a graded structure, exemplified
by the prototype or exemplar theory of concept structure (cf. Rosch 1973, Rosch et al.
1976, Ashby and Maddox 1993, Storms et al. 2000).
According to these theories, concepts are not simply judged in absolutes, but in a graded
way. A tomato is kind of a (good example of a) fruit, just like a particular instantiation of
some model is kind of a (good example of) that model. These are all judged in a graded
way, with some things simply being better than others. The main difference between
prototype and exemplar theory (less important to our efforts) has to do with the actual
cognitive process for the judgments: while for prototypes a particular thing in the world
is compared to an abstract, idealized set of features and information (the prototype),
while according the exemplar theory it is compared to exemplary (previously experienced)
instances of similar things. It is important to note that, regardless of whether one accepts
prototype or exemplar theory, the judgments made are of a graded nature. Thus, they
are not like the discrete in-or-out judgments so often used in computing science.
While most initial research into categorization and the theories derived thereof focused
on physical objects (e.g., tables, chairs, utensils), later research has extended this to
abstract concepts (e.g., the logical concept of if-then, love) and events (e.g., the act of
cutting something, the act of handing something to someone) and showed they are cate-
gorized distinctly as well (cf. Adelson 1985, Majid et al. 2004, Malt et al. 2008). Thus, it
should be clear that our concepts work on all these potential ‘things’, and thus also the
abstract notions that we often deal with in conceptual models (e.g., processes, values).
With this in mind we can study the personal semantics of common concepts in Enter-
prise Modeling notations without problem, physical objects (computers, human beings),
abstractions (computational objects, organizational departments) and events (processes,
transfers, exchanges) alike.
One final aspect that we would do well to keep in mind if we eventually attempt to
generalize any findings on the conceptual understanding people have of concepts is some-
thing that prototype theory research has eschewed so far according to Geeraerts (2010),
dealing with the distribution of knowledge that people have of concepts over linguistic
communities. As Geeraerts (2010) stated:
“. . . linguistic communities are not necessarily homogenous – semantic knowl-
edge may be unevenly distributed over the members of the speech community.
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Prototype-theoretical studies generally tend to ignore the question of whether
and to what extent the prototypical model of category structure might be
plausibly interpreted as involving social variation over individuals rather than
just psychological variations over contexts of use.”
Thus, if we measure the conceptual understanding modelers and stakeholders have of
the concepts in their models we should also keep in mind that it is quite likely these
conceptualizations are different from person to person, and the amount of information
in these conceptualizations (e.g., how detailed they are) can vary from person to person,
even in a related group of modelers.
1.4.2 Characterizing concepts through dimensions
As a last point, we need to treat the idea of ‘measuring’ concepts, given our desire to figure
out (likely measuring) how people understand the concepts in their models. We cannot
fully measure the experience a person has with a concept, as the information related to
such concepts available to a person is too wide and diverse to fully capture. The problem
of having to communicate about these concepts with some signs, often words is that,
as Malt et al. (2011) said:
“Words can help identify the conceptual space of a domain, but they do not
directly reveal bounded units of knowledge that can be labeled concepts”
Instead, the right approach is to characterize these understandings. A discriminatory
dimension can help us narrow down the conceptual space of something we are attempting
to characterize. Combinations of such dimensions narrow it down more and more until we
get to some useful characterization that is specific enough to say something useful about
how people interpret or experience the concept.
This approach is quite similar to arguing via connotations: say we wish to understand
someone’s concept of some fruit. We might provide them with words and ask to what
degree they find them to have a connotation with the fruit, like ‘yellow’, ‘is long and
curved’, ‘tastes sweet’, ‘does not taste good’, ‘is expensive’, ‘goes well with chili sin carne’.
All those different dimensions add something to our understanding of how that person
sees this fruit: the dimensions of ‘yellow’ and ‘is long and curved’ hinting at the structure
and composition (i.e., it likely being a banana), while dimensions like ‘tastes sweet’,
and perhaps disagreement with ‘does not taste good’ hinting at their subjective attitude
towards it (i.e., liking bananas or not). Oddly specific connotations like ‘goes well with
chili sin carne’, combined with other knowledge gained from the earlier dimensions (i.e.,
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knowing we are talking about bananas and the person likes it) could then even be used
to tell us something about the context of the person answering, and identify the utterer
of the phrase.
Back in the context of conceptual modeling and our research efforts, it thus becomes clear
that if we can find a number of dimensions for the concepts we wish to investigate then
we can characterize people’s understanding of them equally as well.
1.5 Research objectives
We have discussed the difficulty that enterprise modeling faces while attempting to in-
tegrate the different models describing different domains, while also ensuring that the
integrated model remains a valid representation of all the intended semantics. Moving
on, we can now more clearly describe what we want to contribute to this issue. It is not
our intention to stipulate some particular way of working, some way of integrating, or
to create a tool or language that will solve this “if only all involved people would use
it”. Too often research stipulates such solutions, without necessarily validating them in
practice (Wieringa and Heerkens 2006), let alone achieving any adoption by practice (cf.
Kaindl et al. 2002, Davies et al. 2006, Regev 2014). Our focus will be on understanding
the differences between modelers, particularly the different ways in which they understand
conceptual modeling meta-concepts. We will investigate these understandings to focus on
knowledge questions, which will help us achieve insights and generate data which can be
used to more clearly understand, and guide modeling processes, while not stipulating and
locking down every aspect of how those processes should be done.
1.5.1 Problem statement
Put briefly, the problem definition we work with is:
The creation of an a posteriori integrated conceptual model which describes
the different aspects of an enterprise is made more difficult by the different
interpretations people working within each aspect have, but not necessarily
explicate, of the meta-concepts (i.e., language constructs) they use to create
conceptual models.
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1.5.2 Research questions
To address the given problem and do so by achieving our objective of gaining a more fun-
damental insight into the conceptual understanding modelers have of conceptual modeling
meta-concepts, we will concretely treat the following research questions. In Section 2.1.1 a
more detailed exposition is given of the approaches to be used for the individual questions.
1. What are the meta-concepts (i.e., language constructs) shared between modeling
languages used in enterprise modeling?
2. What is the conceptual understanding that people have of these meta-concepts?
(a) To what extent do the categories for these meta-concepts more resemble a
graded or discrete structure (e.g., artifactual or natural)?
(b) To what extent do conceptual understandings differ on key points between
different people (e.g., different sets of features, typicality)?
3. Does a person’s conceptual understanding of a meta-concept change over time?
(a) If so, does training in particular languages or techniques affect these base con-
ceptual understandings?
4. To what extent do modeling languages allow for people to express their particular
conceptual understanding of meta-concepts?
(a) Do modeling languages make a distinction between explicitly or implicitly al-
lowing them to do so?
(b) Can particular (kinds of) conceptual understandings of certain meta-concepts
be used to infer which modeling language or notation is best suited for a specific
modeler?
5. Can particular (kinds of) conceptual understandings of certain meta-concepts be
attributed to a community (of discourse, practice, etc.)?
(a) Can this be used to predict a person’s typical conceptual understanding of a
meta-concept by finding their community membership?
1.5.3 Thesis contributions
By focusing on the research questions set out above, this dissertation contributes to the
fundamental understanding of how people conceptualize the meta-concepts they use dur-
ing conceptual modeling. Specifically, it gives insights into the different personal semantics
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people have in terms of how they make category judgments about them, attribute features
to them, and what they see them as. It furthermore shows how this information can be
used for practical benefits. Summarized, this thesis will make the following contributions:
• It derives a number of common meta-concepts shared between many modeling lan-
guages used in enterprise modeling.
• It demonstrates that the permissible understandings of these meta-concepts are
quite flexible (i.e., their category membership is judged in a graded way), thus mak-
ing the question of ‘is x a valid y’ a more difficult question to answer during model
integration, especially when compared with situations where (personal) semantics
are simply stipulated.
• It demonstrates feature sets which conceptual modelers (and those learning to
model) attribute to these meta-concepts. These (combinations of) features can
be used to identify how a meta-concept is typically seen, and what aspects are
particularly salient.
• It demonstrates the different kinds of conceptual understandings that people have of
the meta-concepts and how these understandings can affect the range of conceptually
valid (model) instantiations. Furthermore, it demonstrates the way in which these
understandings change over time, and how little correlation there seems to be with
educational stimuli such as the learning of a new (modeling) language or technique.
• It shows that some specific conceptual understandings people have of these meta-
concepts are not always accommodated by modeling languages, and can thus not
be modeled explicitly, even though they may be vital to understanding how these
people conceptualize the domain.
• It shows the common assumption held in practice that those who share certain
superficial professional similarities think alike about modeling language constructs
(i.e., the meta-concepts) cannot be easily backed up by empirical investigation of
the personal semantics of such people.
1.6 What has been done already?
It would do well to also have some understanding of recent and ongoing research efforts
that are practically related to our own investigations, and what has been done already by
others. While our focus is strongly centered around answering knowledge questions and
20 | Chapter 1: Introduction
finding insights into the way people understand conceptual models, other work focusing
on support (in the form of tools, formalizations, data structures, etc.) for capturing
such information exists to some degree. For example, there are proposals for ontology
formalizations that include the encoding of information about the typicality of a certain
entity, which is information that can be elicited from investigations like the ones we
perform. Furthermore, there is a strong link between our work and research efforts on
(conceptual) model(ing) quality, which we will discuss, and clearly explain to what aspects
of model quality our work might contribute.
Capturing personal semantics
Our research as reported here is centered around the need to understand how people
think about certain things (i.e., meta-concepts). In the field of ontology research, in
particular in applied ontology, this ties into the need for validity checking of created
ontologies. Such validity checking is done to ensure that the semantic content of integrated
models is consistent across individual models. In the field of ontology this is, for example,
done by comparing whether personal ontologies (e.g., based on data elicited in individual
interviews) are consistent with a shared ontology people have agreed on (cf. Almeida
2009). This is regardless of what expert opinion or official standards (e.g., ISO documents
or OMG specifications) stipulate what the ‘correct’ semantic content should be. Doing so
establishes a greater interoperability amongst all these models, which has been argued to
be one of the most important benefits of using ontology (Neuhaus et al. 2011). For such
efforts it is important that one can investigate and elicit detailed information about how
people think about and understand some specific entities in order to have an empirical
basis in which to ground for example these personal ontologies.
There have also been concrete efforts to create data structures and formalizations which
can capture information relevant to such personal ontologies. For example, Liao et al.
(2006) created a recommendation system for library purposes, which was based on corpus
analysis of reference material. It uses this information to build personal ontologies by ex-
tracting relevant details from borrowing records. While based on corpus analysis and not
specifically focused on capturing how people understand something, it does show a move
towards capturing more personal information. Other efforts started to include more de-
tails relevant to this, such as for instance the inclusion of a distance metric which captures
the semantic distance (or an approximiation thereof) between concepts in such personal
ontologies (Yang and Callan 2008). Other efforts allow people to create ontologies in a
more personal fashion by starting out from reference material and choosing data that fit
their interpretation of some domain (Katifori et al. 2008), the result of which is used to
support people in storing their personal preferences (Katifori et al. 2005). Personaliza-
What has been done already? | 21
tion of existing ontologies has received more attention subsequently, with work by (e.g.,
Aime´ et al. 2008; 2009) detailing their efforts of including a prototypicality gradient for
both the conceptual (i.e., the elements in the ontology) and lexical (i.e., the words used
for the elements) understanding people have of their domain. In order to capture this
information, they created a formal structure supporting such information, in this case an
implementation supporting different degrees of typicality. Other implementations of on-
tologies supporting the explicit modeling of prototypicality are for example those created
by Yeung and Leung (2006; 2010), which encode likeliness and typicality, and explicitly
deal with the different graded ways in which elements are valid examples of a particular
concept. Their implementation has subsequently been critiqued and extended by Cai and
Leung (2008), this time explicitly incorporating relationships to ensure one can reason
about and infer knowledge between concepts in the modeled ontology.
The main difference between our focus and this existing research on personal ontologies
is that they tend to focus on either a priori defining (formal) structures for such per-
sonal ontologies or using data mining (i.e., corpus analysis) techniques to acquire content.
Our focus however, is on the empirical study of the content one would capture in such
ontologies: the personal semantics people have of these captured things. The benefit of
having such existing formalizations out there already is that they can subsequently be
used to capture the potential different conceptual understandings and aspects related to
them (e.g., different categorization judgments, typicalities) that we will investigate. The
use of such formalizations does presume that it is known what the structure of particular
categories or concepts is, and what the individual differences for their members are. It
is necessary to have some quantification of the degree of difference between e.g., feature
typicality, or how similar individual members are to each other before encoding them with
these structures. If this information is not known, or worse, if it is not known whether
this information is particularly relevant (i.e., in the case of strongly discrete categories),
the use of such formalizations in a way that corresponds to the real way that people think
is much more difficult. Furthermore, we should be clear that these existing efforts are
often created with a general modeling focus, and not specifically targeted at supporting
enterprise modeling, or other forms of (a posteriori) model integration.
Model quality
While our work is not directly aimed at analyzing or improving the quality of models
or modeling languages, there are some strong links between ongoing research efforts and
the contributions we make. Model quality is a large topic, with many directions that
all receive attention, often doing so along the traditional lines of syntax, semantics, and
pragmatics (cf. Lindland et al. 1994). Such proposals are created in order to have a more
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systematic way of reasoning about model quality instead of just listing sets of desirable
properties for models. Extended work incorporating more semiotics-inspired lines such as
physical, empirical and social can be found in efforts like the FRISCO reports and (e.g.,
Krogstie et al. 1995). Nonetheless, there seems to be little agreement on which quality
framework (and thus way of looking at quality) is the best, as there is a large number
of different frameworks available, all using their own specific terminology, with their own
focus, resulting in a lack of adoption by practice and no truly standard ways of looking
at model quality (Moody 2005).
Regardless of a specific framework for determining model quality, our work ties in with
many of them as they often include pragmatic quality. Our focus on understanding how
people view the language constructs of the modeling languages they use is closely related
to this. In Lindland et al. (1994)’s original framework, model quality is evaluated by
comparing different sets of statements, which are the Model, Language, Domain, and
audience Interpretation. The audience interpretation refers to the statements that people
involved in the modeling process (e.g., modelers and stakeholders) view the model as
being composed of. Pragmatic quality is then given as the degree of correspondence
between model and audience interpretation, ensuring that a model is qualitatively good
when the audience interprets it as it is actually composed (e.g., the intended semantics
are the same as the captured semantics). Another aspect of quality found in multiple
frameworks, which is strongly related to our work is perceived semantic quality. Similar
to our focus on personal semantics, research such as (Poels et al. 2005) focuses on ensuring
perceived semantic quality of models by focusing on the way a model user perceives the
degree of correspondence between a model and the domain its represents. Krogstie et al.
(1995) defines the perceived semantic validity to have two aspects, namely the perceived
validity of a model and its perceived completeness.
In order to determine these aspects, it is important to understand how the people involved
in the modeling process view both the domain and the language they use to model it.
In order to ensure that people’s conceptualization of a domain is the same as the model
that was eventually produced, insights like those we aim to generate about the way that
people understand a modeling language’s construct can be of value. The way in which
they understand these language constructs constricts the amount of valid interpretations
(or instantiations) for a given model, which has a direct effect on whether the created
model can correctly represent the domain, and whether it can do so for all the elements
important to the involved people (i.e., ensure also the perceived completeness).
Recent work by Fettke et al. (2012) more explicitly explores the understandability of
models, which has received less attention as a goal on its own. Instead of stipulating
a framework or set of criteria that define what ‘quality’ is for a model, Fettke et al.
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(2012) look at it as something that is defined in discussions between the people involved
in the modeling process, focusing specifically on what understandability means to those
people. They propose to analyze such discussions for particular modeling sessions in
order to figure out which quality aspects are relevant for them. Doing so leads both to
a deeper understanding of what aspects are important for people involved in a specific
modeling effort, as well to the general insight that people (and projects) all have different
understandings of what comprehensibility means practically, as well as what the quality of
a model is. These research efforts thus also come to the same conclusion as our work: that
it is important to gain insights into how people think and conceptualize their domains.
The quality of the modeling languages we use to create models has also received attention,
e.g., in work by Moody (2010) on a general theory of analyzing model language notations.
This approach focuses strongly on the cognitive aspect, analyzing whether the visual sym-
bols used clearly convey their meaning, are not ambiguous, whether visual metaphors are
used, and so on. With this framework, multiple modeling languages have been analyzed
and critiqued (e.g., Moody and van Hillegersberg 2009, Moody et al. 2010). Our work
touches upon this as we also look at to what degree modeling languages accommodate
the explicit capturing of conceptual distinctions (i.e., different conceptual understand-
ings). If there is a semantically different understanding of a similar meta-concept, say the
language construct used to model acting elements in a particular language, it would do
well that they are represented by different visual elements. For example, distinguishing
between human and non-human actors by using stick puppet character metaphors for the
former. Our investigation into the plethora of different conceptual understanding people
have of modeling meta-concepts gives an overview of what such distinctions exist, and
thus provides valuable input for improving modeling languages in order to ensure their
visual notations is discriminative enough.
Other less directly related efforts are for example focusing on people’s individual differ-
ences using cognitive mapping techniques to ensure quality of conceptual modeling (Siau
and Tan 2005), which is in line with our desire to generate datasets which can be used to
more easily figure out how to make modelers communicate about their conceptual under-
standings. Much work exists that uses ontologies to ground existing modeling languages
in reference ontologies (cf. Fettke and Loos 2003, Anaya et al. 2007), although work such
as that of Clarke et al. (2013) also explores more the logical angle instead of ontological.
This focuses not only on ensuring that concepts in models map to a properly ontologically
grounded entity, but that the grammar of the modeling languages can properly represent
all those concepts and their relations.
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Understanding how people model
While we are focused on understanding the conceptualizations people have of the language
constructs they use to model, understanding just how they actually model is an important
aspect as well. Understanding the different ways people model and thus capture their
knowledge of some domain in a model helps in understanding what is captured in those
models, and how much (of the domain, of the modeler’s total knowledge) is captured.
There have been many studies into just what modeling is, most agreeing on it being some
form of abstraction of knowledge and the explicit representation of that knowledge in
some form (cf. Hoppenbrouwers et al. 2005). A particularly interesting work by Frederiks
and van der Weide (2006) included a detailed analysis of the competencies required of
people involved in the modeling process, and for what those competencies are necessary.
According to them, success of a modeling effort has to do with how well domain ex-
perts provide descriptions of the domain, and validate (paraphrased) descriptions thereof,
and how well analysts afterwards map discussions onto concepts of models and evalu-
ate validations of these models. One of the more poignant points related to our work
is the neccesity that “. . . analysts can handle implicit knowledge”. While the elicitation
of knowledge is based on collecting significant information from the application domain,
verbalizing it in a common language shared and understood by those involved, and then
validating it, not all information is necessarily extracted. Thus, it is important to stay
aware, and deal with potential consequences of such implicit knowledge. Our work and its
contributions can be useful here, as the methods we use to elicit personal understandings
can be used to make such implicit knowledge explicit. In other cases, particular concep-
tual understandings that have been found to be problematic for modeling sessions (e.g.,
people often having different, disagreeing understandings of what constitutes a concept
like restriction) can guide a modeler or facilitator to steer discussions and ensure that
all the potentially problematic areas have been thoroughly discussed and explored. In
doing so, less knowledge is hopefully left implicit.
Other recent studies by e.g., Wilmont et al. (2010; 2013) were aimed at gaining more
insight into the different cognitive styles people have while modeling. They focused specif-
ically on understanding the different ways in which people abstract information to more
general forms (Wilmont et al. 2012), and the different innate skills people have for such
abstraction based modeling. This work is especially useful given the specific nature of
abstraction in computer science, which is focused on hiding information instead of ig-
noring it (Colburn and Shute 2007). In turn, then, adapting modeling methods to more
closely fit to how people realistically model has been attempted in some cases, such as
for example with exemplary process modeling, where models are created based on best
examples of processes instead of their abstract representations (Hofer 2011).
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1.7 Thesis structure
Chapter 2 discusses the research approach we take in this work, and gives an overview
of the different empirical methods that will be employed. In Chapter 3 we introduce the
main meta-concepts and dimensions that will be used for studying the personal semantics
people have. It gives an overview of the derivation of these meta-concepts and dimensions
from an analysis of existing modeling languages and discusses the choices made therein.
The following couple of chapters then use these meta-concepts and dimensions to study
in a more fundamental way the personal semantics people have of them. Chapter 4 uses
the meta-concepts and the modeling terminology used for them as input for a category
structure study, in which we determine whether membership judgments made for these
meta-concepts are of a graded or discrete nature. A more detailed overview of the exact
terminology that received many graded judgments is shown, and the implications on con-
ceptual validity of models containing meta-concepts typically receiving graded judgments
is discussed. Chapter 5 continues with the fundamental work by showing the results from
a feature listing study and discussing the features most typical for the meta-concepts. It
goes into the different kinds of features we elicited, and how (combinations of) these fea-
tures provide ways of identifying what the meta-concept is for someone. Chapter 6 finally
showcases two empirical studies into the conceptual understanding of both enterprise
modeling practitioners, and computing and information systems students. The typical
way in which they understand the meta-concepts is discussed in detail, practitioners are
contrasted to students, and effects of the particular understanding that people have on
the conceptual validity of a model is discussed.
This is followed by a more practical part of this thesis. Chapter 7 uses the meta-concepts
and dimensions to analyze what combinations of meta-concept and dimensions are (not)
accommodated in existing conceptual modeling languages used for modeling (different
aspects of) enterprises. The implications of the lack of such accommodation, or languages
implicitly encoding information in a specific way are discussed, and further implications
on the way we choose languages, and actually model are reflected upon. Chapter 8
touches on the need for generalization by showing a study attempting to verify whether
it is feasible to assume that people grouped together for some modeling effort based on
superficial professional properties (e.g., similar backgrounds, shared knowledge of specific
languages) will display similar personal semantics. We discuss the difficulty of properly
identifying groups of people as having such personal semantics.
Finally, in Chapter 9 we conclude this thesis by reflecting on all the individual research
questions and summarizing their answers. Implications for research and practice are
discussed, and options for further research are explored.

CHAPTER 2
Research Methods
28 | Chapter 2: Research Methods
Abstract. In this chapter we outline the research approach we have used in the course of
this thesis. We state our focus on investigating knowledge questions and performing re-
search that aids in the creation of explanatory theories. For each of the research questions
we detail how we will answer them, and elaborate on to what degree (and in which order)
this should be, and actually was, done. Finally, we detail the empirical methods that
will be used for the empirical studies eliciting the different kinds of data (categorization
judgments, feature structure, and conceptual understandings).
The content of this chapter is based on work published as:
Dirk van der Linden, Stijn J.B.A. Hoppenbrouwers, Alina Lartseva, Wolfgang Mol-
nar: Beyond Terminologies: Using Psychometrics to Validate Shared Ontologies.
In: Applied Ontology, vol.7, no.4, pp. 471-487, 2012
Dirk van der Linden and Henderik A. Proper: Category Structure of Language Types
Common to Conceptual Modeling Languages. In: I. Bider et al. (Eds.): BPMDS
2014 and EMMSAD 2014, LNBIP 175, pp. 317–331. Springer, Heidelberg, 2014
Dirk van der Linden and Marc van Zee: On the Semantic Feature Structure of Mod-
eling Concepts: An Empirical Study. In: IEEE 16th Conference on Business
Informatics (CBI), vol. 2, pp. 158–165. IEEE, 2014
2.1 Research approach
As our focus is predominantly on answering knowledge questions (thus working towards
explanatory theories in terms of Gregor (2006)’s classification of IS theories), we wish to
measure and present data on how people differ in their personal semantics as objectively
as possible. This is particularly necessary as the datasets generated by such studies can,
and should be used by other researchers to both compare our findings and run further
analyses for other research interests. Thus, the results should be as free as possible from
interpretation from our side. Furthermore, we would like to attempt a generalization of
findings, and have enough data to be able to compare people to each other, so that we
can give pointers to trends or particularly typical ways people interpret meta-concepts.
For this reason we will eschew more interpretive approaches that work with the people
themselves and understand why they do the things they do. Instead we will adopt a
Research approach | 29
positivist approach, using traditionally dominant research methods like survey design
and laboratory experiments (whether innate or adopted from other fields). This is quite
common in the field of Information Systems, as it is becoming more and more interested
in obtaining scientific knowledge in real world settings (Chen and Hirschheim 2004). We
are thus, in terms of Chen and Hirschheim (2004)’s study and classification of IS research
focused on deductive, hypothetical reasoning and generalization, while using empirical
(often quantitative) methods, both of a longitudinal and cross-sectional nature depending
on the individual study’s requirements.
2.1.1 How to answer the research questions
Focus-wise there are two main parts to our work. Both of these parts have a number of
related research questions (as set out in Section 1.5.2), which will be answered through
various studies, utilizing different methods. They are:
1. the fundamental part, in which we determine the basic meta-concepts to investigate,
and perform the empirical studies aimed at characterizing their conceptual structure;
and
2. the practical part, in which we use the prior findings and their explanations in
order to strengthen the theoretical backing of more practical aspects (i.e., modeling
language selection, education of modelers).
For the fundamental part, the following questions will be investigated.
What are the meta-concepts shared between modeling languages used in enterprise mod-
eling? This research question will be answered by the analysis of a number of modeling
languages and methods used for different aspects of enterprise models, resulting in a list
of categorized constructs and dimensions on which they differ between different languages
and methods.
To what extent do the categories for these meta-concepts more resemble a graded or dis-
crete structure? After having found out just what meta-concepts there are, research
question 2a will be answered through a term categorization study performed among prac-
titioners and students. The method used here is detailed in Section 2.2.1.
What is the conceptual understanding that people have of these meta-concepts? For the
research questions to do with the (measurement of) the conceptual understanding people
have of the meta-concepts, there are multiple things to investigate. These will be an-
swered by a combination of longitudinal and cross-sectional studies employing semantic
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differentials, which are created based on the result of the analysis of modeling languages
and methods for the first research question. The semantic differential we use for this is
elaborated in more detail in Section 2.2.3.
To what extent do conceptual understandings differ on key points between different peo-
ple?, Does a person’s conceptual understanding of a meta-concept change over time? and
If so, does training in particular languages or techniques affect these base conceptual un-
derstandings? These questions will be answered with a cross-section and longitudinal
study, analysis of the data and comparison of datasets. Furthermore, a study into the
feature structure of the meta-concepts will be performed, which adds to the ability to
reason about the different ways people perceive the meta-concepts. The background of
this feature elicitation is elaborated in Section 2.2.2.
The practical part is concerned with the final two research questions.
Do modeling languages allow for people to express their particular conceptual understand-
ing of meta-concepts? and related subquestions (see Section 1.5.2). In order to answer
this question we will use the data resulting from the modeling language analysis per-
formed for research question 1, and the data from the semantic differential studies in
order to perform a targeted analysis of what meta-concept and dimension combinations
are supported, both implicitly and explicitly in the specification of a modeling language’s
semantics.
Can conceptual understandings be attributed to a community? and related subquestions
(see Section 1.5.2). This final research question will be answered by further data analysis
performed on the results from the semantic differential studies used for the earlier research
questions. It will use clustering and component analysis in order to investigate similarities
between the semantic differential results, cluster similar results, and then compare the
found clusters to real-world properties of the people that were clustered.
The research this dissertation is based on aims to investigate knowledge questions in order
to understand phenomena. Thus, the potential act of implementation (e.g., development
of methods, tool support) is out of our scope. We will, however, use the data in order
to generate insights into the way of working, and thinking, and in doing so reflect on the
knowledge and synthesize it into useful insights. Implementation will remain out of the
scope as it requires a significant effort on the validation of tool development that does
not fit with the timeframe set for our approach.
2.1.2 Order
Certain research questions should logically be investigated before other angles are pursued.
For example, investigating the feature structure of these meta-concepts, and attempting to
Research approach | 31
determine their ranked structure hinges on the assumption that the category structure of
such a meta-concept is of a graded nature. Thus, investigating whether the meta-concepts
are of a graded or discrete nature should be done first. The order we have practically
performed the different studies in is shown in Fig. 2.1. As can be seen, we were not
always able to have a strict hierarchical order of studies, as depending on the availability
of participants, data, and time constraints, many studies were run concurrently.
Derive meta-concepts 
and dimensions
Investigate external 
category structure
Investigate students’ 
conceptual understanding
Investigate practitioners’ 
conceptual understanding
Elicit features of meta-
concepts
Study change 
over time
Correlated 
with stimuli?
Infer training 
effects
Cluster 
identification
Study feature 
ranking
Study 
differences
Usable to 
predict?
Study accommodation 
of conceptual 
understandings
yes
Infer best 
suited 
languages
yes
nono
Reject Reject
Figure 2.1: The structure of the research reported on in this dissertation.
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2.2 Empirical methods
In order for the way we gather our data to have a basis in well grounded research, and
to avoid the need to invent methods on the fly, we will use existing empirical methods
from other fields (e.g., psychology, linguistics) and their related theories for our empirical
work.
2.2.1 Category structure
Investigating the different ways in which people categorize everything from physical ob-
jects to events to emotions has been around for a long time. Such experiments reveal
information about the category structure, specifically the occurrence or absence of graded
category judgments.
The basic way of measuring category structure in terms of discrete or graded category
judgments goes back to Barr and Caplan (1987). They used a numerical scale (1–7, with 1
meaning non-member, and 7 meaning full member) in order to investigate to what degree
certain terms were considered to be members of a given category, and performed this for
a large amount of basic categories (e.g., fruits, tools, vehicles) and terms. In their data
analysis they assumed that responses that were neither 1 or 7 implied a graded category
judgment (i.e., assuming x is graded if 1 < x < 7). One can then also infer relative
gradedness, or positioning of members by looking at the exact scores, comparing how
far away from either negative or positive pole they are. From the many categories (Barr
and Caplan 1987) investigated they found differences in the amount of graded, or partial
member category judgments, with artifactual categories (i.e., categories reflecting non-
natural, man-made ‘things’ such as tools or vehicles) displaying a higher proportion than
natural categories.
Many studies followed using this approach, (e.g., Diesendruck and Gelman 1999, Kalish
1995). Most recently, Estes (2003) proposed an adaptation of Barr and Caplan (1987)’s
method, making the measurement of graded category judgments more explicit. Their
reasoning was to do away with the numerical scoring, and instead simply ask participants
whether a certain term was to be considered as a full, partial or non-member (with the
meaning of each of these options explained to participants beforehand). They also intro-
duced other methods for testing gradedness which involve eliciting category judgments
for two items presented at the same time, which were found to effectively show graded
effects for specific categories (e.g., by showing two slightly dissimilar items like ‘tomato’
and ‘apple’ and enquiring at the same time what their membership status of the category
fruit is). All these experiments had in common that artifactual categories elicited more
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graded category judgments than discrete categories. Uncertainty (or certainty for that
matter) about membership status has also been investigated. For example Estes (2004)
showed that the uncertainty hypothesis of people simply not knowing what some things
were leading to more graded judgments was not necessarily correct. In their findings, one
cannot infer that uncertainy necessarily leads to graded judgments. Thus, the individual
level of expertise with the different terms originating from modeling languages should not
affect the outcome of the category structure itself.
Other studies have also criticized the focus on only the natural and artifactual category
dichotomy, reasoning that, for example, categories for emotional states are categorized
distinctly, and can be differentiated from the others by their relative amount of graded and
discrete category judgments (Altarriba and Bauer 2004). As a result, it can be concluded
that investigating the category structure of categories that have not yet been classified
before leads to potentially useful insight into the way these categories are experienced.
Procedure
We adopt the most recent procedure as used by Estes (cf. Estes 2003; 2004) in their
studies. The steps to take for a typical investigation are explained below.
Select target categories. The first step is to decide which categories to investigate.
For our focus this will be the meta-concepts investigated in the dissertation. One
should keep in mind the width of the categories themselves, and how specific the
investigation should be. For example, one could, in order of specificity, investigate
furniture, or indoor furniture or wooden indoor furniture.
Select target items. Second, it is necessary to select the terms for which the category
judgments will be elicited. Depending on the nature of the experiment, one could
attempt to find a balance of potential full, partial, and non-members (i.e., if the
goal is to compare category structure between multiple categories). If the goal is to
investigate the structure of a particular category, for which the category judgment
status is not yet known, it is effective to select a large sample of terms related to the
category. For modeling language constructs like the meta-concepts we investigate
one can thus select all the terms used by modeling languages for different concepts
(e.g., when investigating the category actor, selecting terms like ‘market segment’,
‘actor’, ‘business role’, ‘department’).
Present benchmark. Before presenting the actual items to be investigated, it can be
useful to include a benchmark for some categories of which the general distribution
34 | Chapter 2: Research Methods
of partial and non-partial members are known. From existing datasets a selection
of 5 full members, 5 partial members and 5 non members can be taken. For these
items the participants are then asked to answer whether each item is a full, partial
or non-member of the benchmark category. Beforehand it is explained that a full
member means that the item definitely belongs to the category, partial member that
it does, but only to a certain degree, and that non-member means that it does not
belong to the target category. These benchmark results are useful later to compare
and contrast a participant’s results with known data in order to see if their category
judgments are as expected – because if they are radically different, interpreting the
actual investigated items should be done with (more) care.
Present items. The actual items that are to be investigated can now be presented to-
gether with their target categories. A list of items can be presented for a category
(e.g., 20 items are shown for the category furniture, followed by 20 items for the
category fruits), and participants are asked for each item to respond whether they
are full, partial or non-members, in the same way as during the benchmark. The
order of both the terms and the categories that are investigated can be randomized
here in order to prevent effects from bias or fatigue, and to make it easier to check for
potential non-serious responses by finding unlikely long strings of repeating similar
answers.
Process results. Depending on the way the target items have been selected, it can be
difficult to make conclusive judgments about the category structure. Comparing
the relative amount of full, partial and non-member responses to benchmark cate-
gories for which the average distribution of these responses is known is a good way,
but cannot be used as effectively if terms were selected as seemingly random (for
example, in our case of taking modeling language terms from specifications). This
is because the distribution of potential graded and discrete judgments can be in-
herently different because, for example, the input data contained almost only terms
that would be judged as discrete. Thus, it also becomes necessary to look at the
terms and their scores in context. With modeling terms here it is for example a
good approach to look at how common the terms are and how often they are used
in different modeling languages. If the terms that are deemed partial members in an
experiment are used by many languages, and thus occur many times, it is a strong
hint of a significant gradedness effect taking place.
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Example
Say that we wish to investigate a category relevant to conceptual modeling: service.
We first select two benchmark categories for which we know one is typically discrete (a
natural category, fruit), and one typically graded (an artifactual one, tools).
First the benchmark was executed. Its results are as expected, with the investigated terms
for fruit readily being judged in a discrete fashion: bananas and pineapples definitely being
fruit, and tomato being one of the few contended partial members. The results for the tool
category were as expected, with items like hammer, screwdriver and the like consistently
being judged as full members, and the category itself displaying a much higher amount of
partial member judgments (let us assume some not entirely unfounded possibilities: both
‘gun’ and ‘pen’ being considered partial members here). After crunching the numbers,
we find percentages for the amount of full, partial and non-members for both benchmark
categories, say, 9% for the fruit category, and 28% for the tool category.
Finally, for the actual target category we simply have a list of terms that people have
used over the years in presentations, talks, and papers (ranging from the obvious like
‘service’ and ‘service something ’, to the less obvious like ‘fragment’). After processing
the results from this category we find some interesting terms that are considered partial
members, some non-members, and so on. We calculate a certain proportion, say 19%
of partial member responses for the service category. This in itself is not enough to
effectively conclude whether this category is of a graded or discrete nature – although
we can conclude it tends towards the investigated artifactual benchmark category, and
thus hints towards also being of a graded nature. The real contribution here is that
certain terms, say ‘fragment’ and others were considered partial members by nearly all
of the participants. Given that this term is used often in the context of services, we
conclude that there is definitely some graded effect happening in this category, and more
importantly, that some of the core terminology is of a graded, multi-interpretable nature.
Limitations of the method and its results
With this procedure, the items’ membership status of a given target category is inves-
tigated out of their usual context (of use). This can have some effect on the actual
judgments, as terms can be used in different ways, having different meanings. Nonethe-
less, the base understanding that people have of the terms will likely be the leading factor
for their judgments. More important to keep in mind are the potential differences orig-
inating from a participant’s cultural and social background, as these can lead to wholly
different kinds of category judgments. For example, while in the Netherlands the term
‘bicycle’ can readily be expected to be a full member of the vehicles to go to work
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with category, one would not necessarily expect the same results while performing the
same study in the United States. Such differences can at times be found in existing
datasets, as they are necessarily reflective of both their era, and culture. The differences
between groups can be used to a study’s advantage though, as one can use this method
to investigate the different ways in which groups find particular items to be discrete or
graded members of a target category, which can be used to determine which terminology
might lead to communication breakdowns if these groups are to meet and discuss. As
noted in the description of the procedure, depending on the selection of the items it can
be more difficult to conclusively determine the exact structure of a given category. This
is especially when larger sets of items are taken from sources without processing them in
balanced sets of potential full, partial and non-members. However, the more important
finding of which terms themselves are considered graded can still be concluded in a valid
way – which for conceptual modeling already leads to useful insights as it can be used to
focus on particular terms which likely have multiple interpretations.
2.2.2 Feature listing
Feature listing is a way of attempting to characterize the conceptualization people have of
some particular thing. It has been used in psychological research a long time (e.g., Rosch
et al. 1976, Rosch and Mervis 1975), and the task of feature listing is understood to be
dependent on the conceptual information people have about the item (Smith 1978). At
times it is also referred to as property generation (e.g., Wu and Barsalou 2009). However,
this can be confusing in some situations as the elicited features (or properties) are, from an
ontological point of view, not always what one intuitively understands as being a property
(e.g., some functional aspects, like how a particular item is used).
Feature listing has been found to characterize the conceptualization someone has of some
investigated thing because it reveals information from two cognitive processes: (1) word
association, and (2) situated simulation (Santos et al. 2011). The word association thus
operates on information related to the linguistic system and information in the brain,
while the situated simulation system operates on memory of events in which those things
took place. Chaffin (1997) has also found that when people are familiar with the items that
they are listing features for, features will be more likely produced based on events (i.e.,
their actual experiences with the thing – the situated simulation). For unfamiliar things
the produced features seem to be more based on someone’s definitional understanding of
the thing (i.e., their linguistic knowledge – the word association).
Given that what we wish to achieve is the elicitation of data that helps us understand
how people think about certain concepts in terms of their features, such elicitation studies
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are likely to yield useful data. Several studies have been undertaken on such premises
alone already – that insights into the feature structure of concepts in itself can be useful
for both research and practice (e.g., McRae et al. 2005). These elicited sets of featurs are
useful because they also serve as a delimiter of what things are to people. Combinations
of different features someone lists effectively reduce the potential instantiation space for
a concept, so that it can be more easily understood what particulars (i.e., instantiations)
they likely think of.
Nonetheless, it should be understood that such studies are temporal snapshots of some-
one’s understanding of some thing, and that they are not necessarily stable. Over time,
as people learn and find new insights the features they attribute, and their typicality to
some thing might change. Gaillard et al. (2011) showed as well that the stability of such
features furthermore depends on the nature of the concept – for some kinds of concepts
the same conserved features are likely to be elicited time and time again, while for other
concepts potentially each feature listing task might generate new data.
Procedure
We follow the basic procedure that other feature elicitation studies use. The three main
steps and their considerations are explained below.
Select items. The selection of the things to be investigated beforehand is quite simple,
as it comes down to choosing a particular concept, and then deciding on a logical
lexical reference for it (e.g., ‘actor’ for the concept actor). In order to ensure that
participants are primed to the correct context (in our case, conceptual modeling),
a short description which does not overly bias participants can be useful to have
alongside them, in this case for example a description like ‘an actor is some kind of
thing that does something’.
Present items. For all of the items to be investigated, participants should be given the
simple question of writing down any and all features or properties they associate
with that item. Beforehand, an example can be given of different kinds of features
to attempt to prevent a bias e.g., only structural or functional features. For exam-
ple, when we use the example chair, we can show participants potential features
of a functional nature (‘used to sit on’, ‘can put stuff on it’), structural (‘has four
legs’, ‘made of wood’) or other natures like taxonomic classification (‘is a kind of
furniture’). In order to focus the features that are elicited, either a time restriction
can be put in place or we can ask only for the n most typical features, so that partic-
ipants are forced to give a specific amount and make a decision between those which
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are particularly salient for them and those that are less so. During the presentation
of the items, care should be taken not to have items followed by semantically close
items (e.g., eliciting features for ‘hard goal’ directly after ‘soft goal’), as this can
introduce unintended overlap between the elicited features.
Process results. The resulting elicited features generally have to be processed in at least
two stages: translation and normalization. Where applicable, the results should be
translated to a single language used for presentation of the results (commonly En-
glish). The elicitation of features in multiple languages can be useful in certain
situations where participants have different first languages, as allowing them to
generate features in their own language avoids potential issues like limited vocab-
ularies, or unintended wrong selection of terms. Finally, for the normalization it
becomes necessary to analyze the form of the words (e.g., collapse singular and
plural versions of the same term) and potential homonyms in order to reduce the
amount of redundancy. Afterwards, they can be classified according to further de-
tails, for example their modality (e.g., whether of an alethic or deontic nature),
or their associated dimensions (e.g., whether of a sensory, taxonomic, or structural
nature).
Example
As an example, assume that we are asking people to elicit their top 5 of the most typical
features for the concept goal. The pre-processed result can include many terms, like ‘has
a time’, ‘is defined by someone’, ‘has name’, ‘has a name’, ‘has a label’, ‘has a type’, ‘has a
relationship with a subgoal’, ‘becomes an evaluation criteria for future accomplishments’,
‘may be quantifiable’, ‘can be refined into a subgoal’, ‘is based on an objective’.
Certain terms clearly mean the same and can be collapsed, for example ‘has name’ and ‘has
a name’ meaning the same. For some other features it is less clear cut whether they mean
the same and should be collapsed into the same feature, like ‘has a label’. Analyzing the
kind of features in this list one sees some deontic aspects, a temporal feature, but primarily
alethic and structural features. Thus, the first conclusion we could draw from this is that
goals are apparently identified primarily in terms of their structural features. The actual
features themselves, especially the repeated ones elicited from multiple participants then
helps us to delimit what potential instantiations (or, particulars) the concept collapse
to. For example, if the ‘is based on an objective’ feature is shared between almost all
participants, we can reason that they see goals as traditional hard goals, and that as
a result, soft goals where the satisfaction criteria is not known are not a typical goal
for them. Further investigations can then be performed with the elicited and processed
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features in order to investigate their typicality in more detail, for example by executing a
survey in which participants are now asked to rate on a numerical scale how typical the
elicited features are for the target item. With such data clusters of features with similar
typicalities could be found and used to reconstruct the most typical instantiations of what
goals are to the participants.
Limitations of the method and its results
The primary thing to keep in mind while applying this method (and analyzing its results)
is the potential for (introducing) unwanted contextual bias. It is necessary to prime the
participants at least in some degree to the actual concept to be investigated – one does not
want a participant to think of their favorite Hollywood actor when they are expected to
elicit features for an actor in the context of conceptual modeling – but this priming should
avoid introducing too much context. Short descriptions of the items that are investigated
can be used to put participants on the right track conceptually, while avoiding introducing
too much specificity or bias.
Finally, the results should not be taken as being a full measurement of someone’s con-
ceptualization of the investigated item, but as a (carefully constructed) characterization
thereof. Likely not all aspects of the conceptualization are captured just by the feature
listing, just as not all aspects of their conceptualization will be captured by other methods
like the semantic differential explained below. Instead, the results from different meth-
ods together should be taken and looked at in a holistic way in order to paint the most
accurate picture of the conceptualization that participants have of the investigated items.
2.2.3 Semantic differential
The Semantic Differential (Osgood et al. 1957) was conceived as a method to measure
meaning through connotation with the dimensions of evaluative, potency and activity. It
can be extended to any describable dimension. The test itself works by semantic asso-
ciation and is based on indirect questioning, i.e., using adjectives that are synonyms to
the dimension under investigation. For instance, if we want to know whether a certain
resource mentioned in a model is an artificially created one (e.g., money) or some-
thing naturally occurring (e.g., daylight) we have to figure out which adjectives carry the
connotative meaning we want to investigate. Here we can use “natural” with its conno-
tative meaning of something that is caused by nature, not by humankind. If we then ask
someone whether a resource is “natural” or not, the connotative meaning carries over
and we can deduce whether they find a resource to be something caused by nature or
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humankind. When this is done with multiple sets of adjectives (“natural – unnatural”,
“cultivated – uncultivated”, etc.) for the same dimension we can create a significant claim
about the understanding a person has of that category for that dimension.
Which dimensions to investigate can be decided upon in several ways. One can find
inspiration from practical, real-world scenarios (e.g., observing conceptual modelers and
seeing if disagreements about certain topics arise more than others), semantic differences
in the methods and languages that people use (e.g., analyzing and comparing specifica-
tions of modeling languages to find differences) or directly eliciting the dimensions from
participants themselves. This last scenario is quite useful if no problematic dimensions
are known yet and one thus needs to figure out what exactly to investigate with the differ-
ential. In such exploratory cases the Repertory Grid technique is a useful complementary
approach (Tan and Hunter 2002) to elicit such dimensions without biasing the partici-
pants towards a certain outcome by asking participants what constructs (comparable to
dimensions in our work) they would use to describe a given concept (cf. its use as a
tool for exploratory research in information systems research (Tan and Hunter 2002)).
These constructs could then be used as input for the investigation by semantic differen-
tial. However, the downside to this approach is that if the participants do not provide
enough shared constructs, there would be very few dimensions to investigate, making a
systematic and targeted study a difficult endeavor.
The semantic differential is not a mere word game with no basis in reality, as can be seen
in research that reveals these same structures in the subconscious semantic connections in
the brain, cf. Luria and Vinogradova (1959; 1971). Because of its flexibility, which allows
it to be used for any category and dimension, it is well documented and widespread in
research. As such there are many well documented quality criteria that can be taken into
consideration while constructing the test (Verhagen and Meents 2007, Garland 1990).
Furthermore, it has been shown to be reliable and to stand up to test-retest validity
considerations (Peter 1979, Di Vesta and Dick 1966).
Procedure
There are a number of steps to take in order to construct a differential that can be used
to investigate personal semantics, as follows:
Determining the target subjects. The people targeted by the differential, i.e., those
whose personal ontology we wish to work on, should ideally share a roughly similar
cultural background and most importantly, the same mother tongue (first language,
or L1). While differences from person to person should be expected, significant
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discrepancies need not be a problem, as the test works on an individual level, and
communities or groups can be defined after the test, based on the results.
Determining the categories. The categories to be investigated can be general or spe-
cific. It is equally possible to investigate a category like ‘resource’ as it is to
investigate ‘resources that are bad for the environment’. In general,
broader categories are a better starting point if little is already known about the
individual categorization, as these more detailed categories can be found through
the results of the initial test.
Determining the semantic primes. In order to make sure each subject fills out the
test according to their typical understanding of the category it is necessary to prime
them to that understanding (i.e., set the context). This is done by offering a list of
words that are often used for the entire range of the category. When investigating
modeling languages one can use the words or names of the language constructs from
specific notations, such as ‘player’, ‘hardware’, ‘organizational unit’ for the category
actor. During the test, the subject should be asked to select no more than 2 or
3 words from this list to describe what they would typically use to refer to that
category.
Determining the dimensions. The dimensions are the actual distinctions we want to
investigate. For instance, if we wish to know whether someone considers resources
to be typically physical things (e.g., hardware, dollar bills) or non-physical things
(e.g., software, meaning) we determine the dimension to be physical. A pragmatic
approach to determining interesting dimensions is to find conflicting use of the same
words, be it from practical origins (i.e., anecdotes of problems that arose in a project)
or theoretical (i.e., semantic analysis of modeling language specifications).
Determining the initial set of adjectives. The adjectives are the indirect measure-
ments of a dimension through connotative meaning. These correspond to the con-
ceptualizations of the target subjects, and can be initially gathered from automated
thesaurus searches and then refined by testing and asking for feedback from the
subjects.
Piloting the Differential. A pilot implementation of the differential with more than
the necessary amount of adjectives should be done with a (significant) sample of the
test population. This helps establish the general polarities of the adjectives, and
can be used to choose those that result in the strongest reactions. Testing should
be done that verifies these results are as non-random and non-neutral in order to
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establish the final set of adjectives. Finally, via interviews or polling it should be
tested that the adjectives actually reflect the desired conceptualizations.
Finalizing the Differential. A set of five or more adjectives per category should be
selected based on their polarities in order to ensure a significant representation of
the dimension (Verhagen and Meents 2007). In the test itself the order of categories
investigated, and the order of adjectives should be randomized in order to prevent
contextual contamination. A Likert scale is used to assess how much a subject
agrees with an adjective. Labels could for instance be ‘very much like’, ‘somewhat
like’, ‘neutral’, ‘not much like’, ‘not at all like’ (in the used language of the test) to
enhance the understanding of what the scores mean. The actual differential can then
be constructed, where for each category first the priming task is given, followed by
the adjectives on for instance a 5 point scale. See Figure 2.2 for a graphical example
of a possible implementation.
Process results The results for each category can be numerically represented and sep-
arately processed. The labels ‘very much like’ to ‘not at all like’ are given a score
of 2 to −2, both extremes representing either complete agreement or disagreement
on how applicable the dimension is. For example, a score of 2 for the dimension
‘human’ in the category actor means the person strongly agrees that an actor is
a human thing, while a score of −2 would be complete agreement that it is not a
human thing. Neutral scores (e.g., −2 < x < 2)) can then be interpreted either as
the subject having no opinion on the specific category (i.e., no familiarity), or that
the combination of category/dimension is an unusual (i.e., irrelevant) one, where for
both cases it may or may not be human. For instance some groups of people think
the property of being human has little to do with rules. The median of the indi-
vidual adjective scores for a dimension is calculated to represent the score for that
category-dimension combination. The standard deviation can then be calculated in
order to figure out cluster coherence.
Example
The results of a pilot study performed early on in the course of this dissertation are
discussed here as an example of the method. Figure 2.3 most clearly shows a strong
tendency of this group of students to associate many categories with being necessary
and intentional but not vague. With the exception of goal, most categories received
neutral (or irrelevant) results to the natural dimension. Most interesting is the strong
individual deviation visible for the material dimension, where it is clear that the test
subjects diverged in their opinion on certain categories. In general the large deviations
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from the median show clearly that the subjects we investigated cannot be considered a
homogeneous group, even though they share most common attributes such as age group,
gender and academic stage and focus. This demonstrates the danger of a priori definition
of groups one may expect to share similar meanings. It seems safer to decide what groups
exist on the basis of actual data.
Figure 2.2: Example of the semantic differential (in Dutch) as we implemented it for our
investigation. For each category we asked which words the subject associated most with that
category. After answering they were presented with a list of bipolar adjectives (e.g., necessary –
not necessary, whole – part) for which they had to answer to what degree the adjective applies
to the category.
Figure 2.4 shows four individual categorization patterns for event. At first glance there is
less immediate agreement between these subjects, but some clusters for some dimensions
can be seen. Most interesting is the strong divergence that can be seen between two
subjects for their understanding of the dimensions composed, necessary and intentional.
While the former subject sees an event as being a composed, necessary and intentional
thing, the latter sees it as being non-composed, non-necessary and non-intentional. The
former interpretation could be that of someone who sees events as things we cause and
for instance includes their consequence in their scope as well. The latter subject sees
them perhaps more as things that just happen, regardless of what we do. From these
incompatible understandings it should be clear that models produced by these subjects
should thus be carefully compared in the likely case that they include any event-type
constructs.
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Figure 2.3: Visualization of the semantic differential results from an early pilot study. Shown
is the median and standard deviation for each category-dimension combination grouped per
dimension. To illustrate, the first cluster of bars shows in what respect all the categories
(actor,. . . ,state) are considered natural things, followed by the next cluster that shows in
what respect the categories are human things and so on. The higher a score (and thus the bar),
the more a given category-dimension combination is considered applicable and vice versa the
lower a score, the more a given category-dimension combination is considered not applicable.
Using Semantic Differentials
From the example investigation it should be clear that the main benefit of this method is
that it can clearly show the different ways people interpret certain categories. As such,
it can provide data that can be used to help verify that shared ontologies do not clash
with the individual conceptualizations of people involved by comparing the (personal)
conceptual structure that can be inferred from the data with the structure of the shared
ontology. Our approach is thus meant to support and complement, rather than replace,
existing practices of ontology engineering.
We envision that the main application of this method will be to generate datasets that
characterize people and showcase different ‘kinds’ (groups) of modelers and their typical
personal ontologies. These datasets are far removed from traditional formal ontology
structures. They are not as easily exchanged or used directly as computational artifacts.
Yet our focus is not on creating data as input for expert systems or other computational
artifacts that would automatically reason with them, but instead to give humans working
with a variety of models and modelers some amount of guidance for understanding others.
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of how four subjects understand events. The bars represent the
respective scores of each subject, grouped per dimension. To illustrate, subjects 6 and 3 score
mostly positive on the dimensions composed, necessary and intentional, while subject 7 is the
inverse of this and scores strongly negative for these dimensions. These differences clearly show
the different interpretations subjects have of a category.
The method described here has potential for application in practice. When an enterprise
modeler creates the integrated model of an enterprise they will use various different aspect
models, specifications and other information to deal with basic syntax and semantic issues
of notations they are not familiar with – and on top of that, the discovered categorization
patterns for all the people involved in creating the aspect models. With this extra infor-
mation they can connect the categorization patterns to the aspect models and thereby,
with a certain probability, infer the semantic boundaries of the constructs used in each
model. For example, where they have a model that contains many goal constructs, and
the relevant categorization pattern shows a strong agreement on goals being ’not neces-
sary’, they might opt to model them as a ‘soft goal’ instead of the traditional mandatory
hard goal. By doing this it will become clearer which constructs from the different aspect
models can be linked together, i.e., which share roughly the same categorization pattern,
and which do not, and thus have to be modeled or re-modeled with different constructs.
Another potential application is more technology-oriented and involves the use of a tool to
guide the aspect modelers themselves as they create their models. It would still be based
on the differential, but would guide modelers through what construct to choose from
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a given notation. This could be done by first asking broad questions concerning what
they want to model, and then refining the possible constructs by going through all of the
possible relevant distinctions (i.e., dimensions). The benefit of this approach could be that
a modeling notation would be used more consistently and in line with its specification.
This would heavily depend on the actual capability of the notation to represent all the
distinct possibilities a modeler can arrive at. Finally, another possible application would
be to validate the semantics of the notations themselves by directly having modelers
evaluate them, with the same method as described above. This could make it possible to
figure out whether certain notations would be used appropriately by the modelers, and if
not, align the notation’s specification with the modeler’s interpretations while integrating.
However, such applications are outside of the scope of this research.
Limitations of the method
The primary difficulty in applying this method is the need for a shared first language
and a roughly similar cultural background among subjects, so that the adjectives used
are assigned a sufficiently similar meaning and connotation. This does not mean one
cannot investigate people with different mother tongues (a common situation, both in
academia and industry) but it does necessitate more work on finding the most useful
adjectives and constructing an effective test for separate language groups. The results
for separate groups can, within reason, be used in combination. For example, results
from separate investigations into tendencies of people from the Netherlands, Germany
and Flemish Belgium or other countries with similar cultures and language groups, show
enough similarity in conceptual background to suggest that the results can be mixed
without becoming unreliable. What should not be done, however, is mixing results from
groups that have strongly divergent languages or cultures, in the sense that one cannot
realistically expect sufficiently similar conceptual backgrounds. For instance, comparing
tests from Dutch speakers with Chinese speakers could potentially introduce too much of
a conceptual gap to be reliable. This will have to be established experimentally.
Another limitation of the method lies in the way it is parametrized in view of the need
for prior identification of (problematic) dimensions. Typically, we only investigate those
dimensions which we already know, or suspect to be problematic, either because we have
observed semantic mismatches or strongly expect them. As such, our method (without an
exploratory phase based on, e.g., Kelly’s Repertory Grid) has little predictive power in the
sense of pointing towards hitherto unproblematic areas that may yet become problematic.
However, if one’s first concern is the resolution of already observed interoperability issues
rather than preventing such issues from ever arising, this becomes less of an issue.
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More importantly, the results of this method are not complete conceptualizations. They do
not create a formal structure of the knowledge we capture, nor define any formal relations,
yet the potential for resolving interoperability issues is there. We focus on finding ‘some
important differences’ instead of finding ‘everything that is similar’. To explain this by
analogy, compare our issue to that of DNA-based paternity testing. It is not necessary to
create a complete representation of the genomes of the individuals involved, but merely to
find a significant number of points at which to find out whether patterns differ or not. We
do not need full conceptualizations because for our goal of ‘figuring out how to integrate
the semantics of a model’, the limited number of ontological distinctions we discover are
in any case a “significant help to the characterization of their intended meaning” (Guarino
et al. 1994).
Limitations of produced results
The data this method produces also has some limitations that have to be taken into
account. Most importantly, because we measure personal understandings instead of pos-
tulating them, it is at best temporarily valid to attribute such an understanding to a
particular person. As someone’s understanding of ‘the world and the things in it’ changes
over time, so does their personal ontology – and thus possibly the pattern of distinctions
they exhibit. Because of this we should not simply rely on a single measurement of a mod-
eler, but measure at regular intervals (for instance yearly, or at the start of a substantial
new project).
What does not necessarily change over time is the pattern of distinctions we attribute to
a given community of people. Suppose we find a cluster of people with certain properties,
sharing a close age-range, interest and job function, we can attribute a specific pattern of
distinctions to it, and define it as a community. If some people’s understanding changes
over time, and their personal ontology no longer fits this understanding, they are arguably
no longer part of the community. However, this does not change the validity of that old
pattern being correlated to that community. Instead, people move between communities
as their understanding changes over time, perhaps eventually stabilizing, perhaps moving
back and forth between communities. Given enough data, the real value may come from
being able to identify and clearly specify the boundaries of a certain community in order
to predict what kind of shared conceptual distinctions people might have.
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2.3 Summary
In this chapter we have outlined the research approach we have followed during this thesis.
We described the way in which we aim to answer the research questions detailed earlier,
and in what order these questions would ideally be investigated. In order to ground
the empirical methods used for our studies (into category structure, feature structure
and conceptual understandings) these methods have been discussed and demonstrated
through prior pilot studies and (fictional) examples of results.
Part II
Fundamental Findings

CHAPTER 3
What to Investigate?
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Abstract. In this chapter we introduce the meta-concepts and discriminatory dimen-
sions we will use as a starting point for the more detailed empirical and applied work on
personal semantics. The selection of these elements is vital, because in order to study how
people understand particular modeling meta-concepts, we first need to know which meta-
concepts there are, and which of them are relevant in the context of conceptual modeling.
The origin of these selected meta-concepts and dimensions lies in an exploratory study
that was aimed at discovering the conceptual landscape of Enterprise Modeling and Ar-
chitecture. It did so by virtue of an analysis of the notations used by modeling languages
and methods, which resulted in a categorization of the used terminology.
The content of this chapter is based on work published as:
Dirk van der Linden, Stijn J.B.A. Hoppenbrouwers, Alina Lartseva and Henderik A.
Proper: Towards an Investigation of the Conceptual Landscape of Enterprise
Architecture. In: T. Halpin et al. (Eds.): BPMDS 2011 and EMMSAD 2011,
LNBIP 81, pp. 526–535. Springer, Heidelberg
Re-published as an extended abstract in: Proceedings of the 6th SIKS Con-
ference on Enterprise Information Systems (EIS2011), V. Dignum et al. (Eds.):
CEUR-WS Vol 800, 2011, pp 17–18
3.1 Background – Why focus on languages?
It is important that we derive the meta-concepts and dimensions a priori, in contrast
to eliciting them on an individual basis from participants during later studies. This is
because we want to be able to compare and relate outcomes from different studies with
each other. In order to do that, we need to have a fixed set of inputs (i.e., meta-concepts
and dimensions) that all those studies can use. Even if every study were to include a
specific concept elicitation phase before moving on to the study-specific details, there
is no guarantee that the same, or indeed, similar, concepts would be investigated. For
example, when we elicit conceptual understandings of students and practitioners and want
to compare whether they think similarly or display significant differences, it is necessary
that we actually investigate the same concepts (i.e., both studies investigating someone’s
understanding of actor, regardless of what that understanding is). If we were to let
participants decide themselves what meta-concepts are most relevant to them during a
study, we would not be able to draw such comparisons. This would make it difficult to
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infer more practical consequences for conceptual modeling affairs, such as the effect from
learning modeling languages (by comparing and contrasting the development of conceptual
understandings from students to experienced practitioners). Thus, it is necessary to a
priori elicit or derive the meta-concepts and dimensions we want to use.
Why derive meta-concepts and discriminatory dimensions by looking at modeling nota-
tions, and not by interviewing or studying people as they model? Arguably a modeling
language is more of a reflection of the conceptualizations the language designers had or
have of a given domain than the language users (although the two are not necessarily
mutually exclusive). The users of a modeling language do not necessarily divide the world
up in the same way (i.e., use the same kind of meta-concepts when conceptualizing a do-
main). However, there are some compelling arguments to derive meta-concepts through
the analysis of existing modeling notations. Because of the sheer amount of languages and
specifications that are in use, there is a wealth of data to use for the our purpose, which
would make for a quicker start than a separate study dependent on a large number of
people active in industry. We opt for the approach using an analysis of notations instead
of working with people for a number of reasons.
First, by investigating the notations used by modeling languages and methods, we can also
get an overview of the terminology used for the different concepts. These terms are useful
for further studies, if not downright necessary for experimental work into categorization,
structuring of concepts and feature-set elicitation. For example, in order to investigate a
concept while ensuring participants are using it in the desired context, it is necessary to
include a semantic priming task (see Sec. 2.2.3), for which either the terminology or the
visual notation used during modeling would be ideal.
Second, having an overview of the terminology used in different languages, and access to
the specification of those languages would also make it possible to derive discriminatory
dimensions on which people differ in their conceptual understanding. We can do so
by taking the semantics of the individual terms into account and for example, look for
polysemy in order to find cases where superficially similar words are used in conceptually
distinct ways, which can lead to the derivation of the necessary dimensions.
Finally, while a language user is often not the designer of that language, their choice for
the language can be regarded as a reflection of their conceptual needs. It is likely that
people interested in modeling a particular domain or aspect of an enterprise (e.g., the
business processes) will opt for a language which allows them to model the things that
are conceptually relevant to them, in the amount of detail they need. In this way, users of
a modeling language constitute a specific discourse community (Hoppenbrouwers 2003).
Their shared focus (i.e., their conceptual needs and points of interest), whether it existed
prior to, or arose by influence of the language or method, are the differentiating factors
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from users of other modeling languages (and thus discourse communities). As Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) describe:
“All language is the language of community, be this a community bound by
biological ties, or by the practice of a common discipline or technique. The
terms used, their meaning, their definition, can only be understood in the
context of the habits, ways of thought, methods, external circumstances, and
tradition known to the users of those terms.”
This means that the language these people use has to be regarded at least as a reflection
of their specific conceptual needs as well. By investigating these modeling languages that
groups of people have chosen to use, we are effectively investigating the understandings
and conceptualizations they have of their domains. While it remains less ideal from a
research point of view to look at these languages as a reflection of people’s conceptual needs
compared to directly interviewing and surveying them, it nonetheless seems acceptable
to derive the meta-concepts and dimensions we need for our further studies from the
modeling notations they use.
By taking this approach it is true that we investigate the languages as they are on paper
(i.e., in terms of their specification), which is not necessarily the same way in which they
are used by people. It is a common occurrence that a modeling language is adopted, and its
notation is used only partially, or with its semantics modified to suit the users (Henderson-
Sellers 2005, Sowa 2010). Thus, if one wanted to study what the elements from the
language (i.e., the meta-concepts) meant to the people using them, looking solely at the
language specification would not be a good starting point. However, our requirements
in this chapter are of a purely ontological nature (i.e., to investigate what meta-concepts
there are). At this point we are not yet preoccupied with the more metaphysical concerns
(i.e., to investigate what those meta-concepts actually mean for people). These latter
concerns will be addressed in more detailed studies described in the following chapters.
Because of this, whether the users of a modeling language use its meta-concepts such as
specified or adopt their own interpretation has no impact on our selection, as right now
we are concerned with just that – the selection of meta-concepts that will be studied in
more detail in other investigations.
3.2 Selection of source languages
As we have opted to use modeling notations as input for the derivation of meta-concepts,
we need to make a well-balanced selection of different modeling languages or methods that
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cover multiple (conceptually different) aspects. In order to prevent a conceptually narrow
set of input we selected a wide variety of modeling languages and methods covering many
different aspects, originating both from academia and industry. Where possible we based
ourselves on official specifications (e.g., refereed and published works, official specification
documents approved by standards management groups such as the Object Management
Group (OMG)). As Enterprise Modeling covers many different aspects of modern day
enterprises such as goals, processes, value exchanges, architecture, and IT, we included
notations used for these different aspects, even if some of them are less widely used in
terms of absolute users. We choose to particularly look at domain-specific languages as
they focus on a specific application domain and often offer specialized terminology to
deal with them (France and Rumpe 2005, Mernik et al. 2005). Given the many different
aspects of an enterprise (e.g., processes, goals, value-exchanges, architecture) that modern
enterprises contain and have to deal with, a plethora of domain-specific languages are often
used to model them.
If no such standardized or widely agreed upon specification exists (e.g., as in the case of
the goal modeling language i*, where there are multiple accepted and used ‘standards’
such as the RWTH Aachen wiki (Grau et al. 2007)) we opted for a widely used one. An
overview of the languages and methods selected as input material is given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: The discourse communities we used as the initial input for our analysis.
Source / Ref. Aspect Reason for inclusion
ADeL
(Patig 2011)
Software
deployment
The Application Deployment Language aims at
describing (and validating) deployment of IT,
which is an aspect that is missed in many other
languages.
ArchiMate 1.0
(The Open Group
2009)
Architecture A standard for Enterprise Architecture (EA)
modeling, it is one of the more expansive
sources of EA-specific terminology.
ARIS / EPC
(Scheer and
Nu¨ttgens 2000)
Architecture The Architecture of Integrated Information
Systems is a framework whose community’s ter-
minology is at the intersection of process mod-
eling and EM.
Balanced Score-
card (Object
Management
Group 2010b)
Performance An analysis framework intended for more than
just (technical) modelers, it is a source of
commonly used terminology by an impor-
tant language community within EM; the not-
necessarily technically inclined.
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BPMN (Object
Management
Group 2010a)
Processes The Business Process Modeling Notation is a
standard for process modeling and useful as a
source as its large community in industry and
practice (Recker 2010) is heavily involved in,
and promotes, abstract process thinking.
e3Value (Gordijn
et al. 2006)
Value exchanges The e3Value notation has a very specific eco-
nomic viewpoint, offering terminology special-
ized for value exchanges.
Game theory
(von Neumann
1944)
Behavior von Neumann’s original concept and its ter-
minology is often used in lieu of more ‘stan-
dard’ modeling languages when dealing with
economic aspects.
GRL, i*, KAOS
(Liu and Yu 2001,
Grau et al. 2007,
Dardenne et al.
1993)
Specifications GRL, i* and KAOS are widely used lan-
guages/methods used in goal oriented thinking.
ITML (Frank
et al. 2009)
Implementation
and deployment
The IT Modeling Language offers terminology
specific to those implementing and deploying
software, which many other languages lack.
RBAC (Ferrariolo
et al. 1995)
Security The terminology defined by Role-Based Access
Control is a near defacto standard way of de-
scribing security issues, even outside of techni-
cal descriptions thereof.
VPEC-T (Green
and Bate 2007)
Architecture
(analysis)
The “Lost in Translation” approach focusing on
Value, Policies, Events, Content and Trust of-
fers an analysis framework that can be used by
more than just those with technical expertise.
For this reason it is worthwhile to take the ter-
minology and its respective language commu-
nity of non-technical users into account.
As we aimed to keep the analysis manageable we did not include many existing languages
and methods, both general-purpose, and domain-specific. When it comes to widely used
general-purpose languages for example, we did not include perhaps obvious choices such
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as ER or UML, nor methods like TOGAF, even if some of them are among the most used
modeling techniques in practice (Davies et al. 2006). This was done because we initially
wanted to ensure a wide diversity of input material that would reflect the different parts
of an enterprise (i.e., the different Aspects listed in Table 3.1). Because of this we focused
on first finding domain-specific languages so that we could ensure that elements from con-
ceptually distinct worlds (e.g., specific terminology used only in the context of goals, or
value exchanges, or business processes) would be included in our analysis. After consid-
ering (a number of) these languages we extended our scope and focused on including less
domain-specific sources. We initially opted here to include modeling languages or methods
originating not only from technical work in academia, but more business-oriented sources
(e.g., Balanced Scorecards) to ensure a balance between conceptual elements originating
both from the more technical as well as business worlds.
At this point, we found that we had an extensive amount of conceptually diverse input,
with a seemingly significantly large number of terms. When we attempted to include more
notations, whether domain-specific or general-purpose, we found that little was added in
the sense of new conceptually distinct elements, or terminology being used in different
ways. We then decided that the addition of more languages became unnecessary due to
the saturation of semantically distinct terms. From the selected input we gathered all the
terminology used by their notations and classified them into lists of nouns and verbs (i.e.,
entities and relationships). Figure 3.1 gives an example of the result of this process.
Internal memory
Central processing unit
ADeL
Relationship Entity
is linked to
depends on
groups
Unit
Artifact
Hardware
Software
Requirement Unit
Hard disk
Figure 3.1: Example of the classified terminology for a modeling notation, here in particular
for ADeL. On the left terminology used for relationships are denoted, while terminology for
entities is given on the right, showing also the hierarchy of the elements from the specification.
3.3 Derivation of meta-concepts and dimensions
With the selected notations from Table 3.1 and their initial terminological classification
we can now iteratively derive the main meta-concepts we will investigate, as well as the
discriminatory dimensions we can find in those meta-concepts.
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3.3.1 Derived meta-concepts
The meta-concepts (i.e., categories of the language constructs) were derived in an iterative
fashion based on the terminology derived from the modeling notations. The requirements
we had at this point were to have a practically manageable set in terms of number of
concepts. Furthermore, they should remain recognizable to future study participants by
being easily related to different domains of origin (e.g., goal modeling, value exchanges,
process modeling). The derivation was performed with the involvement of three experi-
enced conceptual modelers and researchers reaching agreement on the classification of each
term in order to ensure less of a bias for the final categorization judgments. All people
involved in this derivation had different professional backgrounds and foci in conceptual
modeling, so that for the discussion on categorization judgments multiple interpretations
were represented.
At first a simple 1 : 1 term to concept mapping was established, meaning that for each
term found in the language we denoted the existence of one meta-concept. This led, as
expected, to a large amount of meta-concepts with significant redundancy for almost all
aspects. For example, meta-concepts as goal, soft goal, business goal, belief,
were defined, as well as actor, actors, artificial actor, and so on. This would lead
to an overload of specialized (almost atomic) meta-concepts, making it necessary to start
integrating the conceptually similar terms into their overarching concepts. We did so by
collapsing these redundancies into the most common denominator and repeating this step
for multiple iterations, so that we would end up with a limited set of high-level concepts
from which it would be actually possible to study typicality and centrality effects.
For example, an initial mapping for acting elements included meta-concepts as business
actor, person, hardware, software, which would iterate into smaller sets of meta-
concepts such as humans, artificial actors, abstract actors, again be reduced
to humans actor, non-human actor and eventually end as the over-arching meta-
concept “actor”. Through this iterative process, each term was classified into a final set
of high-level meta-concepts.
We used the semantics of each term as defined or described in its specifications as the
guideline for the classification here, not what might be intuitively expected of the term
itself. For example, end event being a result according to BPMN, not an event. While
it would be quite feasible to continue to collapse the set of selected meta-concepts until one
arrived at nothing more than, say entity and relationship in the vein of Chen (1976),
or going even further by ending up with a single particular in the sense of blobjectivism
as proposed by Horgan and Potrcˇ (2000), there would be little practical benefit in doing
so. Given the need for the meta-concepts to be recognizable, and in doing so offer enough
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different points of investigation, we finished with the classification found in Table 3.2.
It is broad enough to fit the explicit differences found in the source material, while still
remaining minimal in the amount of meta-concepts.
Table 3.2: The meta-concepts and the words used for particular instantiations of them result-
ing from our analysis of the languages and methods. Numbers denote the originating commu-
nity as following: 1=ArchiMate, 2=ADeL, 3=BPMN, 4=e3Value, 5=GRL/i*/KAOS, 6=ITML,
7=ARIS, 8=Balanced Scorecard, 9=Game theory, 10=RBAC, 11=VPEC-T.
Meta-concept Members
actor unit1, requirement unit2, actor1,4,5, role1,5,10, collaboration1, player9, in-
frastructure/application component1, device1, application software7, or-
ganizational unit7, position7,5, perspective8, market segment4, hardware
role6, software role6, hardware6, software6, organizational role6, environ-
ment/software agent5
event event1,5,7,11, behavior1, function1,7, interaction1, activity3, task3, busi-
ness rule/service task3, transaction3, start event3, intermediate event3,
value activity4, value interface4, value offering4, connection4, move9,
contribution5, correlation5, dependency5, means-ends5, control5, goal
refinement5, monitor5, operation10, operationalisation5, performance5,
operation5, initiatives8
goal goal5,6,7, hard-goal5, soft-goal5, business goal6, achieve goal5,
assignment5, avoid goal5, cease goal5, expectation5, maintain goal5,
requirement5, consumer need4, belief5, value11, target8
process organizational/infrastructure service1, information/other service7,
service1, IT service6, process3, sub/business/process flow3, business
process6, dependency path4, game9, task5
resource artifact1,2, location2,6, hardware2,6 , cpu2, hd2, memory2, software2,
value1, data/business object1, object5, node1, network1,6, network
device6, representation1, meaning1, device1, computer hardware7, ma-
chine resource7, environmental data7, data input3, input5, value object4,
information9, resource5, content11, value port4
restriction interaction1, contract1, interface1, message7, catching3, throwing3,
boundary3,5, rule9, decomposition5, belief5, priority6, license6, boundary
condition5, conflict5, domain property5, permission10, value11, policy11,
trust11, (non)interrupting3, strategy9, measure8, strategic objective8
result product1, human/material/service output7, data output3, outcome8,
end event3, payoff9
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It is important to stress the need for the selection of these particular meta-concepts with
their high level of abstraction. This is done because the things we wish to investigate
through other studies (e.g., feature clusters, centrality and typicality of conceptual ele-
ments, as explained in more detail in Sec. 1.4.1) hinge on a prototypical view, for which
it is necessary to investigate the central, more conserved regions of a concept. The se-
lection of more specialized meta-concepts would make that impossible, as it would not
be possible to as easily compare different clusters of typical conceptual understandings
if they were already separated into their distinct own concepts (e.g., separating human
and non-human actors). While more specific (and thus detailed) meta-concepts would of
course lead to more detailed studies, it should also be considered that the selection of
those meta-concepts a priori would introduce an unwarranted bias originating from our
own ideas of how the world (and in this case, conceptual modeling) is made up.
Consider the example of the concept kitchen equipment. If we know already that what
we really want to investigate is kitchen equipment used to prepare food, we would be
tempted to just skip to the more detailed concepts, such as cutting board, frying
pan, or water kettle. However, those (subjective) choices are strongly reflective of
the way that we see the world, whereas other people might divide the world in different
ways, and end up with different sets of specific concepts: for example simply mortar
and pestle. By making such a priori choices for detailed concepts we unnecessarily bias
ourselves to a particular view of the world and lose the ability to investigate how people
other than ourselves view it. This works in the same vein for our modelings concepts:
if we choose a very specific interpretation to investigate, for example a business process
modeling concept of goal, then we would forego any potentially interesting results that
we might have found for the goal concept in more studies of value exchanges. For these
reasons we will use these higher level, abstract meta-concepts which can encompass all
these interpretations in our studies.
It is not our goal to give stipulative definitions for the selected meta-concepts, but for
clarity’s sake they can roughly be described as being: things that act (in the broadest sense
of the word) (actors), things that happen (events), things that someone or something
wants to achieve (goals), things that happen in some way (processes), things that
are used for something (resources), things that limit something or someone’s actions
(restrictions), things that are the end state of something (results).
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Additional considerations
Note that the classification is limited to the terms describing entities (i.e., nouns), because
initial classifications that included relationships (i.e., verbs) significantly increased the
amount of members of the event meta-concept compared to the other meta-concepts.
We found it undesirable to (superficially) cloud further analyses for the debatable virtue
of including the many existing (strongly similar) relationships within this meta-concept.
Since it is necessary to use these words in further empirical research, having such an
unbalanced amount of words for the event meta-concept (with no direct clear benefit to
having them), would make it more difficult to ensure participants in these studies do not
become demotivated and give up because of question overload.
Initially, we had also selected the meta-concept of state, as there were some (albeit
a rather small) amount of terminological references to it. However, after several early
pilot studies and feedback sessions with potential participants for our longitudinal study
into conceptual understanding (described in detail in Ch. 6.4) we decided not to include
it. We found that the limited amount of terminological input was a detractor to not
biasing people into a specific interpretation, which made it difficult to get useful readings.
This lack of different interpretations might be because most people had at least some
background in (discrete) mathematics, and were familiar with the basic notions of states
and transitions. This did not lead to many different opinions on the metaphysical nature
of a state itself, as most semantic focus was often given to a thing that is in some state.
Whatever properties it has while being in such a state were then often attributed to that
thing, not the state itself as an ontologically separate entity.
3.3.2 Derived dimensions
As it is commonly accepted in cognitive and psychological literature that we can best
investigate concepts by characterizing them instead of attempting to exhaustively mea-
sure someone’s conceptual understanding (Malt et al. 2011, Pinker 2007), we also need
dimensions on which to characterize them by. This means that instead of attempting to
exhaustively write down what exactly a concept is for someone, that we simply find some
dimensions on which people (commonly) agree or disagree for that concept, and by that
characterize typical understandings. For example, we could characterize the concept of
spaghetti alla bolognesa on such dimensions as ‘tastiness’, ‘ease-of-making’, ‘costli-
ness’, ‘easy-to-eat’. Such sets of dimensions thus make it easier to see when people differ
in particular aspects of their conceptual understanding.
We derived such an initial set of dimensions for our meta-concepts by analyzing the classi-
fication of the terminology and looking for terms which, according to their specification’s
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definition, could function as antonyms. We analyzed all the terminology from Table 3.2
in this way and derived a number of dimensions that serve as a means to characterize
people’s understanding of the meta-concepts. The results of this analysis and the selected
discriminatory dimensions are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Dimensions we found which can be used to differentiate the different lexical members.
Dimension Explanation
natural Whether something was intentionally created (be it with a purpose or
not) or occurred naturally. For example, an artifact versus a location
or an actor versus some hardware.
human The human condition appears both in the sense of actors, for example
a (human) actor or some software. It also seems to appear in composed
structures, for example an organizational unit or market segment being
necessarily subject to the human condition, a collaboration not so.
composed If something is composed of multiple parts (be it an aggregation or
complex structure). For example, a single actor versus a organizational
unit, or a cpu being a single resource, while a piece of hardware is seen
as more than one.
necessary The difference between logical (im)possibility and probability. For ex-
ample, a belief being a restriction that can be broken, while a (logical,
or natural) rule is logically impossible to be broken.
material Something exists either as a physical, material object or is a (metaphys-
ical) conception. For example, a materially existing resource can be a
piece of hardware, while a piece of information can be just as much of
a resource without existing as a material object.
intentional Something is done, or provoked (be it with or without a reason) instead
of spontaneously occurring. For example, an event can be a spontaneous
occurrence while a transaction is always intentionally provoked.
vague Something is either determined explicitly or is vague and left open for
interpretation. For example, a hard goal or a soft goal.
Combinations of these dimensions can be used to characterize the meta-concepts, effec-
tively arriving at the particular interpretations that some term from the investigated
modeling languages use for them. Different combinations of dimensions thus discriminate
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between these different interpretations. For example, while ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ are
both a singular, non-human, non-natural actor, they differentiate on the ‘material’ di-
mension. When the same term is used for a different interpretation of the same concept,
different combinations of these dimensions can be used to discriminate between them. An
‘actor’ is often a non-composed, non-vague thing, but whether it is human often varies.
That particular dimension can thus be used to discriminate between the different usages
of the term. It should be noted that doing this based on the specification given by mod-
eling languages becomes more difficult when the specification of a term is ambiguous or
contradictory. For example, according to the iStar Wiki (Grau et al. 2007) an ‘Agent’ is an
actor with a concrete physical manifestation (i.e., in line with our dimension material).
However, in the same specification it is explained that the term ‘Agent’ was chosen “. . . so
that it can be used to refer to human as well as artificial (hardware/software agents)”.
The latter of these, software agents, would be difficult to interpret as actually existing in
a material sense. As such, figuring out which dimensions to use to characterize the term
thus becomes more difficult.
Clarification of the dimension derivations
To go into more detail about how to derive such dimensions, we now explore how we
derived each of the dimensions from Table 3.3. The term ‘actor’ could, depending on
which notation it originated from, be used both to refer to a human being performing
some action, as well as a non-human entity performing an action. Based on this distinction
it becomes possible to infer that there is a dimension, tentatively to be called human on
which we can characterize someone’s conceptual understanding of the concept actor.
Often dimensions do not apply only to one meta-concept, as the dimension described
here also can be found in resources, where e.g., BPMN has a specific subtype for
resources that indicates the resource is a ‘Human Performer’.
The resource meta-concept also seems to include (words for) things that ‘just’ exist
and can be used like that, like a ‘location’. Others are dependent on some kind of manu-
facturing process, that is, they have to be made, such as ‘hardware’. This indicates that
there is a dimension on which we can distinguish between those things that are natural,
and those which are created by artificial, or man-made means (e.g., processes that do not
occur spontaneously in nature, like the building of a car, or the intentional creation of a
new chemical element).
For some meta-concepts there are both things that are seen as either singular things
or collections of things. For instance, depending on the abstraction level that a person
thinks on, an actor can be such a specific individual thing, or a collection of things. The
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different terms like ‘organizational unit’ or ‘market segment’ are often taken as collection
of individual actors (albeit approached at one interface point), while a ‘player’ or some
piece of ‘hardware’ is regarded as a singular thing. From this we can derive that there is
a dimension on which people distinguish whether things are composed or not.
We found as well that a distinction is made between things that physically exist in the
world versus things that do not. When it comes to actors, there are physical objects like
pieces of ‘hardware’, but also abstract entities used for the same, like ‘roles’, or ‘software’.
In some cases words that one might assume to not be physical objects are actually defined
as being so, as is the case with the way the i* language uses ‘agents’, as they are defined
as being an entity “with a concrete physical manifestation”. For resources there are
also distinctions to be found for this dimension, with clearly physical(ly needed) objects
like ‘hardware’, ‘cpu’, or some kinds of ‘business objects’, while the non-physical occupies
equally as much: ‘information’, ‘representation’, ‘meaning’, and so on. It becomes evident
that there is thus a dimension on which we distinguish between things being material or
not.
We find that for the meta-concept goal there is a clear dimension on which people distin-
guish them: whether they are well-defined (e.g., having specific, measurable achievement
criteria), or whether they are more open-ended (e.g., having fuzzy or non-measurable
achievement criteria). This is reflected in most goal-modeling languages having both
‘hard goals’ and ‘soft goals’. From this we take the dimension of whether things are vague
or not.
For some meta-concepts there are also differences whether something was intended or
simply occurred, like for example with rules being either because of environmental condi-
tions (i.e., laws of nature and logical necessity), or whether they were intentionally created
to perform some specific function. When it comes to events it is also sometimes the
case that an ‘event’ spontaneously occurs, while some other things like ‘transactions’ are
always triggered by an intended source. Because of this we also include a dimension of
intentionality.
Finally, while not necessarily reflected as clearly in the different words used by the mod-
eling languages, there seems to be a distinction between things that are logical necessities
and those that are not. For example, the many different kinds of restrictions put on
entities to control their behavior can, depending on what that entity is, either be logical
rules that simply cannot be broken (e.g., operational conditions in an algorithm) or a de-
ontic rules that shouldn’t be broken, but can (e.g., a guideline to be followed during some
business process). Some general-purpose languages like Object Role Modeling (ORM) 2.0
explicitly model this with the use of different colors for the deontic or alethic status of a
restriction. We thus chose to include a dimension of necessity to reflect these differences.
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Additional considerations
It is not our intention to claim the dimensions selected and described here are exhaustive
for the different ways in which people see the meta-concepts. Instead we aim to have
a wide-range of dimensions available on which to investigate people’s conceptual under-
standings. While it is likely there are more dimensions on which people differ in their
understanding of these meta-concepts, we consider that the selected set offers an effective
starting point with enough semantic diversity to support us in our investigations. Further-
more, the dimensions are grounded in existing distinctions found in modeling languages in
use in practice. In line with our argument for using modeling language notations to derive
the meta-concepts, we find using them equally useful as a starting point for deriving these
dimensions.
Other existing classifications, ontological and metaphysical alike, offer far more extensive
and detailed classifications of what kinds of things exist, and what properties they have,
which could be used to generate these dimensions. However, how would we make a selec-
tion out of such sources without either overly biasing us to a specific (kind of) dimension
that may or may not be that relevant to conceptual modeling? Given that many of these
existing classifications are of a significant size and complexity (e.g., SUMO (Niles and
Pease 2001)), or focused on providing upper ontologies from which the distinctions often
remain too abstract for our more domain-oriented requirements (e.g., UFO (Guizzardi
and Wagner 2004)) it is difficult to make a balanced selection, even if they are more spe-
cific to our context like the UEML class taxonomy (Anaya et al. 2010). We would again
have to go back to the modeling language notations themselves and verify whether the
dimensions proposed by some ontology are relevant to it.
An example of one of the detailed distinctions that such ontologies provide (which might
be too abstract for our use) is the distinction between endurant and perdurant things.
In the case of a perdurant thing only some part of it is seen to exist when it is observed
at some specific point of time. An endurant thing exists fully even when observed in
a single point of time. A human body, for instance, could be regarded as such. The
way that human body moves, its locomotion, however, is perdurant, as walking or
jumping cannot be readily and fully observed in a single point of time. Thus, one
could make a distinction between concepts on this dimension of endurant/perdurant.
But, in the context of conceptual modeling, such distinctions quickly become esoteric
and of a less direct interest, as they do not relate to more concrete domain concerns
on which practitioners actually discuss (e.g., “do we know the satisfaction criteria for
this goal?”, “do we allow server uptime to be seen as a necessary resource?”). Thus,
this particular dimension might be too academic in nature to be salient for studying
dimensions experienced by actual people involved in the creation and use of models.
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For these reasons we have opted for the derivation of the dimensions based directly on
the notations and semantic differences found between their terminologies. Doing so led
to a timely and practical derivation of semantically distinct dimensions that can be used
right away for further studies and analyses.
3.4 Hints of conceptual disagreements
With the set of selected meta-concepts, their related terms and the discriminatory dimen-
sions we now have a decent base that we can use as input for our empirical methods. From
the simple overviews presented here we already see hints both at a common, shared cate-
gorization of concepts between different aspects of EM and at a difference in preferred, or
central terminology. Thus, there seems to be a common conceptual ground, with perhaps
typical understandings correlated with particular aspects.
Some examples of this are terms used for the meta-concept actor. In e3Value an actor
is necessarily a being with some very specific properties (i.e., economic independence),
while in a language often used with it, i*, it can also be other things, like a computer.
Thus, while users of both languages likely share the common conceptual ground of an
actor being some active entity, someone using e3Value would quickly associate it with
what they see as economically independent beings (i.e., humans), while someone using i*
can be expected to have a more generic abstract association. Another example concerns
the meta-concept resource. A language with a focus on deployment of software has
many words for describing hardware that is needed, and as such a speaker of ADeL,
ITML or other languages with comparable focus might readily associate some resource
with material objects that are needed to do something. Someone with other concerns, say
architecture as expressed in ArchiMate, or more abstract process design like BPMN, might
more quickly associate resource with some information, knowledge, or environmental
data (i.e., immaterial objects) needed for something to be produced.
Yet more examples can be found with the meta-concept restriction, as many terms
used for it differ in how they deal with ’necessity’ of compliance to some restriction.
On the one hand, languages tasked with implementation or technical factors often deal
with logical, computational laws, and therefore use words like rule in the alethic sense:
restrictions that logically cannot be broken. On the other hand, those speakers dealing
with human aspects often find themselves prescribing deontic rules or restrictions which
can be violated, even though this is improper. Depending on the view of a speaker,
their interpretation of the meta-concept restriction could be biased towards rules that
are either alethic or deontic in nature. Some counterintuitive classifications can also be
found in a number of meta-concepts. Some descriptions or types of things are sometimes
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seemingly seen as specific kinds of those things. This happens with terms for actors,
like ARIS’ position, ArchiMate’s organizational role or RBAC’s role, which are used not
in the sense of a role, but as some [actor] entity with the role of. Similarly, depending
on the focus of a language, words that are commonly seen as properties (for instance,
location), can also be regarded as concrete concepts, like location being a (limited yet
necessary) resource for people dealing with the (physical) deployment of machines.
While it is true that some of these differentiations of meaning between languages might
not be intended, factors like historical compromises in the design or implementation of
a language (such as ArchiMate’s awkward handling of information as a physical entity,
cf. The Open Group (2009), ch. 6.4), still allow for such differences to occur. In time
those differences can become (unintentionally) entrenched in the conceptual landscape
of a language and its speakers, especially if they are not quickly corrected. As a result,
they will drift away from a shared understanding with once similar communities, and risk
becoming a distinct community.
Knowing all this, we can see how important it is to discover these differences in meaning
to know exactly what is meant by a model. For example, an e3Value actor and an Archi-
Mate organizational unit both are some kind of actor. However, in terms of Table 3.3’s
dimensions, actor in this sense is naturally occurring, human and not composed, while
organizational unit is not naturally occurring, human, and composed. Thus, while both
languages speak of superficially the same thing, the mapping shows they are not inter-
changeable. Different words mapping to the same concept can be found in the same way.
Take for example the meta-concept result. An outcome in ARIS is often seen as a non-
naturally occurring, non-materially intended ‘thing’, which would be the same as an end
event in BPMN. Thus, in this context the mapping shows the words are interchangeable.
3.5 Summary & outlook
In this chapter we have answered our first research question (“What are the meta-concepts
shared between modeling languages used in enterprise modeling?”) with the selection of
meta-concepts and dimensions detailed in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. We can now move on to
more detailed investigations using them. We will first investigate a specific aspect to
do with the conceptual understanding that people have of these meta-concepts, namely,
whether the structure of these concepts more resembles that of a graded or discrete concept
(i.e., whether specific things or instantiations are regarded as being absolute members or
whether partial membership is permissible).

CHAPTER 4
On the Category Structure of Modeling Concepts
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Abstract. In this chapter we investigate the category structure of the meta-concepts
we just derived in order to study whether they more closely approximate a discrete or
graded category. It is important to be aware of this distinction because it can have a
significant effect on the way models (and the modeling languages used to create them)
should be formalized and reasoned about. Furthermore, when a model contains (terms
from) graded categories, the (conceptual) validity of instantiations of that model likely
becomes a graded matter as well (i.e., while two instantiations can both be conceptually
valid and fit with someone’s view on the domain, some are more valid than others). To
this end we performed an empirical study involving a group of modelers with varying lev-
els of experience in order to discover their actual categorization habits. Overall, we find
that most of the investigated meta-concepts exhibit a graded structure, with experienced
modelers displaying this even more strongly than the other groups.
The content of this chapter is based on work published as:
Dirk van der Linden: Categorization of modeling language concepts: graded or dis-
crete? In: Y.T. Demey and H. Panetto (Eds.): OTM 2013 Workshops, LNCS
8186, pp. 743–746. Springer, Heidelberg, 2013
Dirk van der Linden and Henderik A. Proper: Category Structure of Language Types
Common to Conceptual Modeling Languages. In: I. Bider et al. (Eds.): BPMDS
2014 and EMMSAD 2014, LNBIP 175, pp. 317–331. Springer, Heidelberg, 2014
4.1 Background
We categorize the world around us in different ways depending on the subject matter.
Some things we categorize more discretely, like natural things (e.g., things that naturally
occur like fruits, plants, or animals), some things we categorize in a more graded way,
such as artifactual things (e.g., manmade things like tools and vehicles). These different
categorization tendencies have been shown many times in research, starting around the
time of Rosch (1973) and Rosch and Mervis (1975). Also, they have been investigated by
many others explicitly elaborating on the category structure for a number of natural and
artifactual categories (cf. Diesendruck and Gelman 1999, Barr and Caplan 1987, Estes
2003; 2004). While some work investigating this has had difficulties in finding significant
differences in categorization tendencies between artifactual and natural categories (Kalish
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1995), other larger studies have re-affirmed it (Diesendruck and Gelman 1999). There are
also arguments that only the natural/artifactual distinction is not enough, and we should
also distinguish between other categories like emotional states (Altarriba and Bauer 2004).
Regardless of the debate on whether particular kinds of categories are usually categorized
in a specific way, it is clear that we do not categorize everything in the same way.
The categorization we speak of here deals with membership judgments. That is, whether
a certain thing is judged to be a member of a given category. For example, most people
would have no problem saying that an apple is a member of the category fruit, and they
will likely reject the notion of a newspaper being so. In these cases, it is is easy to make a
discrete, or absolute judgment. However, when borderline cases are introduced interesting
effects occur (Hampton 1998, Hampton et al. 2006). Given, for instance, cases that do
not have clear or crisp boundaries, like tomatoes or rhubarb, people have more difficulty
deciding with certainty whether they are fruits or not. In such cases people often tend to
give graded judgments – things being members of a category only to a certain degree. This
prevalence of (strongly) graded membership judgments is then often correlated with the
structure of the category being graded. It should thus be clear that the things we reason
about while modeling or developing systems are also subject to such categorization effects,
even when they are abstract things like IF-THEN statements (Adelson 1985). Given
that many of our modeling efforts (be they the creation of domain models, ontologies
to formalize knowledge or support reasoning with, databases to implement schemata,
etc.) require us to be as exact as possible about what we aim to model, being aware of
differences in membership judgments is thus an important aspect of properly representing
a given domain and the things in it.
The importance of being aware of these different judgments starts during the modeling
phase, particularly in settings where there is collaborative modeling and integration ef-
forts (e.g., enterprise modeling). The uncertainty of membership judgments (i.e., what
is a valid instantiation for this type, is this instantiation as valid as others) creeps into
models, and is often lost, unless explicitly elicited and written down. The effect this has
on the validity of a model can occur on two levels, the level of the categories from the do-
main (i.e., the concepts from the universe of discourse) and the level of the categories from
the language (i.e., the meta-concepts used by a modeling language). Domain categories –
the concepts from the universe of discourse – often receive great attention in discussions
between modelers and stakeholders as well as in discussion between modelers themselves.
This ensures (to some degree) that modelers know what things the stakeholders want to
see in a model, and that they understand those things in the same way (Hoppenbrouw-
ers 2003). However, categories from the language receive such detailed attention far less
often, e.g., by asking “What exactly is this type ‘actor’ from the language we are using?
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Does it allow us to model the acting elements from the universe of discourse we know
about?”. Instead, we often end up using our own intuitive or naive interpretations as
we use the semantics of our own natural language (Sowa 2010) – together with all the
category structures and nuances that come with doing so. Because of this, the modeling
language that ends up actually being used often differs from the (formal definition of the)
modeling language that is used on paper (Henderson-Sellers 2005). For example, a mod-
eling language might formally define an actor as a rather specific thing (e.g., requiring it
to be a singular abstract entity, and whatever other features might apply), which makes it
fairly easy to determine whether something is a valid instantiation of that type – a human
being here definitely not being one. On the other hand, one of the modelers (or simply
any reader) might not use or be aware of those semantics, and instead see the type as
having a different range of conceptually valid instantiations. This is problematic because
it means that important semantics of the model might be lost when it is interpreted by
other people not involved in the original modeling process (e.g., during model integra-
tion), or stakeholders who were not aware of some of the not explicated particularities.
This is exacerbated by the fact that we do not have an insight into the structure of these
categories as used by people, because not only do we not know what is considered valid,
we do not know whether some things are considered more valid than others.
Thus, in this chapter we aim to clarify whether the categories common to many model-
ing languages and methods (i.e., those meta-concepts used by a language to instantiate
domain concepts by) are categorized in a discrete or graded fashion. The implications
of this for model creation and usage (particularly for models used to capture and docu-
ment a certain domain) are important to be aware of. If a category from a language is
typically judged in a discrete fashion, the semantics of models are likely easier to commu-
nicate, formalize, and keep coherent. However, if such a category is typically judged in a
graded fashion, communicating it to others becomes more involved, also requiring more
explicit discussion. Furthermore, the formalizations and tools we use need to explicitly
support such structure (e.g., by using ontologies with support for features as typicality
and centrality).
4.2 Experimental parameters
What we wish to do is to examine whether a number of categories more closely resemble
graded or discrete categories. We can do this by performing a category membership
experiment for the target categories and a number of benchmark categories of which we
know whether they are typically judged in a discrete or graded fashion, and to what
extent their members are so judged. The important things to find out are the overall
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membership judgments for the categories, and specifically the amount of non- and partial
membership judgments for the individual terms.
This is typically done by letting participants rate terms (i.e., the non, partial and full
category members) either on a numerical scale (cf. Barr and Caplan 1987, Diesendruck
and Gelman 1999, Kalish 1995), or by directly asking them whether the exemplars are
full, partial or non-members (Estes 2003). Foregoing the numerical scales for this direct
questioning membership status has some advantages, as there is less ambiguity both from
the participants’ side, as well as from the researchers’ side when it comes to interpreting
the exact meaning of the numerical data. The use of these methods in practice and more
methodological details about the exact measuring scales and potential confidence issues
are explained in more detail in Chapter 2.2.1.
4.2.1 Considerations
There are a number of considerations to take into account with this investigation. First
is the issue of the potential participants and their (natural) language. Most importantly,
when we ask whether a certain thing is a member of a category or not, we would optimally
do that in the participant’s native language. However, as the terms used by most modeling
languages and methods (i.e., the terms we will use in our experiment) are in English, we
need to either use them as-is, or translate them. Given that most modelers use the terms
as given by languages (i.e., in English), albeit often appending their own semantics, we
will perform the experiment with the terms without translating them to the participants’
native language.
For the benchmark we will use datasets from existing research. However, an issue with
these existing and still often used datasets is that they can be outdated (e.g., the com-
monly used Barr and Caplan dataset was published in 1987), and they can be sensitive to
cultural differences. Category judgments can shift as certain objects fall out of common
use and are replaced by entirely different things, as well as certain objects that can be seen
differently in different cultures. For example, while in Barr and Caplan’s dataset bicycles
are found to not be strong members of the category vehicle, repeating the experiment
with Dutch, Danish or German participants (who are far more likely to use a bicycle
as a mode of transport, cf. Pucher and Buehler (2008)) will likely lead to significantly
different results. As such, care will have to be taken when interpreting the results from
the benchmark categories to place them into the correct frame of time and culture.
While there are other datasets available that were gathered from non-English native speak-
ers (e.g., Ruts et al. 2004, who performed an exemplar generation study amongst Belgian
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students) that might be used to create a more even dataset, they often only include full
members and lack the necessary borderline and non-members.
4.2.2 Method
Participants: In total fifty-six people participated in the present study. Twenty-one of
them were advanced (3rd or 4th year) students at an undergraduate university of
applied science with a focus on computing science and modeling. Thirty-five were
professional modelers employed at a research institute with a focus on information
technology, and used modeling languages and tools to varying degrees. According
to this level of use they were further subdivided into a group of fifteen beginning
modelers and twenty-one expert modelers. All participated voluntarily and received
no compensation for their participation.
Materials: The materials used for the benchmark in the experiment were based on the
list of exemplars reported on by Barr and Caplan (1987). We used 5 full, 5 partial
and 5 non-members terms for both of the benchmarks. They were translated and
presented in Dutch for the twenty students, but presented in English for the partic-
ipants at the public research center, given that this was the only shared language
between all participants and all participants were sufficiently fluent. In this text
we consistently refer to them in English. For this benchmark we included the cate-
gories fruit and vehicles (see Table 4.2). For the modeling part of the experiment
we investigated the meta-concepts as found in Table 3.2: actor, event, goal,
process, resource, restriction and result. More information on these meta-
concepts, terms and their derivation can be found in Chapter 3.3.1. The terms used
for the members of these categories are the terms as used by the modeling languages
and methods, based on the official (or most-used) specification.
Procedure: The procedure was based on Estes (2003)’s experimental approach. Par-
ticipants completed the task through on online survey. In this survey, participants
were instructed to judge whether a list of given terms were either full, partial or
non-members for the current category. Participants were informed beforehand that
partial member scores meant that the exemplar belonged to the category, but to a
lesser degree than others. This was first done for the two benchmark categories, and
followed in the same way for each of the investigated categories from the modeling
languages. Additionally, for the categories from the modeling languages participants
were instructed that the terms were to be considered in the context of conceptual
modeling. The orders of the terms in each category were randomized for each par-
ticipant. Care was taken to validate that participants filled out the survey seriously
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by comparing results and checking for long strings of repeating answers that the
randomization of question order should have prevented from occurring.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Benchmark concepts
The proportion of graded membership judgments exclusively for the borderline terms (i.e.,
expected partial member, as determined by the original datasets) used in the benchmark
are shown in detail in Table 4.1. What was to be expected is that the typically discrete
category (fruit) would show lower proportions of graded judgments compared to the
typically graded category (vehicles). The given scores indicate the proportion of partial
member judgments (e.g., 19% of students, 13% of beginning modelers, and 30% of expert
modelers considered an avocado as a partial member of the fruit category). Shown are
respectively the scores for students, beginning modelers, expert modelers, and the scores
as reported by Barr and Caplan (1987), and Estes (2003).
Table 4.1: Partial member proportions for the partial member terms of the benchmark.
Category Term Student
(n = 20)
Beginner
(n = 15)
Expert
(n = 21)
(Barr and
Caplan
1987)
(Estes
2003)
fruit avocado 0.19 0.13 0.30 0.37 0.16
coconut 0.24 – 0.05 0.38 0.37
tomato 0.33 0.27 0.25 0.34 0.05
cucumber 0.19 – 0.25 0.23 0.21
rhubarb 0.14 0.20 0.15 0.45 0.26
vehicles gondola 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.50 0.21
tricycle 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.64 0.58
wheelchair 0.29 0.27 0.50 0.70 0.63
horse 0.48 0.27 0.55 0.54 0.50
husky 0.38 0.27 0.55 0.27 0.21
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Table 4.2: The categories and terms for the benchmark as adapted from Barr and Caplan
(1987) and Estes (2003), followed by the used Dutch translations for the student group.
Category Term
fruit (discrete) apple, pear, plum, banana, pineapple, avocado, coconut, tomato,
cucumber, rhubarb, carrot, onion, potato, rose, spinach
vehicles (graded) bus, car, truck, van, taxi, gondola, tricycle, wheelchair, horse,
roller skates, husky (dog), lawnmower, bus driver, carton, news-
paper
fruit (discrete) appel, peer, pruim, banaan, ananas, avocado, kokosnoot, tomaat,
komkommer, rabarber, wortel, ui, aardappel, roos, spinazie
vehicles (graded) bus, auto, vrachtwagen, busje, taxi, gondel, driewieler, rolstoel,
paard, rolschaatsen, husky (hond), grasmaaier, buschauffeur,
doos, krant
4.3.2 Modeling concepts
An overview of the average amount of full, partial and non-member judgments for all
investigated categories is given in Table 4.3. The results are given for each investigated
group (students, beginning modelers and expert modelers), and indicate the proportion
of membership judgments. For example, students considered 47% of the presented terms
for the actor category to be full members, 18% to be partial members and 35% to be
non-members. The primary points of interest here are the higher scoring partial and
non-member results, as they indicate words actually used by modeling languages that are
either only considered to be partially reflective of their category (e.g., a ‘market segment’
would be only considered somewhat an actor), or are considered not to be exemplars of
that category (e.g., a ‘requirement unit’ would not be considered an actor).
Table 4.4 gives a detailed overview of specific modeling language terms considered partial
members by at least 30% or more of one of the investigated groups. We decided on
an initial cutoff value of roughly at least one-third of a group for partial membership
based on the data of Barr and Caplan (1987), judging it to be an effective cutoff point
for inferring a significant partial membership effect occurring. On average the expert
modelers displayed a much higher amount of graded judgments than the students or
beginning modelers. For the terms listed in this table, students on average considered
15% of the investigated terms to be partial members, while beginning modelers did so for
32% and expert modelers considered 83% to be partial members.
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Table 4.3: Average amount of membership scores (full, partial and non-members) for each
group of investigated categories. The average proportion of partial judgments for the modeling
concepts are bold, as well as the proportion of partial responses for the natural and artifactual
benchmark category listed below them for comparison.
student (n = 20) beginner (n = 15) expert (n = 21)
Category full partial non full partial non full partial non
actor 0.47 0.18 0.35 0.30 0.14 0.55 0.41 0.25 0.35
event 0.46 0.14 0.41 0.39 0.16 0.45 0.29 0.19 0.51
goal 0.65 0.11 0.23 0.60 0.16 0.24 0.56 0.20 0.24
process 0.66 0.14 0.20 0.62 0.22 0.16 0.41 0.32 0.28
resource 0.59 0.19 0.22 0.62 0.19 0.20 0.54 0.22 0.24
restriction 0.50 0.21 0.29 0.55 0.18 0.27 0.39 0.24 0.37
result 0.73 0.16 0.11 0.86 0.07 0.08 0.76 0.16 0.09
average 0.58 0.16 0.26 0.56 0.16 0.27 0.48 0.23 0.29
fruit 0.44 0.10 0.45 0.47 0.05 0.42 0.49 0.09 0.41
vehicle 0.48 0.14 0.37 0.49 0.13 0.37 0.51 0.20 0.29
Table 4.4: Terms considered partial members by ≥ 30% of the people from at least one
group (students, beginning modelers, or expert modelers), considering the cutoff considerations
discussed in 4.3.2. The terms listed here are only those considered partial members, not including
the terms primarily considered full or non-members. Raw datasets containing the complete set
of terms in terms of full, partial and non-members can be found in Appendices A.1 through A.7.
Category Term Student Beginner Expert
actor unit X
requirement unit X
infrastructural component X X
organizational component X
device X
application software X
organizational unit X
hardware X
software X X
event behavior X
function X
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interaction X
activity X
task X X
service task X
value activity X X
contribution X
operation X
goal expectation X X X
requirement X
consumer needs X
target X
process organizational service X
infrastructure service X
information service X
other service X X
IT service X X
service X
sub flow X X
process flow X
dependency path X
game X X
task X
resource artifact X X
hd X
location X
data object X X
business object X
object X X
data input X
input X
value object X X
network device X
representation X
value port X
device X
restriction belief X
priority X
value X
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interface X
catching X
throwing X X
license X
trust X
interrupting X
non-interrupting X
strategy X
strategic objective X X X
result end event X X
payoff X
4.4 Discussion
We will first discuss the results in general, showing how they support the assumption that
there are categories in modeling languages that are of a graded nature. Finally, we also
discuss a number of limitations of our current study that should be kept in mind when
interpreting the results. A discussion of the more practical consequences these findings
have for conceptual modeling can be found in Chapter 7.4.2.
4.4.1 General discussion
It was expected that the partial member judgments for the natural and artifactual bench-
mark categories would show a difference, with the artifactual category displaying a higher
proportion of graded judgments. Although compared to the results from Barr and Caplan
(1987) and Estes (2003) the overall amount of graded judgments seems to be lower, the
relative distribution still seems intact. This is the case for both the beginning and expert
modelers (the proportion of some graded judgments for vehicles being at least twice as
large compared to the ones for fruits). This is not the case for the student group, as the
difference between the benchmark categories there was found to be much smaller. This
could be explained by the lower amount of experience with (and exposure to) modeling
and languages (and modeling languages) that students have. This is further reflected in
Table 4.4 where there are far less words considered to be partial members by students as
compared to experienced modelers.
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On average the proportion of partial member judgments is 0.16 for students, 0.16 for
beginning modelers, and 0.23 for expert modelers. When we compare these scores to the
average proportion of partial member judgments for the discrete and graded benchmark
categories in Table 4.3 (respectively 0.10 and 0.14 for the students, 0.05 and 0.13 for the
beginning modelers and 0.09 and 0.20 for the expert modelers), we can see that for the two
groups of modelers most scores shown for the categories from modeling languages more
clearly reflect the graded benchmark category than the discrete one. Thus, as a careful
first investigation we seem to have found support that most categories from modeling
languages are of a graded nature. Perhaps more importantly the results from Table 4.4
corroborate this idea, as it can be seen that there is a large number of real modeling
terms that are deemed to be partial members by those modelers with a lot of experience.
Furthermore, given that the distribution of terms for these categories was not the same as
the benchmark categories (i.e., the benchmark categories were made up of equal amounts
of full, partial and non-members, while for the categories from the modeling languages
we were unaware of this distribution, with them likely containing proportionally more
full members) this makes it all the more acceptable to support the idea described in the
introduction that these categories can be seen as exhibiting a graded structure.
Another interesting finding is the high amount of non-member judgments found in many
of the categories. It is striking that the terms we have used in modeling languages and
methods are sometimes considered absolute non-members of their related category. In
particular, it can be seen that events are the largest category for non-members across
all groups (respectively 0.41, 0.45, and 0.51), while actors and restrictions also have
a high amount of non-members in some groups. A possible explanation for this is that
people are quicker to judge about things they are specialized in, for example a process
modeler having more snap judgments about concepts to do with processes, and thus also
being more willing to rule out terms. In practice this means that the terminology we
use originating from some languages might not reflect our innate category judgments at
all, raising the question whether this is a bad thing (e.g., because the terminology is far
away from our naive understanding and semantics) or perhaps not that much of a problem
(e.g., because the mismatch between a term and our understanding of it in a given context
makes it easier to ‘redefine’ and use it in that context).
As already hinted at and most clearly visible in Table 4.4, there is a striking difference
between the groups we investigated when it comes to the proportion of partial member
judgments. The expert modelers have a far higher amount of partial member judgments
compared to the students, and in a lesser degree to the beginning modelers. An exception
to this are processes and resources, which are judged more comparably between be-
ginning and advanced modelers. This might be explained by the fact that the department
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of the research institute which the majority of the participants were working in has a
strong focus on service science and is thus focused on many efforts involving processes
(e.g., process modeling). An explanation for the difference between these groups might be
that students simply have had less exposure to modeling terminology and are thus more
likely to give absolute judgments. On the other hand, there is also the possibility that
the (expert) modelers are, through training and experience, cognitively better equipped
to deal with situations with abstract and vague concepts (cf. Wilmont et al. 2012), which
could manifest in a higher amount of graded judgments.
4.4.2 Limitations
While it is good to find that our results hint towards the modeling language categories
(i.e., the meta-concepts) having a graded nature, care must be taken not to immediately
extrapolate this finding and use it to judge the structure of the investigated modeling
categories in general. Because the data originates from a a single study, with two of our
groups of participants being people with professional experience in conceptual modeling,
repeating it with additional groups of (experienced) people to validate whether they share
the same graded structure would be a prudent thing to do. Nonetheless, we see no
immediate threats to the internal validity of the study we have performed.
It should also be noted that the study presented here talks about the structure of the
category in terms of it being graded or discrete, but does not aim to give a representation
of the internal structure in terms of where each member belongs in relation to each other.
It is very likely that the internal ordering of the categories (regardless of the graded or
discrete structure) is specific to different groups of people. For example, it can be expected
that process modelers will have a different central core for a number of categories than,
for example, goal modelers.
Furthermore, as categorization judgments are something inherent to people, it would also
be useful to perform this study on specific subgroups of modelers (e.g., process model-
ers, enterprise architects, goal modelers) to analyze whether the proportion of graded
responses is different for specific categories or not (i.e., test whether categories that mod-
elers are focused on receive less partial member judgments). One could for instance
hypothesize that people who are specialized in a topic have less semantic flexibility in
regards to the categories of that topic.
Related to the terms we used, it might also be interesting to see whether the introduction
of model context (i.e., presenting the terms while being used in a model) instead of the
isolated terms themselves would yield different results. Nonetheless, the results from our
study investigating the terms in isolation also provides useful insight into the number of
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terms that would typically not be considered as good representatives of their functional
category. Furthermore, this might provide an additional source of complexity for partic-
ipants, as with the amount of terms we used in the study, a large amount of modeling
languages would be used, some of which participants are likely not familiar with.
Finally, as referred to earlier, the distribution of the terms for the modeling categories
was not optimal (i.e., not evenly divided between full, partial and non-member), which
makes it more difficult to infer detailed general statements about the internal ordering of
the terms. However, this is a reflection of the fact that we performed a study on terms
as they are used in practice (by modeling languages), and not on an artificially prepared
text corpus. Such work on the detailed structure of these categories like those described
above can be undertaken in further research, where the individual category members are
rated on typicality and centrality in order to attempt to build an actual representation
of a shared category structure. Such findings could then be used to create a more evenly
distributed set of modeling terms for further membership judgment experiments and other
purposes like discovering internal ordering of terms. Some of these potential avenues for
further research will be discussed in Chapter 9.2.1.
4.5 Summary & outlook
In this chapter we have presented a study into the categorization of categories used by
most modeling languages. It showed that many of these modeling categories (i.e., the
meta-concepts) are likely of a graded nature (that is, some things are considered to be
better members than others), which can have an effect on the semantics of models and their
derivatives. We have discussed the implications for validity of models, and argued that it is
important to be aware of these different categorization judgments. The main contribution
of this chapter to our research questions has thus been empirically showing that the
categories we use to model are likely of a graded nature, which before was only assumed
(or worse, ignored). More specifically, we have shown that the modeling terminology
from actual modeling languages and methods are affected by this graded nature as well.
With this we have found an answer to our research question, “To what extent do the
categories for these meta-concepts more resemble a graded or discrete structure?”. Now
that we know the structure of the meta-concepts that we investigate in this dissertation
is of a graded nature, we can pursue further investigations into other aspects which also
exhibit such gradedness. A first focal point will be the features that people attribute to
these meta-concepts (e.g., a resource is made of wood), and attempting to infer which
features are shared between multiple people and thus are more or less typical for each
meta-concept. This will be the focus of Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 5
On Features of Modeling Concepts
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Abstract. Is an actor typically considered a human being? What about an autonomous
entity? In this chapter we investigate the typical feature structure of Chapter 3’s meta-
concepts in order to create an empirically grounded description of the semantic feature
structure that people implicitly use while reasoning about, and with such concepts. Apart
from the insights into the meta-concept structure that this chapter presents, consequences
for the quality of models and use of modeling languages are discussed. These results will
be used in Chapter 7 to discuss in more detail how the process of modeling stands to
benefit from more insights into how the individual modelers see the basic modeling con-
cepts shared between them. This is done in the context of when such a modeling process
involves multiple people with different backgrounds, modeling different aspects (i.e., en-
terprise modeling).
The content of this chapter is based on work published as:
Dirk van der Linden and Marc van Zee: On the Semantic Feature Structure of Mod-
eling Concepts: An Empirical Study. In: IEEE 16th Conference on Business
Informatics (CBI), vol. 2, pp. 158–165. IEEE, 2014
5.1 Background
Things are identified by their features, whether they are physical objects, abstract ele-
ments or psychological entities like concepts (Malt 1990, Bloom 1998). For example, I
might identify a certain object as a table because it has some properties I have come to
expect of tables (e.g., it has four legs, is made of wood, is of the right height to sit at,
and there happens to be a full set of dinnerware on top of it). This holds for conceptual
entities as well, where, for example, we identify the creation of a good research paper
as a goal because we see certain features like wanting to achieve it, the possibility of it
being achievable, and we want to achieve it, that it can be achieved, and that there is
some way to achieve it. The features we identify things by are often of a structural (an
aspect of a thing’s physical or logical composition: the table being made of wood) or
functional (an aspect of what a thing is used for, or does: the table being used to eat
at) nature. Earlier work (Malt and Johnson 1992) found that non-natural concepts (i.e.,
human-made or abstract things) were also mostly identified by their structural features,
as examples with similar functionality but different structure were still excluded as being
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part of those concepts. This might mean that the modeling concepts we use are as well
strongly identified by their structural features (e.g., a process being composed of steps,
an actor being a human thing, a resource being physical material).
This kind of identification through features is fundamental to human nature (Harnad
2005), as we categorize everything around us. It is how we decide just what things are.
When something does not have the properties we typically associate with it, or differs
from them too much, we simply reject it as possibly being so. For example, a typical
Japanese dining table would be far less of a typical dining table for most Europeans given
the difference in structure (being significantly lower), and function (being interacted with
in a fundamentally different way: sitting on the floor in front of it instead of on a chair).
As such, two different people could have a fundamental disagreement about whether a
specific thing is a table or not. The identification of things in this way is an important
aspect of determining whether something corresponds to our expectations – whether it
is a correct model of our subjective reality. Such judgments are not discrete, but most
often graded: things are not simply considered to ‘be’ a thing or not, but they are so to
a certain degree. When we see a particular thing with some set of features (for instance
the Japanese table) we thus make a graded judgment deciding to what degree it is a table
or not. Whether this is done in the brain by comparing to an abstract set of features
(in case of prototype theory), or to specific exemplars with a set of features (in case of
exemplar theory) is still debated (cf. Storms et al. 2000, Ross and Makin 1999). However,
it is clear that a comparison to some set of observed features is made.
The meta-concepts we use so often in modeling tasks are no different from this. For ex-
ample, someone could simply find it incorrect to view a ‘department’ as being an actor,
because they are not singular human entities that can easily be attributed moral respon-
sibility for their actions. When that person is forced to model a department as an actor
in some modeling language, because the language dictates it to be done in such a fashion,
the produced model is not a truly valid representation of that modeler (or stakeholder’s)
conceptualization anymore. If we had more of an insight into what features are most
common and typical for these modeling concepts we would have a better chance of judg-
ing whether a produced model corresponds to the involved modelers’ and stakeholders’
conceptualizations. Perhaps more importantly, if we know how stakeholders and model-
ers alike identify things in terms of their features (i.e., what the modeling concepts really
are for them), we could reason whether the modeling languages we use let us (or can be
extended to) model the world as they see it.
Investigating what features are most linked with common modeling concepts is thus di-
rectly relevant to the practice of conceptual modeling. In particular, the quality of models
and modeling languages can benefit from a deeper understanding into these features, as
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it would be easier to ensure models are a valid representation of the conceptualization
someone has of a particular domain. While quality is a term with many different meanings
and aspects (Fettke et al. 2012, Houy et al. 2012), determining whether a model is able to
convey the intended meaning of the original modeler (Robinson 2006) is surely relevant
for all purposes. This holds especially when models are used for building and exchanging
knowledge (Stahl 2000) (i.e., communicating between different parties), as is often the
case with the different aspects modeled in Enterprise Modeling, making it important to
be aware of the validity of just what knowledge is being exchanged.
An empirically derived understanding of the features that modelers typically associate
with modeling concepts would help us in this, especially so because we tend to model
with the semantics of our own natural language (Sowa 2010), and all the bias that comes
with doing so. The primary use would be in knowing how people (in the context of
conceptual modeling) actually judge whether some element from the universe of discourse
is a typical example of some concept, or whether it is barely so. For example, if resources
are typically resources because they are material, we know that we need to be very careful
when we want to model an abstract piece of ‘information’ as a resource for some business
process, and perhaps discuss whether we select instead a material representation of that
information (i.e., a set of documents). By analyzing what kind of features are used to
make these judgments (e.g., structural or functional, or other yet unknown modalities),
we could also gain more insight into the fundamental nature of these concepts themselves.
Furthermore, from analyzing the most typical features (e.g., those often repeated or shared
between different modelers) and atypical features, we could find specific areas that would
benefit from extra attention during modeling sessions. If we know what there are a
large number of varied views for a particular concept (e.g., many people holding different
views on what constitutes a resource), focusing extra discussions during the modeling
process on those concepts would help enhance the validity of produced models, and likely
have a positive effect on the agreement between the people involved (Stirna et al. 2007).
Finally, knowing what features are most typical would make it possible to analyze where
modeling languages might go wrong (by forcing people into an atypical use of a concept),
or can be made better (by not allowing for the explicit modeling of some particular
conceptualization).
5.2 Experimental Parameters
In this section we give an overview of the exact procedure we followed for our study,
what materials we used, how we gathered the participants, and how we processed the
results. We chose to perform a simple elicitation study with clear semantic priming at
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every question, where it was made clear to participants that all questions and answers
were to be given in the context of conceptual modeling.
5.2.1 Considerations
Feature listing studies (sometimes also referred to as property generation), as described
in more detail in Chapter 2.2.2, are a fairly simple type of study, where our primary
requirement is to reach enough participants. For this reason we opt to create an open
survey to which to invite people, and in doing so attempt to achieve a wide spread of results
from different professional backgrounds. Similar to other studies we have performed, the
main consideration here is the language used to survey the participants. As we want
to reach a wide variety of people, and also include multi-national companies in which
employees might have a different first language, it would be more practical to have a
single shared language for the survey. Given that the practitioners we attempt to reach
a) in general speak and understand English to a high professional working capacity, and
b) the modeling languages they typically use are predominantly in English, it seems safe
to assume the language used for surveying participants can be English.
However, a more troubling consideration for this particular study is what language should
be required of the participants for the features they are asked to list. While participants
might clearly understand the concept and descriptions given to them in English, an asso-
ciation task such as this feature listing in which they are asked to list any features that
come to mind might yield more (or simply, faster) results in their native language. With
such a setup it becomes necessary to ‘normalize’ the resulting features to a single language
before analyzing and comparing them. This can introduce a translation and interpretation
bias originating with the researchers performing this step. The use of multiple people,
both independently translating non-English features to English, and afterwards compar-
ing and contrasting their interpretations seems to be a safe compromise here. For this
reason we will allow for participants to list features in their own language if they wish to
do so (which practically means features can potentially be in English, Dutch, German, or
French), and afterwards have at least two researchers translate the listed features back
into English and reach consensus on any contended translation.
5.2.2 Method
Materials The basic examples of a chair and its functional and structural features were
inspired by common works in cognitive science and categorization studies (e.g., Barr
and Caplan 1987). We use the meta-concepts from Table 3.2, and use the direct
88 | Chapter 5: On Features of Modeling Concepts
lexical references for them (i.e., actor, event, goal, process, resource, restriction, re-
sult), together with a simple description for each meta-concept that was non-specific
enough to not prime participants on a particular interpretation which already ex-
ists in the context of conceptual modeling such as hard goals or soft goals (see the
descriptions given in Section 3.3.1 given on page 60).
Participants We invited professionals from academia and practice with significant con-
ceptual modeling experience to participate in our study. Where available, we se-
lected people who had participated in our earlier studies, and had at least an in-
termediate level of experience with modeling and modeling languages. In total 45
people participated, all of whom were experienced modelers employed at various in-
ternationally operating businesses located throughout Europe and the United States.
All participated voluntarily and received no compensation for their participation.
Procedure The survey was executed online with the use of LimeSurvey. Participants
were instructed in detail what the experiment was about, and what kind of infor-
mation was needed. First we elicited what modeling languages the participant had
significant experience with, followed by a longer explanation of the feature ques-
tions. For the studied set of seven modeling concepts we then asked participants to
write down any and all features they would typically attribute to this concept, in the
context of modeling. In order to encourage as much intuitive responses, participants
were allowed to respond such features in a number of major languages locally used
(English, German, French, Dutch). The results of this step were first (where neces-
sary) translated into English, and then iteratively analyzed in order to standardize
the grammatical and lexical form of the feature (e.g., standardizing ‘human’, ‘is
human’, ‘a human thing’ to ‘is human’). After this, another iteration followed in
which features with the same meaning were clustered together (e.g., ‘is a person’,
‘is a human being’, ‘is a human’ into ‘is human’). We then counted the amount
of times that a feature was expressed by participants in order to determine which
features were most commonly given. Each of these features were also analyzed to
determine their modality and whether they were of a structural or functional nature
(e.g., a restriction ‘limiting behavior’ is functional, while ‘exists as an abstract
thought’ is structural.).
5.3 Data
The diverse amount of views on the different concepts we investigated was ensured by
the wide variety of participants and the languages they were specialized in. While most
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common were general purpose language such as UML, ER and their variations, ArchiMate
was also widely used. The total list (see Table 5.1) encompasses a wide range including also
a host of formalized languages, methods and frameworks, and improvisational approaches
(e.g., sketching models with pen and paper or in Microsoft PowerPoint).
Table 5.1: Used modeling languages, as reported by participants.
language
Object-oriented programming languages, IDEF, UML, ER, ArchiMate, BPMN, NIAM,
Essence, Petrinets, BPEL, Amber, Merode, Turtle, DEMO, Dataflow diagrams, The
Decision model visual modeling for decision logic, EPC, IE, CBM, BMC, TOGAF,
IDEF, IDEF0, IT City Planning, Flowcharts, Value stream mapping, Value chain dia-
gram, SIPOC, BPEL, ARIS, Proprietary language, Microsoft Powerpoint, ORM, Busi-
ness object diagrams, Natural language, Plateua planning, ISAC, Yourdon Ward en
Mellor ERD, Evolutionary NIAM, CaseTalk, JBF, i*, Secure Tropos, CORAS, VCL,
VHDL, WSDL, e3Value, RBAC, XACML, EMF, BMO, PERT.
As the complete, raw list of elicited features is rather large (see Table 5.2 for their respec-
tive sizes), we give an overview of cleaned up results, with redundant features removed
from them. (The full list is found in the Appendices.) We will focus specifically on the
reoccurring features (i.e., those likely more typical as they were shared between multi-
ple participants), which are given in Table 5.3. An overview of the different modalities
expressed in the results is given in Table 5.4 (see later discussion in Section 5.4.1). Full
datasets can be found in Appendices B.1 through B.7.
Table 5.2: Amount of features elicited per concept. These amounts are given excluding repeated
features (i.e., exactly the same term was elicited from multiple participants), the number of which
are given at the bottom of the table.
actor event goal process resource restriction result
total 131 98 97 51 105 75 79
% structural 52% 70% 82% 73% 82% 52% 85%
% functional 43% 30% 18% 27% 18% 48% 15%
repetitions 46 35 13 4 28 16 8
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Table 5.3: The most often reoccurring features we elicited in our study. Full datasets can be
found in Appendices B.1 through B.7.
concept feature
actor has a name, has a role, has skills, can perform an action / actions, has a
responsibility / responsibilities, has capabilities, carries knowledge, has
permissions, has rights, is human, is independent, carries out actions,
is machine, is a person (with a role in a company), is an organization,
initiates actions, is autonomous, is active, has responsibilities, is part
of a business function
event is triggered by something, has consequences, has a trigger, can trigger
an action, has a duration, triggers a process, occurs at a time, can be
observed, has a name, happens, is a process end, triggers a task, has
a description, has a source, is atomic, is a trigger, is repeatable, is an
occurrence, is temporal, can trigger a process
goal has a related stakeholder, has a name, can be achieved, becomes an
evaluation criteria for future accomplishments, is clear, is measurable,
has to be achieved, gives direction, is desired, is in the future
process has input, has output, has related actors, has steps
resource is used for something, is material, is immaterial, is countable, is scarce,
has a name, has a value, has costs, has a source, can be human, is
human, is a machine, is needed for an activity, has a type
restriction has a type, limits something, has a name, has conditions, is natural,
limits something, limits possible solutions, is quantitative, has a source,
is measurable, can be temporal
result is measurable, has a name, has a quality, has a description, is realized,
is observable, has value for someone
5.4 Discussion
5.4.1 General discussion
In this section we will first come back to the research questions we stated, and then discuss
some of the more interesting findings in more detail.
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Elicited and most typical features
The results given in appendices B.1 through B.7 are a complete, processed overview of
all the elicited features that conceptual modelers use to identify common concepts. They
are unweighted terms which, for at least one practitioner are in the top 5 most important
features which they use to identify that specific concept by. The total amount of terms
here is a collection of the results from all the individual participants and is thus not
meant to be a requirement for what every actor has to be. These results can be found
in Table 5.3, where only the features that were repeated by multiple participants are
listed. For example, in appendix B.1 the first features are ‘has a name’, ‘has permissions’,
‘has a role’, and so on. This means that, in order to be a conceptually valid actor, an
entity should have some kind of name that identifies it, it needs to have permissions on
something, and it needs to hold a specific role. Almost all of the concepts have at least
some repetition of features that allow for identification, whether it is the existence of some
specific name or label, or them being capable of being identified or observed. Furthermore,
most concepts can be dealt with on an instantiation level, as often they are seen in terms
of specific instantiations.
The most often recurring features for the concept actor center around, as could be
expected, its ability to act. Specifically its logical and/or ethical capability to act when
it should do so (e.g., having responsibilities), and its role of acting as an independent
or autonomous entity. This seems to point the common view of an actor more towards
human beings and (smart) agents, not simple reactive agents or automata. Furthermore,
this is expressed again in the often reoccurring features that identify exactly what acts,
including such features as stating whether it is a human being, a specific person, a machine
or an organization.
When it comes to events, the most conserved features are that of being a trigger for some-
thing, and needing to be triggered itself. This shows that most modelers conceptualize of
events as intentional things: things that are specifically made to happen. Environmental
or contextual events, even if they might impact on something (e.g., some market condi-
tions impacting a process’ efficiency) are thus typically not considered to be events in this
context, which is in line with the often used assumption of closed world semantics.
Goals are most importantly identified by knowing whether they can be achieved, and
to what degree they can be verified to have been achieved. This is in line with the often
used distinction between hard and soft goals, as it is often important to know whether a
goal’s satisfaction criteria can actually be known to have been met.
Processes are primarily identified as things with a clear beginning, middle, and end.
They also typically have related actors that drive its events.
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For resources there are a number of important features. They are identified by their
nature (e.g., material or immaterial), the availability (e.g., scarcity) and the need of
them having to be used for something. This implies strongly a view that resources exist
primarily as a contextualized entity that only exists in the context of some other entity
(e.g., a process) using them for a specific purpose.
Restrictions are, like most other features identified by their ability to be properly
identified, described, and measured. However, this goes into more detail than some other
concepts, as features like the specific conditions of what it limits, and for how long it does
so are found to be important for something to be a restriction.
Results are quite similar to restrictions in terms of their identifying features: the ability
to be properly identified, described, temporal conditions like when a result is achieved.
Furthermore, just like resources it seems that results are another contextually existent
entity, that they exist in the context of being the result of some specific thing, often a
process.
It is important to re-iterate that the feature sets as described here are only a small subset of
the total amount of elicited features. All of the features we elicited, even those mentioned
by only a single participant and not repeated by others, are used by practitioners in actual
situations for the identification of concepts. Thus, each of these features should be taken
seriously as a possible restriction of what specific modeling concepts can be in professional
contexts. While the discussion we gave based on those repeated features gives a likely
overview of how multiple people identify modeling concepts, there are far more possible
features, and thus ways of seeing the world out there (as evidenced by the plurality of
the elicited features), meaning that we should not simply close our eyes to them because
they do not represent the majority opinion.
Functional and structural nature
As Table 5.2 shows, the largest amount of features we elicited were of a structural nature,
excepting the concept of actor, which also had a significant amount of functional features
(likely because actors are inherently associated with what they do: their functionality).
Most of the features that can be seen in the other Tables corroborate this quite clearly,
since most often they deal with some structural aspect a concept has (e.g., having a
label, being some specific kind). This is in line with the findings from Malt and Johnson
(1992) where it was also found that most artifactual categories were identified primarily
by structural features. The reason given for this difference is that most concepts have
multiple (often directly observable) structural features by which we identify them (even
for abstract objects), but often only few main functions that we associate with them.
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Table 5.4: The main modalities we found features of in the elicited features. We distinguish
between alethic (what is or has to be), temporal (what will be), deontic (what should be), and
mereological (what is part of what).
modality feature prefix example of feature
alethic is . . . an actor is human, an event is trig-
gered by something, a goal is based
on an objective, a process is com-
posite, a resource is used by an ac-
tor, a restriction is valid until some
time, a result is material
has . . . an actor has capabilities, an event
has consequences, a goal has a re-
lated objective, a process has steps,
a resource has a quality level, a re-
striction has to be made explicit, a
result has value for someone
does not . . . an event does not have a duration
temporal always has . . . an actor always has an input, an
actor always has an output
becomes . . . a goal becomes an evaluation crite-
ria for future accomplishments
deontic has to . . . a resource has to be protected, a
goal has to be fulfilled, an event has
to be monitored, an actor has to
work under constraints
can be . . . an actor can be human, an event
can be caught by something, a goal
can be refined into a subgoal, a re-
source can be available
may . . . an event may be notified to lis-
teners, a goal may be quantifiable,
a process may involve roles, a re-
source may be decomposed
mereological is part of . . . an actor is part of a business func-
tional
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This results in a smaller amount of functional features elicited from each participant.
This means also that these feature sets are likely less (modeling task) context-dependent
than if they were identified primarily by functional features, since the structure exists
independently of the actions taken or the environment in which the entity is found.
Modalities found in the results
Apart from the distinction between structural and functional features, we found some
reoccurring modalities expressed in the dataset. Table 5.4 gives an overview of these,
with some specific examples. A large group contains features of an alethic nature, which
talk about things that are or are not the case (both functional and structural); for example,
an actor being a human thing, an event being triggered by something. These types of
features clearly state that some feature has to be the case, and thus needs to be true for
some thing in order for it to be that concept.
Some temporal features were also present in the data set, dealing with features having
specific time-bound aspects. These temporal features are sometimes a stronger version
of a similar alethic feature, like for example with the feature ‘an actor always has an
input’, which is a stronger version of the logical requirement that ‘an actor has an input’.
Others are interesting because they transform structural features of some concepts, like a
goal becoming a specific thing (e.g., an evaluation criteria) which specializes (and perhaps
narrows) the set of needed and sufficient features for it to be a goal.
The other largest class of features we found were those of a deontic nature. These deal
with features that should be the case, like a ‘resource has to be protected’, ‘an actor has
to work under constraints’. The difference of these features compared to their alethic
counterparts is that they are less strong in stating what is the case in the subjective
reality of the modeler, and are thus likely weaker features for rejecting something as not
being a proper instantiation of a concept. In this case, even though a resource has to
be protected, some particular thing that is not protected, but has enough other features
that correlate with resources, will likely still be identified as being a resource. Thus, the
features of modal nature are less strong when it comes to rejecting the identification of
something as a specific concept.
Finally, we found some mereological features, which express part-whole relationships. For
example, the ‘an actor is part of a business function’ is stronger than a similar subset/type,
as here the business function cannot exist without the actor. However, compared to
the total amount of results these kind of features were few and far between and thus
likely are not widespread amongst practitioners. It is interesting that the amount of
mereological features is so low, as they could be inferred from some other features (for
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instance, if an actor is an absolutely necessary thing for some process, then it makes
sense to see that actor as a part of the whole business process; the process collapsing and
not existing without that actor). The simplest explanation for this would be the use of
terminology from which it cannot be unambiguously inferred that a mereological feature
was intended. If people are simply used to express these types of features also with more
general terminology like, e.g., ‘belongs to’, or ‘fits in’, it is difficult to estimate, from
their verbalizations alone, whether a statement about some mereological structure was
intended. Reasons for this lack of features could be that either people do not conceptualize
these more stringent part-whole relationships and thus do not verbally express them either.
A stronger focus on thinking of part-whole relations in terms of sub and super typing
originating from widespread database thinking could be an explanation for that. A lack
of support from modeling languages or methods could also be intuitively argued for as a
reason. However, this does not hold as a widespread language like UML already supports
the definition of constrictions on the structure of things with ‘containment’ relationships,
where the whole seizes to exist once a single element is removed. Thus, there seem to be
existing ways to both reason and encode mereological structure in modeling languages.
5.4.2 Limitations
The primary concern we have for the internal validity of the study discussed in this
chapter and the presented results is the multi-lingual component of the answers, and the
related difficulty in ensuring that meaning was correctly preserved during translation to
a common language for the analysis phase. However, given that most responses were
given by people fluent in both English and their native tongue, and the translations were
validated by multiple readers, we are confident that no errors were introduced here.
The external validity of this study is ensured partially by the varied background of the
participants: we have responses from people from multiple kinds of sectors (government,
for-profits, educational institutes), and from different countries (USA, the Netherlands,
Germany, France, etc.). We aim to increase the external validity (that is, the generaliz-
ability of the sets of often repeated features) by incorporating another quantitative study
that will further clarify the exact typicality of each of these features. However, because
of the nature of the feature sets and the significant amount of terms that need to be
investigated, this is a significant research effort which will take a longer running time in
order to gain enough results, as will be discussed in Chapter 9.2.
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5.5 Summary & outlook
In this chapter we have shown the results of a study into what features conceptual modelers
typically identify common modeling concepts by. We discussed some interesting details
of the data, including common modalities found in them, and the need for modeling
languages to explicitly accommodate them. Related to one of our main research questions,
“To what extent do conceptual understandings differ on key points between different people
(e.g., different sets of features, typicality)?” these findings as discussed thus offer an
insight into some of the key aspects – the typical set of features – of the conceptual
understanding people have of the modeling meta-concepts.
These features can be used as a guideline for what aspects are important to focus on
during modeling sessions, as they represent the subtly different ways in which conceptual
modelers interpret common modeling concepts, and might thus, unbeknownst to them,
disagree with each other. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.4. Now
that we have performed these investigations into the external category structure and a
first glance at the internal structure of these meta-concepts, we will go into more detailed
studies of the internal structure with the in-depth semantic differential studies described
in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 6
On Conceptual Understandings
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Abstract. The aim of this chapter is to have a more in-depth look at the internal
structure of the meta-concepts. It incorporates two semantic differential studies into the
conceptual understanding people have of the meta-concepts. First a small group of model-
ing practitioners, all professionally active in an enterprise modeling context is investigated
to see how they view the meta-concepts on the basic set of dimensions. Second, the results
of a longitudinal study among computing and information systems science students into
the conceptual understanding of the same meta-concepts is presented. Of particular in-
terest here was the potential evolution of the conceptual understanding that students had
over the course of their studies. Finally, we compare the results of both practitioners and
students. We initially expected that practitioners would have more specific conceptualiza-
tions related to the particular languages they use, the domain or aspect they operate in,
whereas students, being far less experienced, would have more general conceptualizations
of the same meta-concepts. These assumptions both proved to be false, of which we will
discuss the potential cause and consequences of as a reflection on both studies.
The content of this chapter is based on work published as:
Dirk van der Linden, Khaled Gaaloul, Wolfgang Molnar: Initial Results from a Study
on Personal Semantics of Conceptual Modeling Languages. In: G. Bouma et al.
(Eds.): NLDB 2012, LNCS 7337, pp. 360–365. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
Re-published with extended abstract in Proceedings of the 7th SIKS Con-
ference on Enterprise Information Systems (EIS2012), Nieuwegein, the Nether-
lands
Dirk van der Linden, Henderik A. Proper: On the cognitive understanding of types
in modeling languages. In: Jung and Reichert (Eds.): Enterprise Modelling and
Information Systems Architecture (EMISA 2013), LNI 222, pp. 149–162, GI,
2013
Dirk van der Linden, Henderik A. Proper and Stijn J.B.A. Hoppenbrouwers: Con-
ceptual understanding of conceptual modeling concepts: a longitudinal study
amongst students learning to model. In: L. Iliadis, M. Papazoglou, and K. Pohl
(Eds.): CAiSE 2014 Workshops, LNBIP 178, pp. 213–218. Springer, 2014
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6.1 Background
In the previous Chapters we have set out a detailed overview of the meta-concepts com-
mon to conceptual modeling languages and on what semantic distinctions they can be
discriminated. We then showed that people judge these meta-concepts to be of a graded
nature, where some particular things are better examples of such a concept than others,
further detailing this by eliciting the features that people most typically associate with
these meta-concepts. While this gives us some insight into the structure and understand-
ing of these concepts, it does not yet give us a detailed hint at the attitude people have
towards them – what these meta-concepts are to people.
It is important to be aware of what these meta-concepts are to people, because the models
in which we use them are there to support the building and exchange of knowledge (Stahl
2000). While the quality of such models are dependent on many aspects and can be
interpreted differently depending on what is expected from the model (cf. Fettke et al.
2012, Houy et al. 2012), it is contingent on their ability to communicate any intended
meaning clearly and completely (Robinson 2006). Thus, we need to be able to be sure
that the semantics in a model reflect the semantics intended by the modeler. This goes
further than merely ensuring that the model is capable of expressing those semantics that
the original modeler wanted to (with, e.g., test scenarios). We need to additionally ensure
that the model does not allow one to express situations that, by the original modeler and
stakeholders, are considered conceptually invalid (or simply illogical).
For this to be possible it is necessary to first have more detailed understanding on how
people typically understand these meta-concepts, what particular instantiations make
sense to them, and what particular instantiations do not. This can be done effectively
by characterizing their conceptual understanding of the meta-concepts (in regards to the
found semantic dimensions), as those directly affect the amount of conceptually valid (in-
stantiations of) models. Such characterizations offer other benefits as well, as performing
these studies among both practitioners and students allows for the comparison of typical
conceptual understandings between those with more and less modeling experience, expe-
rience in particular languages and techniques, and so on. Furthermore, measuring the
development (or potential lack thereof) of such conceptual understandings over time can
give some insights into the stability of such understandings. This can be used to reason
about how fragile the consideration of a particular model’s instantiation as conceptually
valid is, or if one needs to worry about models becoming conceptually invalid as soon as
a modeler changes their mind or has some new insight. Thus, this chapter will focus on
studies attempting to understand more clearly what these meta-concepts are to people,
in terms of how they find the dimensions relate to the meta-concepts.
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6.2 Experimental parameters
This section gives an overview of the experimental parameters for both of the studies
discussed in this chapter. Because they share the empirical method used for them, as well
as a significant amount of materials (i.e., both investigated the same meta-concepts and
dimensions) we discuss the setup of both studies here at once. If some details are specific
to one of the studies (e.g., just the practitioners or students), they will be labeled as such.
As explained earlier in Chapter 1, in order to investigate the conceptual understanding
people have of a concept we need to understand that we cannot completely measure
concepts, but instead can characterize them (cf. Malt et al. 2011, Pinker 2007) by looking
at which semantic dimensions resonate strongly to them. This can be used in order to
reason about the range and boundaries of the concept. For example, if we know that for
someone the dimension ‘human’ strongly resonates with their view on the concept actor,
we can deduce what are typical and atypical examples of that concept for them, and
thus clearly characterize ‘what’ an actor is for them. If we have a number of semantic
dimensions to measure for each concept, we could thus clearly characterize someone’s
conceptual understanding of a particular concept, and distinguish between understandings
different people have.
6.2.1 Considerations
The size of the semantic differential we use for our study is quite large. To investigate
the seven meta-concepts on seven distinct dimensions we require a total of (7× (7×5) =)
245 bipolar scale questions. While such questions can (and should) be answered quite
quickly without too much conscious consideration, the sheer amount of questions does
represent a significant time investment expected from a participant. Pilot studies showed
that on average half an hour to 45 minutes were necessary to fully fill out the differential.
This is a significant investment for practitioners active in industry. Because of this, it
will be difficult to get a large amount of participants from professional settings. However,
reducing the length of the survey is difficult, as it would require reducing the amount
of terms below the threshold of statistical significance, or removing entire dimensions
altogether. Only investigating a subset of meta-concepts and dimensions per participant
would be a potential solution, but this would require a far greater amount of available
(and willing) participants than we had access to at the time of investigation.
For the longitudinal study there were some additional considerations to keep in mind.
Since the people involved were required to participate in a survey at the end of each
semester, and do so for several years in a row, it was necessary 1) to ensure the drop-out
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rate would be low, and 2) that participants did not skip any surveys. Dealing with a
decrease in the number of participants because of drop-out was expected to some degree,
as we started the study at the beginning of the participants’ undergraduate program,
and some of them were bound to drop out, switch majors, or stop responding due to
different reasons. In order to deal with this from the beginning we included incentives
for students to respond in the form of gift coupons which were raﬄed among participants
that fully concluded the survey during each semester. In order to deal with participants
skipping one or multiple surveys of the study (which would lead to an incomplete dataset
of their conceptual change, and thus become unusable for comparison with others) we
ensured that we reminded participants up to 3 times for each survey if they had not yet
completed it.
6.2.2 Method
Materials: The concepts we investigate are the meta-concepts as found in Table 3.2:
actor, event, goal, process, resource, restriction and result. More
information on these meta-concepts, terms and their derivation can be found in
Chapter 3.3.1. The terms used for the members of these categories are the terms as
used by the modeling languages and methods, based on the official (or most-used)
specification. The dimensions we investigate these concepts on are the dimensions
presented in Table 3.3, namely: natural, human, composed, intentional, necessary,
material and vague. A more in-depth description of these dimensions can be found
in Section 3.3.2, page 63. Any combination of these features can then be taken as a
characterization of a given concept, for instance an actor being a natural, human,
non-composed material thing.
Participants – practitioners: We report on a study investigating practitioners (n =
12), which was performed amongst employees of two internationally operating com-
panies that provide support to clients with (re)design of organizations. The partic-
ipants all had several years of experience as enterprise modelers, creating and using
conceptual models and using diverse modeling techniques.
Participants – students: We report on a longitudinal study amongst computing and
information science students at Radboud University Nijmegen. We initially gath-
ered students in the very first session at the beginning of their studies, at which 46
students volunteered to participate. Of these, 19 actually participated in the first
phase. Over the course of the study, several students either stopped responding
(without specific reason given), stopped because they changed their study program,
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or because they dropped out entirely. At the final measurement, 9 people partici-
pated. However, because one of them had not participated in an earlier phase we
were forced to reduce the total set down to 8 complete measurements of the total
timespan.
Procedure: We use a semantic differential (elaborated on in section 2.2.3) in order to
investigate the conceptual understandings which participants have of the selected
meta-concepts. For each combination of a meta-concept with a dimension (e.g.,
actor–human) we used five adjectives (found through an earlier pilot study among
the same student population) which relate to the specific semantics of the dimension
to be investigated, so ensuring statistical significance (Verhagen and Meents 2007).
An overview of these adjectives can be found in Appendix C.1. We then constructed
a differential with a page for each meta-concept in which we included 1) a priming
task to ensure participants responded in the context of conceptual modeling, and
2) a differential in which a bipolar scale of the adjectives was presented to each
participant in a random order. They were asked to rate how well each adjective
related to the particular meta-concept on a 5 point Likert scale.
Procedure – students: For the longitudinal study, we started the study at the begin-
ning of the students’ studies so that we would have a null measurement. From then
on, at the end of each semester, students received an email inviting them to a digi-
tal implementation of the semantic differential, where they were also asked to detail
what courses they had followed, and what new languages or techniques (if any) they
were introduced to. In each phase we sent out 3 reminders to participants if they
had not yet responded, and afterwards reduced the set of active participants down
to those that participated.
Processing: The resulting data from the semantic differential was processed to calculate
an average score for each concept-dimension combination based on the individual
adjectives used to describe that dimensions. From this we constructed a vector for
each concept, which contained scores ranging from 2.0 to −2.0, describing for each
dimension how it relates to that concept. We considered scores ≥ 1.0 as positive
judgments, and scores≤ -1.0 as negative judgments. Other scores were considered as
neutral. These judgments were then used to calculate a percentage wise breakdown
of the amount of different polarities (i.e., negative or positive connotations) found
for each concept.
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6.3 Study among practitioners
This section will focus on how enterprise modeler practitioners understand the meta-
concepts as used in most modeling languages in terms of their attitude to the various
investigated dimensions. We are particularly interested in any conceptual understandings
that display a specific interpretation of a particular meta-concept, where that would affect
the range of conceptually valid instantiations (e.g., actors should not be instantiated
with human things). We are furthermore interested in studying whether these experienced
modelers on average display a specific interpretations for some meta-concepts, or whether
these remain more non-specific, and thus more open to different interpretations. Thus,
we will treat the following specific questions in this section:
1. What conceptual understanding do practitioners have of the meta-concepts?
2. Are there particular understandings for some meta-concepts that stand out?
3. Are these conceptual understandings significantly specialized or more generic?
With these results we also hope to demonstrate the use of having insights into how people
conceptualize modeling concepts in general, and our method being a valid systematic way
of uncovering them. In Chapter 7 we will discuss in more detail what consequences our
findings have for modeling languages, and the use and creation of models themselves,
especially in an inherently collaborative effort like enterprise modeling.
6.3.1 Data
A visual overview of the scores from the semantic differential for all meta-concepts and
dimensions is given in Fig. 6.1. These results from the study were processed into the
amount of different polarities, and are shown in Table 6.1. The percentages are an aggre-
gate reflecting the amount of negative, neutral and positive results. The amount of neutral
responses can be taken as a measure of how open people’s typical conceptualization of
a concept is, in that it allows for more flexible (and possible amount of) instantiation.
Negative and positive responses indicate that an instantiation of the concept would ei-
ther need to, or not need to display a certain dimension. For example, when it comes
to actors, there are 9% negative responses, 53% neutral and 38% positive. This means
that about 9% of the responses indicate a dimension that has to be false for a typical
actor instantiation (e.g., a typical actor should not be a composed thing), 38% of the
response indicate a dimension that has to be true for a typical actor instantiation (e.g., a
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Figure 6.1: Visualization of the semantic differential results from our study amongst prac-
titioners. Shown is the median and standard deviation for each meta-concept and dimension
combination grouped per dimension. To illustrate, the first cluster of bars shows in what respect
all the meta-concepts are considered natural things, followed by the next cluster that shows in
what respect the categories are human things and so on. The variance in the results of the
meta-concepts is respectively 0.38, 0.57, 0.68, 0.93, 0.73, 0.94, and 0.92.
typical actor should be a human thing), while the remaining 53% allow for dimensions to
be either false or true (e.g., an actor can be either material or immaterial thing).
Table 6.2 shows a number of specifically strongly polarized meta-concept and dimension
combinations. The percentages here denote how many of the participants judged the meta-
concept to need (or need not) to display the given (semantic) dimension. For example,
91% of practitioners judged goals to need the ‘necessary’ dimension, which means that
the majority conceptualize goals as things that need to be achieved (or perhaps gained,
if goals are also conceptualized as material objects). It can also be seen that 64% of
practitioners judged processes to be non-vague things, meaning that they are (or should)
be well-described things.
Study among practitioners | 105
Table 6.1: A detailed overview of the polarities of the responses from the practitioner study.
pol. nat hum com nec int mat vag avg.
actor
neg 0% 9% 9% 0% 0% 0% 45% 9%
neu 73% 55% 73% 27% 45% 55% 45% 53%
pos 27% 36% 18% 73% 55% 45% 9% 38%
event
neg 36% 36% 0% 0% 9% 55% 55% 27%
neu 64% 55% 73% 27% 64% 45% 45% 53%
pos 0% 9% 27% 73% 27% 0% 0% 19%
goal
neg 9% 45% 9% 0% 9% 36% 45% 22%
neu 82% 45% 82% 9% 36% 64% 45% 52%
pos 9% 9% 9% 91% 55% 0% 9% 26%
process
neg 36% 36% 9% 18% 9% 45% 64% 31%
neu 64% 55% 45% 18% 36% 45% 18% 40%
pos 0% 9% 45% 64% 55% 9% 18% 29%
resource
neg 36% 36% 36% 18% 9% 9% 64% 30%
neu 64% 55% 64% 18% 45% 55% 27% 47%
pos 0% 9% 0% 64% 45% 36% 9% 23%
restriction
neg 73% 73% 18% 9% 9% 55% 82% 45%
neu 18% 18% 82% 18% 36% 36% 18% 32%
pos 9% 9% 0% 73% 55% 9% 0% 22%
result
neg 64% 73% 18% 18% 18% 36% 91% 45%
neu 36% 18% 64% 27% 9% 45% 9% 30%
pos 0% 9% 18% 55% 73% 18% 0% 25%
6.3.2 Discussion
General discussion
As briefly discussed in the previous section, the results as seen in Tables 6.1 and 6.2,
directly affect the total amount of conceptually valid instantiations for a given meta-
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Table 6.2: Some strongly (> 55%) polarized meta-concept – dimension combinations.
meta-concept is . . . score
goal necessary 91%
process necessary 64%
not vague 64%
resource necessary 64%
not vague 64%
restriction not natural 73%
not human 73%
necessary 73%
not vague 82%
result not natural 64%
not human 73%
intentional 73%
not vague 91%
concept. The higher the amount of neutral scores, and vice-versa the lower the amount of
polarized (and more to the point, strongly polarized) scores, the lesser dimensions need
to be exhibited by an instantiation of a meta-concept. Most interesting for our purpose
are the polarized scores, as they indicate a dimension that has to be exhibited by the
meta-concept, and thus restricts the amount of conceptually valid interpretations for that
meta-concept.
The results also show that around half of the judgments for the meta-concepts are of a
polar (either positive or negative) nature, indicating that there are many dimensions that
are conceived of as either strongly typical or atypical. On an individual level this may
vary, as specific people might find all dimensions (a)typical for a given meta-concept, or
find no dimensions particularly typical for a given meta-concept. Such differences can
be correlated with someone’s expertise in a specific area, causing them to more closely
scrutinize the meta-concepts relevant to that specific area.
Discussion of meta-concepts
Goals are one of the few meta-concepts where there is but one absolutely needed dimen-
sion. Specifically, goals are considered by most (91% of practitioners) to be necessary.
What this means is that goals are considered to be logical necessities in the sense of their
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being achieved, i.e., they are the logical consequence of following a certain procedure to
achieve them, and should be achieved then (and likely only) then. This is in contrast to
the other option of goals being things that ‘merely’ should be achieved. As a consequence,
this seems to imply an implicit bias towards hard-goals, as soft-goals are often used to
model goals for which the achievement status is (or cannot) be known a priori. The ab-
sence of any other needed dimensions is interesting as well. It could have been expected
that, in line with the implicit bias towards hard-goals, the majority of practitioners would
consider goals as being non-vague (i.e., well-described), yet only 45% does so.
A slight majority of practitioners deem resources to be necessary and not vague. This
seems to imply that resources, are commonly seen as things that need to be well-defined,
before they can be reliably (and systematically) used for some other activity. Such typical
interpretations might clash with the way resources are handled in some languages, e.g., the
information object in ArchiMate (The Open Group 2012), which allows you to represent
a functional piece of information needed by some business process, without requiring you
to be explicit about what information it contains.
Restrictions already have a larger typical dimension set. They are typically consid-
ered non-natural, non-human, necessary and non-vague things. The non-vague dimension
seems obvious in that it demands us to be clear about what a restriction actually does
(perhaps making rules more typical restrictions than something like, say, architecture
principles). Non-natural clearly implies that they are not naturally occurring restrictions
(e.g., natural laws like gravity) but more like restrictions that are ‘created’ to control or re-
strict other things. Related to this restrictions are also not considered to be human things,
which in this context might mean that the general way of conceptualizing a restriction is
seeing it as the abstract entity itself, and not, for instance, the human being enforcing it.
More interesting from a modeling language point of view is the, perhaps obvious, view of
restrictions being logically necessary things. This means that a typical restriction is some-
thing that has to be adhered to, and not something that can be broken. To accommodate
that, a modeling language should either have its restriction meta-concepts be inherently
alethic, or allow for a way to explicitly distinguish restrictions with different modality.
While there are not many (especially domain-specific) languages that accommodate this,
Object Role Modeling (ORM) (Halpin 2005) does have explicit support for denoting el-
ements as being either alethic or deontic, and thus could be a useful choice of language
when a domain involves those non-typical restrictions: ones that do not necessarily have
to be adhered to.
Results are typically non-natural, non-human, intentional and non-vague. This seems
to fit with the common conceptualization of results, because they are seen as ‘new’ things,
and thus shouldn’t be already existing naturally occurring objects. This requires a certain
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level of ontological scrutiny though, because a tree is certainly a naturally occurring
entity, as well as a tree branch that naturally fell off from a storm, but a log that results
from cutting the tree into parts with a chainsaw is not. Furthermore, a branch that
merely breaks off from a tree would not be considered a result in our sense because its
breaking off was not intentional. Some results as modeled by languages might seem not
to fit and evoke discussion on their ontological status, as, for instance, the human output
concept in ARIS (Scheer and Nu¨ttgens 2000). At first glance, it would seem not to fit the
characterization as it is likely a human kind of thing. However, ontologically speaking,
the actual thing here is the activity performed by a human, not the human itself. Say,
the successful delivery of a pizza. As results are not typically considered material things,
this seems thus to be a conceptually valid instantiation of a result.
Effects on conceptual validity
To detail how certain combinations of dimensions can change the amount of conceptually
valid instantiations for a given meta-concept, some examples are shown in Table 6.3. In
line with the explanation of context (in this case, the dimensions) changing the amount
of conceptually valid instantiations, we show how some of the common meta-concepts are
affected by the results we found.
On the one hand, when a meta-concept has only few absolutely needed dimensions, the
amount of conceptually valid instantiations is significant. Conversely, the amount of
conceptually invalid instantiations is quite small. A goal is a good example of this, as the
only needed dimension is it being a necessary thing, which means we can instantiate it
as an actual physical object to be achieved (i.e., the goal is the pizza that will be baked),
the activity of having done so (i.e., the goal is the final state of the pizza baking process)
or even more abstract, an abstract object that follows from its creation (i.e., the goal is
the information gained when the pizza is baked). The few counter-examples are those
where the goal is not necessarily achieved, which could be either something that is not
achieved, or something that was achieved by accident (e.g., as a side-effect from another
process). The main problem here is that the counter-examples (and examples themselves
too, perhaps) are so broad that it is difficult to figure out whether an instantiation was
actually a valid instantiation or not.
On the other hand, when a meta-concept has many needed dimensions, it is easier to
find out whether something is a conceptually valid instantiation or not. When it comes
to results, certain objects are clearly valid instantiations, like a freshly baked pizza or a
specification of a modeling language. The latter can actually be a result in two ways, as
both the actual specification of the language is a valid result, as well as the representation
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Table 6.3: Examples of difference in conceptually valid instantiations for some concepts re-
flecting some of Table 6.2’s results.
type is a . . . feature-wise example counter-example
goal necessary thing any thing to achieve,
whether physical (e.g.,
producing a represen-
tation of a model) or
non-physical (e.g., pro-
ducing the information
needed for it) entity to
be acquired or some
state to be reached,
and so on
a non-necessary goal,
or thing that is
achieved as a side-
effect of achieving
something else
restriction not natural, not hu-
man, necessary to
adhere to and well-
defined thing
legal rules given
in a state’s laws,
well-known and docu-
mented natural laws
etiquette, informal din-
ner rules, or natural
laws like gravity
result not natural, not hu-
man, intentionally
achieved well-defined
thing
a baked pizza, a sawed
log, a specification of
a modeling language,
a representation of the
specification of a mod-
eling language
a newly hired person,
the outcome of trial-
and-error testing
of the language (i.e., the actual written documents describing it). Counter-examples are
then also easy to come by, for instance, the actual person hired as the ‘result’ of a hiring
process is not typically considered a result (by virtue of being human). Furthermore, any
‘results’ that were the outcome of trial-and-error approaches are also on shaky grounds,
as they are not typical results by virtue of not having been necessary.
Limitations
Even though the results we have shown are interesting and could be used for a multi-
tude of purposes, care must be taken not to immediately extrapolate the results of this
relatively small study and infer general truths from them. Different groups with varying
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backgrounds and specializations might have different conceptualizations, and thus further
studies might uncover additional and conflicting conceptualizations. As such, the contri-
bution of this work has been in demonstrating the possibility to systematically uncover
such conceptual distinctions and laying the ground for further investigations.
6.3.3 Conclusion
In this section we have shown an overview of how practitioners conceptualize the com-
mon meta-concepts. We discussed how these conceptualizations can affect the range of
conceptually valid instantiations for such a meta-concept, which can have a negative ef-
fect on the validity and usefulness of created models if we do not take care to discover
and communicate these conceptualizations. Furthermore, some languages might be more
suited to deal with certain conceptualizations by virtue of explicitly expressing concep-
tual distinctions that other languages leave implicit. Care should thus be taken to also
select an appropriate modeling language that fits most with the conceptualizations of the
involved modelers and stakeholders. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.1.
6.4 Longitudinal study among students
In this section we will discuss our investigation into the conceptual understanding that
students have of the common meta-concepts used for conceptual modeling. In contrast to
the study among practitioners, our focus here was more on if and how those understand-
ings change over time during a student’s progress through their academic curriculum.
To this end we followed a group of students starting computing and information science
studies at Radboud University Nijmegen (see Section 6.2 for experimental details). We
followed them from the beginning of their studies as they learned new theories, techniques,
and languages for modeling. We focused on investigating whether their conceptual under-
standings changed as they became acquainted with new languages and techniques, and
whether there were correlations between the introduction of such educational stimuli and
changes in their conceptual understanding.
6.4.1 Background – on training modelers
For concepts we often use in a professional setting (like the meta-concepts we focus on in
this dissertation), education and training come into play already early on in the career
of a modeler. We attempt to shape the way people see certain things by exposing them
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to particular viewpoints, and interpretations of things, in order to shape their conceptual
understanding and make it easier to communicate and work together. This is meant to en-
sure that people’s conceptual understandings are close enough so that no mismatched un-
derstandings between different modelers and stakeholders remain, which otherwise could
have dire consequences for the modeling process and any produced models (Kaidalova
et al. 2012). An example of such a process is the use of ‘Semantic Reassurance’ (Hoppen-
brouwers 2003) during modeling sessions, where modelers and stakeholders clarify their
interpretations of a particular concept to each other and attempt to come to a common
ground for that concept.
However, before any of these techniques and processes come into play, there is the educa-
tion of the people involved in the modeling process. For new students in computing and in-
formation science (who represent a significant source of later professional conceptual mod-
elers in the Netherlands) this is where they are first introduced to the core modeling con-
cepts and start shaping their understanding of them. The curriculum teaches them both
new ways of thinking (e.g., object-orientation in terms of programming, fact-orientation
in terms of modeling), new ways of working (e.g., specific analysis methods), and the tools
to use with them (e.g., specific languages like ORM, BPMN, UML). Afterwards, much
training is done in-house to educate people in a specific language/methodology, and way
of thinking/working, as was our experience working with practitioners and companies. In
other words: apart from familiarizing them with specific tools, companies/practitioners
aim to ensure that (new) people think and conceptualize in the way they want.
Much of the effort of this kind of training specifically for conceptual modeling seems to
rely on a basic assumption: that such training has a controllable effect on the conceptual
understanding the trainee has of the modeling concepts. However, there is little in the way
of studies attempting to verify whether such effects are systematically achieved. For this
reason, we are interested in understanding whether students develop specific conceptual
understandings, or perhaps conceptual prejudices, when it comes to the meta-concepts.
More concretely, we want to investigate whether the curriculum that a student follows
might push them into a specific interpretation of these meta-concepts, and if so, what
kind of effect they have on their conceptual understanding. Because most academic
programs are focused on training well-rounded people who can orient themselves in new
conceptual environments, we can assume that the point is not to steer people into specific,
narrow conceptual understandings (i.e., strongly biasing people into accepting one kind of
thing as correct), but instead to focus on opening their minds to many different, equally
valid viewpoints from which they can analyze multiple situations (i.e., to steer them
in a direction where their conceptual understanding allows for many possible correct
things). On the one hand, academic training seems to promote being open-minded, (i.e.,
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by treating many different viewpoints and approaches), on the other hand, it might also
work against that (i.e., by training people in specific languages with specific conceptual
biases). To focus on this, we will treat the following specific questions in this section:
1. Does the conceptual understanding that students have of modeling concepts become
more refined or nuanced as they progress through their studies?
(a) If there is such a change, is it of a discrete or continuous nature?
(b) If there is such a change, is it one-directional or reversible?
2. Is there a correlation between the educational stimuli students receive and the pos-
sible change in their conceptualizations of modeling concepts?
(a) Do conceptualizations take the form of the semantics of a specific language or
approach?
In order to treat these questions, we will investigate the base conceptualizations that stu-
dents have of the selected modeling concepts. In particular, this means that we study the
core connotations they have of these concepts when primed in the context of conceptual
modeling, without focusing on a specific kind of model or modeling issue. This should
allow us to see whether the training they receive affects the actual cores of the conceptu-
alizations, without dealing too much with the ever-changing content of the concepts due
to contextual effects. For example, a specific focus on goal modeling which might give rise
to radically different conceptualizations compared to a specific focus on process modeling.
6.4.2 Data
Conceptual understandings
The polarities we calculated show the relative amount of positive, neutral and negative
responses to each meta-concept-dimension combination and are shown in Table 6.4, with
some potentially interesting ones detailed later in Table 6.6. We present a visualization of
the concept-dimension scores in Fig. 6.2. It shows the averaged results for each concept-
dimension combination for each phase, with error bars showing the range of individual
results. A more detailed overview of the specific meta-concept and dimension polarities
for each phase of the longitudinal study can be found in Appendix C.3.
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Table 6.4: Average polarities over all concept-dimension responses for each phase of the lon-
gitudinal study. Polarity scores of individual concept-dimension combinations are excluded due
to space constraints, but are available upon request.
polarity actor event goal process resource restriction result
phase 1
neg 26% 31% 31% 27% 21% 30% 20%
neu 53% 57% 46% 43% 47% 51% 54%
pos 21% 11% 23% 30% 31% 19% 26%
phase 2
neg 10% 30% 26% 20% 17% 26% 27%
neu 63% 57% 46% 63% 56% 51% 49%
pos 27% 13% 29% 17% 27% 23% 24%
phase 3
neg 7% 36% 31% 24% 24% 30% 26%
neu 57% 56% 41% 53% 46% 49% 49%
pos 36% 9% 27% 23% 30% 21% 26%
phase 4
neg 10% 37% 30% 30% 20% 29% 29%
neu 60% 49% 37% 37% 49% 44% 36%
pos 30% 14% 33% 33% 31% 27% 36%
phase 5
neg 17% 33% 31% 29% 24% 33% 24%
neu 59% 59% 39% 51% 44% 46% 47%
pos 24% 9% 30% 20% 31% 21% 29%
Educational stimuli
The educational stimuli are detailed in Table 6.5. They include the courses that students
followed, and languages and techniques they were introduced to in the semester before
that particular measurement was made.
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Figure 6.2: Visualization of the average concept-dimension scores and individual variations for
each phase of the longitudinal study.
6.4.3 Discussion
General discussion
We will first answer the questions we posed before moving on to more detailed discussion
of the individual results. Our primary question to do with whether teaching students
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Table 6.5: Overview of educational stimuli students reported receiving before the measurement.
Each phase was measured at the end of a semester. Phase 1 is a null measurement at the start
of the participants’ studies, hence no stimuli were reported.
at . . . languages course topics
phase 2 C++, SQL, ORM, UML, Finite au-
tomatas, Formal Grammars, XML
Domain Modeling, Formal Thinking,
Programming, Discrete Mathematics
phase 3 Java, ORM, UML, C++, Assembly,
Ruby, Clean, Logic
Digital Information Architecture,
Mathematics, Research & De-
velopment, Object Orientation,
Processors, Applied Logic, Business
Process Modeling, Languages &
Automata, Artificial Intelligence,
Requirements Engineering
phase 4 Turing Machines, Haskell, Clean,
Ruby, Clean, Prolog, abstract ORM,
ORC, Clean
Information Systems Analysis, Func-
tional Programming, Mathematics,
Security, Efficient Storage of Data,
Reliable Storage of Data, Transfor-
mation and Implementation
phase 5 UML, Prolog, NXC, Clean, Pro-
log, Structural Operational Seman-
tics, Natural Semantics
Innovation Management, Human-
Machine Interaction, Semantics &
Correctness, Requirements Engineer-
ing, Knowledge Representation, Re-
search & Development, Functional
Programming
languages and techniques for modeling affects their conceptual understandings was “Do
the conceptualizations students have of modeling concepts become more refined or nuanced
as they progress through their studies?”. We can answer this by looking at both Fig. 6.2
and Table 6.4. In Fig. 6.2 we see that there is not a clearly obvious shift for any of the
concepts or individual concept-dimension combinations to a particular understanding.
For this to happen, the bars should either gradually or suddenly switch from ranging
to one of the extremes to the other, or stay neutral in the middle. However, as we can
see over time the general pattern of all the results stays similar, not having any of its
constituents change too much. The semantic dimensions natural, human, and vague stay
mostly negative for most concepts, while the dimensions composed, necessary, intentional
stay positive. The dimension material is the one dimension in which we clearly see both
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positive and negative polarities for different concepts, although these particular concept-
dimension combinations still do not seem to change much over time.
We can look in more detail at Table 6.4 to compare the actual distribution of the polari-
ties for the concepts through time to verify this lack of systematic change. Here we also
see that, while there are subtle variations from phase to phase in the relative amount of
negative, neutral, and positive responses, there does not seem to be a significant grad-
ual change increasing or decreasing over time for any of them. However, some specific
concept-dimension combinations, do seem to have gradual shifts in one direction, which
are documented in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Notable shifts of conceptual understanding in the results of the average (i.e., all
participants) polarity scores.
polarity p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 primary trend
humanity of results
neg 60% 60% 80% 70% 80%
stronger negationneu 40% 40% 20% 30% 20%
pos 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
necessity of results
neg 0% 10% 10% 0% 0%
stronger acceptanceneu 50% 40% 30% 30% 30%
pos 50% 50% 60% 70% 70%
vagueness of actor
neg 60% 20% 40% 50% 50%
slight decrease in negationneu 40% 80% 60% 50% 50%
pos 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
naturality of actor
neg 40% 0% 0% 10% 20%
increase in neutralityneu 50% 70% 80% 90% 70%
pos 10% 30% 20% 0% 10%
As a result, our first subquestion, “If there is such a change, is it of a discrete or contin-
uous nature?” becomes irrelevant. However, the second subquestion “If there is such a
change, is it one-directional or reversible?” is still interesting to look at, as the data do
show that there are sometimes shifts for specific concept-dimension combinations where
the polarity changes, and reverses again over the course of our study. While this might
also be attributed to individual or contextual factors, it can hint at the flexibility of the
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students in their conceptual understandings while focusing on a specific way of thinking
and working (e.g., because in one semester they work in a different paradigm than the
others).
Our second main question, “Is there a correlation between the educational stimuli students
receive and the possible change in their conceptualizations of modeling concepts?” and the
related subquestion “Do conceptualizations take the form of the semantics of a specific
language or approach?” can be answered by also taking into account the data given in
Table 6.5. There do not seem to be specific systematic shifts that can be correlated with
educational stimuli, nor do they seem to be systematically widening or refining to fit a
specific way of thinking that could be attributed to them (e.g., the strong fact-oriented
thinking approach of ORM (Halpin 2005)). Given that students used several languages
and techniques almost from the beginning of their studies until the final measurement, one
could have expected to see some kind of development towards fitting those ways of think-
ing. However, given the lack of specific shifts into particular conceptual understandings
discussed for question 1, this seems unlikely as well.
As touched upon earlier, there were some specific concept-dimension combinations that
did show a development towards a specific conceptual understanding. Notable ones are
shown in Table 6.6. These are specifically a stronger rejection of the possibility of results
(of something) being human things, a much stronger view that results are necessary to
achieve, a very slight decrease in rejecting a vague thing being an actor, and a strong
increase in neutral views on whether actors can be natural things. These patterns all
show an example of a different polarity gaining or losing ground, which all translate into
the willingness of a specific person accepting or rejecting a particular thing as being a
good example of that modeling concept. When we see that someone has a much stronger
negative view on a particular thing (i.e., here the humanity of results), during modeling
sessions those might come to the foreground when people clash on their conceptualization
of the universe of discourse. Finding such specific strong polarized concept-dimension
combinations might thus be a useful aid in steering such discussions to avoid communi-
cation breakdowns.
Limitations
Due to the amount of people that dropped out during the study, and the generally low
initial response rate we cannot guarantee a strong external validity due to the lack of
statistical generalizability. This could have potentially been prevented by including mul-
tiple, parallel groups of students (originating from different universities). However, this
would lead to a strong heterogeneity of the results because different academic institutes
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and programs focus on different aspects. As such, whether those results could be first
combined in order to create a larger coherent set of data is debatable as well. Nonethe-
less, the results here are still a thorough examination of specific individuals, and can be
used to reason about the effects found in them, and to what degree measurement of their
conceptual understanding is a feasible, and useful endeavor.
6.4.4 Conclusion
In this section we have discussed the results from our longitudinal study which investi-
gated how the conceptual understanding a group of students have of the meta-concepts
changed over time. Surprisingly, we found little systematic change in their conceptual
understanding, especially when attempting to correlate such changes with specific edu-
cational stimuli (e.g., courses taken, languages learnt). These findings can have some
consequences for the way in which we train people to be modelers, and the (ease of)
adoption of specific conceptual modeling languages. However, we will first use Section 6.5
to go into the differences (or lack thereof) between the conceptual understanding that
practitioners and students have of the meta-concepts.
6.5 Comparing practitioners and students
Given that we performed these studies in two groups with quite different levels of ex-
perience in conceptual modeling, it would be interesting to pay some explicit attention
to the differences and similarities between their conceptual understandings of the same
meta-concepts. As the study with practitioners was performed with a number of people
who all had multiple years of experience in applying conceptual modeling, were intimately
familiar with some modeling languages and techniques, and were usually specialized in
some particular domain (e.g., finance, government, healthcare), one could expect some
differences when comparing them to undergraduate students just beginning in computing
and information science. Because many students in this program go on to have a career in
industry in these kinds of companies, seeing whether they develop into the already expe-
rienced practitioners would be interesting. From our basic assumptions on the difference
between practitioners and students regarding their experience and knowledge about tech-
niques and modeling languages, we would have expected a difference in their conceptual
understandings in one of two ways:
1. Practitioners displaying (much) more polarized conceptual understandings
2. Practitioners displaying (much) more neutral conceptual understandings
Comparing practitioners and students | 119
While this might seem contradictory, there is a fitting explanation for both possibilities.
On the one hand, if practitioners were to display significantly more polarized understand-
ings (i.e., much more strong judgments stating that a particular dimension has to be
reflected for a given meta-concept: an actor has to be human), this could be in line
with their larger amount of experience and familiarity with modeling languages and tech-
niques. If such a person has, for example, worked in the finance domain for a decade,
using BPMN to model taxation processes, his typical conceptual understandings might
have strongly shifted in favor of those valid and most used for that domain. Thus, one
could expect such strongly polarized responses from practitioners as they all share this
larger amount of experience and expertise compared to the investigated students.
On the other hand, there is also an argument to be made for the case where practitioners
would display significantly more neutral conceptual understandings. That is, they would
be far less likely to be absolute in stating that a particular dimension has to be reflected
for a given meta-concept (e.g., an actor can be a human, but also a machine, or an
abstract thing). With the large amount of experience practitioners have, they are likely
to have been exposed to many different viewpoints and interpretations of the domain they
work in. It can be expected of such a modeler that they are capable of identifying and
understanding the way someone thinks. If they have done so for many years, dealing
with different people all with different ideas, one could expect them to become more
open-minded, and less likely to rule out particular conceptualizations as being ‘incorrect’.
Either way, one would expect some noticeable difference between the conceptual under-
standings that practitioners and students have. As can be seen in Table 6.7 this is hardly
the case. While the proportion of responses for the student study varies between phases,
the average trend that can be seen in the column ‘average’ seems to remain around ∼30%
for both polar scores, and between 40–50% for neutral scores. On an individual level there
are, expectedly, large differences to be found. Similarly, there are differences for particular
meta-concepts, as it can be seen that practitioners are less neutral about restrictions
and results. The main difference here is that practitioners have more negative scores
for dimensions that do not apply to them (e..g, a restriction cannot be a naturally oc-
curring thing). However, it is the difference between the groups and averages that would
have to be significant in order to be able to say anything about how different practitioners
and students truly are. Given the lack of significant difference in the average proportion
of scores, it thus does not seem to be the case that there is a systematic difference between
how polarized or neutral practitioners and students are in their conceptual understandings
of the meta-concepts. In Table 6.8 we also compare the development of students’ con-
ceptual understandings for a number of specific meta-concepts and dimensions (based on
highly polarized combinations found in the practitioner study). As can be seen, and was
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Table 6.7: Comparison of the average amount of polar (negative, positive) and neutral (neu)
responses between practitioners (n = 12) and the final set of student responses (n = 8). Both
studies yielded comparable proportions of polar responses (25 – 30% positive and negative),
with only a slightly larger amount of neutral responses (∼ 5%).
actor event goal process resource restrictionresult average
Practitioners
neg 9% 27% 22% 31% 30% 45% 45% 30%
neu 53% 53% 52% 40% 47% 32% 30% 44%
pos 38% 19% 26% 29% 23% 22% 25% 26%
Students (phase 1)
neg 26% 31% 31% 27% 21% 30% 20% 27%
neu 53% 57% 46% 43% 47% 51% 54% 50%
pos 21% 11% 23% 30% 31% 19% 26% 23%
Students (phase 2)
neg 10% 30% 26% 20% 17% 26% 27% 22%
neu 63% 57% 46% 63% 56% 51% 49% 55%
pos 27% 13% 29% 17% 27% 23% 24% 23%
Students (phase 3)
neg 7% 36% 31% 24% 24% 30% 26% 25%
neu 57% 56% 41% 53% 46% 49% 49% 50%
pos 36% 9% 27% 23% 30% 21% 26% 25%
Students (phase 4)
neg 10% 37% 30% 30% 20% 29% 29% 26%
neu 60% 49% 37% 37% 49% 44% 36% 45%
pos 30% 14% 33% 33% 31% 27% 36% 29%
Students (phase 5)
neg 17% 33% 31% 29% 24% 33% 24% 27%
neu 59% 59% 39% 51% 44% 46% 47% 49%
pos 24% 9% 30% 20% 31% 21% 29% 24%
discussed earlier, the average tendency of the students does not (systematically) change
much over time. Furthermore, the scores are quite similar to each other, with practition-
ers and students sharing the same polarity (i.e., either being positive or negative) for the
listed meta-concept and dimension combinations.
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Table 6.8: Comparison between some specific strongly (> 55%) polarized meta-concept and
dimension combinations scores for practitioners and students. For students average scores from
each phase are shown in chronological order.
meta-concept is . . . score score (student)
goal necessary 91% 70%,60%,60%,70%,70
process necessary 64% 70%,50%,50%,70%,60
resource necessary 64% 60%,60%,70%,70%,70
not vague 64% 30%,50%,70%,50%,50
restriction not human 73% 50%,70%,50%,50%,50
necessary 73% 40%,60%,60%,80%,50
not vague 82% 70%,50%,70%,80%,70
result not human 73% 60%,60%,80%,70%,80
What could be the reason behind this lack of strong difference between practitioners
and students? We have to acknowledge that with the small dataset presented here (in
particular, 12 practitioners compared to 8 students), it would not be fair to generalize
and claim this specific comparison holds in general. However, even with that in mind, the
sheer lack of overall difference between practitioner and student is difficult to understand.
It could be the case that polar responses are overrepresented in the results from the
students because, even though they were not sure about some meta-concept and dimension
combinations they felt pressured to give non-neutral responses (e.g., not wanting to click
the equivalent of “don’t know” to every question). While the data of the surveys were
treated confidentially, so anonymity in regards of other students or instructors being
aware of responses was guaranteed. Controlling for such an effect beyond this would
be difficult. Yet, equally the same argumentation could be used for overrepresentation
of neutral answers, as it could be reasoned that students did not want to ‘be wrong’
about their answers, even though it was explained that the personal attitude and feeling
participants had was the focus of the study. Exit interviews held with the students after
each measurement (and processing of the data) could have been used to corroborate the
findings and figure out whether this was the case.
Another option would be to execute a more contextualized investigation where practi-
tioners are asked for their conceptual understanding of meta-concepts not in the general
context of modeling, but specifically in the context of the domain they focus on, and
the particular kinds of models they work on. However, that would lead to more difficult
comparisons with student data, as with students it is feasible to investigate the base con-
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ceptual understanding of the meta-concepts, but as they lack experience in applying it in
a specific domain, contextualizing the investigation in the same way would be difficult.
This lack of significant difference between how practitioners and students conceptualize
the meta-concepts returns as well in a different study discussed in Chapter 8, where the
clustering of people by their real-world properties (e.g., modeling languages used, edu-
cational background, professional focus and operation domain) and measured semantics
was compared, and for both groups little correlation between measured semantics and
real-world properties was found.
Going from student to practitioner
This lack of difference between the conceptual understandings of practitioners and stu-
dents is of particular interest now for further discussions on how to best educate and train
people to become effective conceptual modelers. As there does not seem to be much of a
difference (and perhaps, implied, not a necessary difference) in how students and practi-
tioners think about meta-concepts, perhaps the main difference is in their familiarity and
skill with particular languages and techniques. The findings of the longitudinal study,
that people do not seem to be affected in their conceptual understanding by learning new
languages and techniques resounds with other research (e.g., Recker and Dreiling 2007).
Such recent work into the training and education of conceptual modelers has discussed
similar observations, and argued that teaching and training should thus not focus on
teaching specific tools and techniques, but instead on different understandings and how
people view the world.
6.6 Summary & outlook
In this chapter we have presented the results of two semantic differential studies which
investigated the conceptual understanding that people had of the common meta-concepts.
The goal of these studies was to gain a more detailed understanding of how different
people understand these meta-concepts, in terms of a number of semantic dimensions.
While the results of both studies showed that there is a wide variety of understandings
differentiated to effectively the personal level, there are some conclusions that can be
drawn. In regards to our research questions as given in Section 1.5.2, we can reflect on
some specific questions:
What is the conceptual understanding that people have of these meta-concepts? The con-
ceptual understanding people display of these meta-concepts seem to be highly personal
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and potentially vary wildly from one person to another. Some attitudes of particular
dimensions to specific meta-concepts do stand out (e.g., shared strong attitudes towards
almost all meta-concepts being non-vague, highlighting the desire to be exhaustive and
correct in our descriptions of things), but overall the lesson to be drawn here seems to be
that each modeler is a person in their own right, with their own particular conceptual id-
iosyncrasies, and during the modeling process should thus be approached and understood
on a personal level.
Does a person’s conceptual understanding of a meta-concept change over time?” While
our longitudinal study has shown that the conceptual understanding that someone has of
these meta-concepts changes over time, there seems to be little rhyme or reason to how
it changes. The subquestion “If so, does training in particular languages or techniques
affect these base conceptual understandings?” is thus particularly important here, as in the
longitudinal study there did not seem to be any correlations between the way conceptual
understandings changed and what educational stimuli (the learning of a new modeling
language, adoption of a new technique, and so on) were presented.

Part III
Practical Findings

CHAPTER 7
Accommodating Conceptual Understandings
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Abstract. In this chapter we will elaborate on some of the implications that our findings
have for (the practice of) conceptual modeling. While the findings themselves as they
have been presented in the previous chapters are more of a fundamental nature, they
relate to a number of more practical aspects. When people wish to model, they need to
select an optimal language, which we will treat from the aspect of conceptual accommo-
dation: analyzing a number of modeling languages to see what kind of meta-concept and
dimension combinations they (implicitly or explicitly) accommodate. Finally, we reflect
about when we model, the way in which we do so, and the artifacts we use to capture
our knowledge and support our communication processes (e.g., the languages, ontologies,
and other formalizations) need to support the different structural aspects such as graded
category judgments, typicality differences between various model instantiations, and so on.
The content of this chapter is based on work published as:
Dirk van der Linden and Henderik A. Proper: Do conceptual modeling languages ac-
commodate enough explicit conceptual distinctions? In: J. Grabis et al. (Eds.):
Short Paper Proceedings of the 6th IFIP WG 8.1 Working Conference on the
Practice of Enterprise Modeling (PoEM) CEUR-WS Vol 1023, 2013, pp. 126–
135
Dirk van der Linden and Henderik A. Proper: On the accommodation of concep-
tual distinctions in conceptual modeling languages. In: H.G. Fill et al. (Eds):
Modellierung 2014, LNI 225, pp. 17–32, GI, 2014.
Dirk van der Linden and Henderik A. Proper: Category Structure of Language Types
Common to Conceptual Modeling Languages. In: I. Bider et al. (Eds.): BPMDS
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7.1 Background
It is important that the different conceptual understandings people have of a modeling
language’s meta-concepts can be modeled distinctly by that language. It would not do well
for the overall clarity and semantic quality of a produced model if we conflate semantically
different conceptual understandings (e.g., human beings, abstract entities and material
objects) under the same banner (e.g., ‘actor’) and pretend that they are one and the
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same thing. Yet, in modeling languages often these different conceptual understandings
are not made explicit. Frequently, the designers of a modeling language define a type
(e.g., actor) and allow it to be instantiated with a wide diversity of entities (humans,
hardware, abstract and mathematical entities) which have no common conceptual basis.
Sometimes modeling languages do accommodate (some of) these conceptual distinctions,
but then do so only implicitly. That is, in their specification or meta-model they assume
a particular interpretation. As such, all instantiations of a model are then implicitly
assumed to abide by that interpretation (e.g., all actors in the given model are assumed
to be human things, all goals are assumed to be hard goals). An example we have used
before of a modeling language doing so is the i* specification as found in the Aachen
RWTH wiki (Grau et al. 2007), which defines agents (the acting entities) as having “a
concrete physical manifestation”. This implicitly makes it semantically incorrect to use
abstractions (e.g., agents as they are commonly understood) and furthermore, perhaps
ontologically incorrect to use composite agents – market segments – as the composition
itself is not physically manifested.
It is more useful if a modeling language accommodates such conceptual distinctions ex-
plicitly, to the extent needed in relation to its expected and planned use. That is, instead
of relying on the underlying semantics to define every concept they allow (or perhaps
require), to use a notation that explicitly encodes information about our interpretation –
and do so by providing distinct notational elements for all the important different con-
ceptual distinctions. This can mean for instance, having exclusive (visual) elements to
represent such distinct concepts by (e.g., the amount of ‘stick puppets’ in in ArchiMate
actor type denoting whether it is a single actor or a collection of them). This is important
from a cognitive point of view as it improves the quality of the notation by ensuring there
is no notational homonymy. Many researchers have proposed methods and frameworks
to analyze the degree to which languages are complete in this sense (Gemino and Wand
2004, Burton-Jones et al. 2009), often ontological in nature (e.g., UFO (Guizzardi and
Wagner 2010), Bunge-Wand-Weber (Wand and Weber 1990) and their applications (Fet-
tke and Loos 2003, Guizzardi et al. 2003)), although some have been criticized as being
poorly suited when applied to the information systems domain given their dependency on
a materialist ontology (cf. Wyssusek and Klaus 2005).
A major effort on this topic was undertaken by Moody (2009) in his work on a general
‘physics of notation’. Several modeling languages have been analyzed to estimate their
cognitive quality in terms of this framework (e.g., i* (Moody et al. 2010), BPMN (Genon
et al. 2011b), UCM (Genon et al. 2011a), and UML (Moody and van Hillegersberg 2009)).
However, most of these analyses are aimed at the semantics of the (visual) syntax, and
forego a more detailed analyses of the semantics of the individual elements of meaning
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themselves. By this we mean that they analyzed the semantic quality of the formal-
ization of grammar or the syntax (i.e., which elements interoperate in what way), but
gave less attention to the question what the elements arranged by this syntax (i.e., the
meta-concepts) actually mean to the users of the language. From a quality perspective,
important related issues touched upon by such work are the semiotic clarity (one-to-one
correspondence between semantic constructs and graphical symbols) and perceptual dis-
criminability (symbols should be clearly distinguishable) (Moody 2009). This issue comes
into play more clearly with domain-specific modeling languages than it does with general-
purpose languages like UML, ER or ORM (even though these languages were originally
designed for specific purposes like software and database engineering) because they have
more native specialized semantic elements (i.e., types) to represent the important aspects
from their domain by. It is thus important that these domain-specific languages have the
ability to explicitly express important semantic distinctions that might arise in needed
specific situations.
The goal of this chapter is not to provide detailed individual analyses of all the lan-
guages involved, but to explore whether there is a trend in modeling languages to support
enough distinctions or not, and on basis of that argue what kinds of research and engineer-
ing efforts are needed to deal with optimizing the conceptual completeness of modeling
languages. Hence the purpose here is to gain a deeper (empirical) understanding of the
issues and challenges involved, rather than ‘jumping’ to the creation/suggestion of mech-
anisms to possibly deal with them. Therefore, we specifically look at the cognitive quality
of a number of modeling languages and methods in terms of the semiotic clarity of their
semantic constructs. These constructs can be both visual (for visual notations) and tex-
tual (for textual notations), but both require a proper correspondence between semantic
constructs and symbols used for them.
7.2 Analysis
The different aspects that are focused on in enterprise modeling, typically have a number
of (not necessarily overlapping) specific conceptual distinctions, which are important to
be aware of. For example, a motivational model describing the things to be achieved
by an enterprise and the reasons for wanting to achieve them is likely to require more
detail (and thus fine-grained conceptual distinctions) for what goals are than, say, a
model describing the related process structure. In previous Chapters we have elicited and
described such distinctions in more detail, such as for instance whether goals absolutely
have to be achieved, whether the ‘victory’ conditions for achieving it are known, whether
the goal itself is a physical thing to be attained or not, and so on. On the other hand,
Analysis | 131
a model describing the process undertaken to achieve a certain goal (e.g., bake a pizza)
might require conceptual distinctions like whether the actors involved are human entities
or not, whether it is one or more actors responsible for ensuring the goal’s satisfaction,
and so on. Thus, not all conceptual distinctions that are relevant to one aspect (and the
modeling language used for them) will be as relevant (and necessary to model explicitly)
for other aspects.
Table 7.1: A cross-section of aspects of modern enterprises, and some modeling languages used,
or usable to represent them. The selected languages here are based on the initial selections from
Table 3.1. While there the focus was on gathering terminology, here the focus is on conceptual
differences, and thus we extended the list with more languages having different foci, relevant for
the analysis of conceptual accommodation.
Aspect of an Enterprise Related languages
Architecture ArchiMate (The Open Group 2012) (1.0, 2.0), ISO/DIS
19440, ARIS
(Business) Processes BPMN (Object Management Group 2010a), (colored)
Petri nets, IDEF3, EPC (van der Aalst 1999)
Design decision-making EA Anamnesis (Plataniotis et al. 2012), NID (Gal and
Pfeffer 2003), OMG DMN (Object Management Group
2014a)
Deployment of IT artifacts ADeL (Patig 2011)
Goals & Motivations i*, GRL, KAOS (Dardenne et al. 1993), TRO-
POS (Giunchiglia et al. 2003), ARMOR (Quartel et al.
2009), ArchiMate 2.0’S (The Open Group 2012) moti-
vational extension, OMG BMM (Object Management
Group 2010b)
Management of IT artifacts ITML (Frank et al. 2009)
Strategy & Capability Maps TBIM (Francesconi et al. 2013), OMG BMM (Object
Management Group 2010b), Capability Maps (Scott
2009)
Value exchanges e3Value (Gordijn and Akkermans 2003), REA-
DSL (Sonnenberg et al. 2011), VDML (Object
Management Group 2014b)
This increased amount of focus on specific aspects has thus, amongst other factors, led to a
plethora of modeling languages, methods and frameworks (some of which we have analyzed
for their terminological use in Chapter 3.2). Many of these aspects have a large amount of
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dedicated modeling languages available, which differ only slightly in their actual notation
or specification. This is evidenced, for example, by the large amount of overlap between
the notations used in goal modeling such as i*, GRL, KAOS, TROPOS, which at times
use the same terminology to refer to conceptually different things. The languages we look
at to investigate what conceptual understandings are accommodated are given, together
with the aspects of enterprises they are, or can be used for, in Table 7.1. We chose these
specific languages based on the work done in Table 3.1, the languages integrated into the
Unified Enterprise Modeling Language (UEML), and a number of additional languages
that were not relevant for the analysis in Chapter 3, but here might offer some points of
interest when it comes to accommodation of conceptually distinct understandings.
In order to systematically talk about whether these modeling languages accommodate
different conceptual distinctions we will again use the meta-concepts and dimensions
from Chapter 3 as a guiding framework. We thus took the meta-concepts from Table 3.2
(actors, events, goals, processes, resources, restrictions, results) and for
each of them looked at whether the selected languages allow for the dimensions from
Table 3.3 (natural, human, composed, intentional, necessary, vague) to be explicitly mod-
eled. We started with a full list including each possible conceptual distinction for each
concept, resulting in many different possible points of analysis. We then went through all
the concepts and removed the distinctions that we deemed less relevant or interesting in
the context of how domain-specific languages were typically used, and what earlier find-
ings from the semantic differential studies (reported on in Chapter 6) had shown not to
be particularly salient (e.g., whether a process is human, whether a result is intentional,
and so on). For the resulting list it is then shown why it can be useful to be aware of this
dimension for that particular meta-concept, and what modeling language supports doing
so. Doing so led to the creation of the overview shown in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2: This table gives an overview of a number of relevant conceptual distinctions for
common modeling. For each of the concepts, we list relevant conceptual distinctions, show what
they are useful for, and what languages support modeling them explicitly, might support it, or
(where relevant) make a specific implicit interpretation.
Dimension Useful to . . . Supported by . . .
actor
human Distinguish between
actors that can be
more fickle than pure
rational agents.
BPMN through the explicit use of a ‘Human Per-
former’ resource type, VDML does contain a ‘Per-
son’ subtype of Actor which is specified to be hu-
man, but does not distinguish in the visual nota-
tion between types of Actors.
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Dimension Useful to . . . Supported by . . .
composed Distinguish whether
an actual entity acts
or whether a group
of them does, which
impacts responsibility
judgments for actions
ArchiMate, TROPOS via ‘composite Actor’,
somewhat as well with differentiation between
‘role’ and ‘position’, e3Value somewhat through
differentiation between actor and market seg-
ments, VDML distinguishes between an ‘actor’
being a singular participant, and modeling ‘col-
laboration’ or ‘participant’ as potentially multi-
ples.
material Know whether an ac-
tor physically inter-
acts with the world
(and can thus be af-
fected by it directly
– think hardware vs.
software)
i* assumes that an agent is an actor “with a con-
crete physical manifestation” (iStar Wiki)
intentional Know whether an ac-
tor is considered an
explicit part of a sys-
tem, i.e., is expected
to act or not on cer-
tain things, in con-
trast to actors from
outside the systems
scope which may act
but were not regarded
or thought of to do so
Implicit in most languages, mentioned as such in
TBIM, depending on interpretation could be ar-
gued to be explicit in OMG BMM with differen-
tiation between internal and external influencer.
specific Knowing whether an
actor is a specific
thing (i.e., an instan-
tiation) or a general
thing (i.e., a role)
Supported by some (e.g., ArchiMate), through
type/instantiation dichotomy, explicit in TBIM
by the claim that an agent “represents a concrete
organization or person” ArchiMate, implicit in
e.g., e3Value and RBAC by automatic use of roles
(types).
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Dimension Useful to . . . Supported by . . .
event
intentional Distinguish between
events that should, or
will happen given a
set of circumstances,
and events that
happen (seemingly)
unprovoked.
Arguably explicitly supported by BPMN through
the use of ‘None’ type triggers for Start Events.
goal
composed Distinguish between
complexity level of
goals, i.e., whether
they are an over-
arching strategy or
directly needed goals.
TBIM explicitly models composite goals as ‘busi-
ness plan’ types, implicit in some other languages
focused on strategy/tactics (e.g., OMG BMM).
material Distinguish between
objects and their
representations, i.e.,
is the goal to achieve
an increment in the
integer on a bank
account, or to hold an
n amount of currency.
necessary Distinguish between
goals that have to be
attained and those
that should.
specific Distinguish between
goals for which the
victory conditions are
known and not, i.e.,
hard vs. soft goals.
Most goal modeling lan-
guages/methods/frameworks (e.g., i*, GRL,
KAOS, ARMOR) support this explicitly. Sur-
prisingly1 ArchiMate’s motivational extension
does not.
1Given that it was derived from ARMOR, which does explicitly support soft/hard goal distinctions
Analysis | 135
Dimension Useful to . . . Supported by . . .
process
composed Distinguish between
black (closed, singu-
lar) and white (open,
composed) boxes.
Arguable either way for BPMN with the use of
pools, which can function as black boxes, how-
ever, those do not allow for linking sequence flow
to it, and are thus self-contained.
intentional Know whether they
are part of an in-
tended strategy or
something that has
to be dealt with (i.e.,
negative environmen-
tal processes)
specific Know whether the
structure is (sup-
posed to be) clear
(deterministic) or not
(fuzzy).
resource
natural Know whether a re-
source requires a ‘fab-
rication’ process.
Somewhat related, TBIM explicitly models re-
source types as being either animate or not.
human Know whether re-
sources can act on
their own and pro-
duce issues, e.g.., be
unreliable, not always
generate the same
outcomes
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Dimension Useful to . . . Supported by . . .
material Distinguish between
objects and their
representations, i.e.,
whether a given re-
source a collection of
paper and ink blobs
or the information
contained within
them.
Explicit in ITML through the use of hard-
ware/software dichotomy.
restriction
natural Distinguish between
restrictions we cannot
do anything about
and those we can.
intentional Distinguish between
restrictions we stip-
ulate from those
that arise holistically
(whether good or
bad).
Some languages implicit, e.g., EA Anamnesis,
and BPMN through use of ‘Potential Owner’.
necessary Distinguish restric-
tions that can be
broken from those
that cannot.
(supported by some GPML, e.g., ORM 2.0).
specific Distinguish restric-
tions for which we
know when they are
broken and not.
result
natural Know whether a result
requires some kind of
‘fabrication’ process
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Dimension Useful to . . . Supported by . . .
material Distinguish between
an object and its
representation, i.e.
whether the physical
pizza or the status
update in the IS
saying a pizza was
baked is the result of
a given step in the
pizza making process.
specific Know whether a re-
sult is (supposed to
be) clear (determinis-
tic) or not (fuzzy).
Arguably supported in BPMN through the use of
‘None’ type End Events.
7.3 Discussion
7.3.1 General discussion
Languages used for specific aspects do seem to explicitly accommodate some basic (and
often widely accepted) necessary conceptual distinctions. For example, the de facto lan-
guage used for process modeling, BPMN, has explicit support for differentiating between
human and non-human actors, which can be important to know for critical steps in a
process. Most modeling languages used for motivations and goals also accommodate the
distinction between goals with well-specified victory conditions and those with vague or
unknown conditions by means of separate hard and soft-goal elements. These explicit
distinctions in the notation are likely correlated with the conceptual distinctions being
widely accepted as important and having become part of the basic way of thinking. How-
ever, taken overall, there does not seem to be a consistent or systematic pattern behind
what language explicitly accommodates (or lacks) which conceptual distinctions.
As such, there are a number of conceptual distinctions for which we found no explicit
support by any modeling languages. For example, we found no support for explicitly
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modeling goals and results as being material things. It also did not seem possible to
explicitly model goals as being a logical necessity in the investigated languages. The
distinction whether results were things that naturally occurred or fabricated was also not
supported. When it comes to processes we found no support to model them explicitly
as being intentional, and distinguishing between specific (i.e., well-defined) processes and
processes more fuzzy in their structure. Modeling resources as being humans was also not
supported, while this is likely not an unthinkable interpretation – effective management
of ‘human resources’ being important for large enterprises. Finally, we found no explicit
support for modeling restrictions as naturally occurring and specific things. We will
discuss some of these distinctions in more detail.
While the scope of this chapter is not to present an overview of such deficiencies based
on our data, we can discuss some of them as an example. For some concepts the primary
features that have been discussed are all explicitly supported, like for instance goals being
differentiated between those for which we know when we achieve them and those for which
we do not. However, not every language allows for such distinctions, as ArchiMate 2.0
for example still does not incorporate the hard/soft goal distinction, even though it was
based on a language (ARMOR) which itself did. When it comes to events, the important
features of intentionality are clearly supported in the most common languages dealing
with events, like for instance BPMN’s extensive dealing of triggers, and the possibility of
modeling an unintentional event by using a ‘None’ type trigger. However, some of the
features we found for resources are far less often supported by languages, like for example
the identification of their nature in being material or immaterial. This does not seem to
be explicitly supported in most modeling languages, usually being implicitly assumed to
be a specific kind. A rare exception to this is ITML which at least enforced the distinction
by using a hardware/software dichotomy where it is immediately clear whether a resource
is a physical object or not. While not every feature listed once by an individual modeler
should be part of each modeling language, it does seem to suggest that a combined effort of
updating languages with the features important for their users would be a useful venture.
7.3.2 Some unaccommodated conceptual distinctions
Surprisingly, we found no explicit support for differentiating between goals with varying
levels of necessity and obligation. While many common methodologies (e.g., the MoSCoW
technique (Clegg and Barker 1994) of dividing requirements into must, should could, and
would haves) call for such distinctions, many modeling languages conflate them all into a
single kind of goal. Arguably in certain aspects it would make sense to make an implicit
choice, as in e.g., process modeling it is necessary for certain steps in a flow to be reached
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before the flow continues, which can be seen as an analog to logically necessary goals.
However, goal models in dedicated languages seem not to make this distinction, even
though there is a strong focus on differentiating between hard and soft-goals, which seem
correlated with different levels of necessity (e.g., one cannot as certainly rely on a soft-goal
to be achieved compared to a hard-goal, especially for mission critical goals).
Another seemingly unaccommodated distinction is the necessity of restrictions, that is,
whether some restriction (e.g., a rule, principle, guideline) is an alethic condition that
cannot be broken or whether it is not and thus can be broken. While in the context
of enterprise modeling there is a strong differentiation of terminology used for different
kinds of normative restrictions that can be considered breakable, or at least not strictly
enforceable (e.g., principles, guidelines, best practice), these often seem to be used outside
of modeling languages in their own approaches – e.g., architecture principles (Proper and
Greefhorst 2010). It seems problematic that many languages used for aspects of enter-
prises, and languages used to describe the actual enterprise architecture like ArchiMate do
not have explicit notational support for these different kinds of restrictions. Many models
that are analyzed a posteriori (e.g., when they are integrated in other models, and the
original modelers are no longer involved or available) then become difficult to interpret,
as the notation of different kinds of restrictions can be ambiguous and lead to situations
where it is not clear whether a restriction can be relaxed or not. Surprisingly the only
language that seems to support this conceptual distinction is ORM (in particular version
2), which supports the explicit modeling of restrictions as being either alethic or deontic
conditions through its visual notation.
Another conceptual distinction that is typically not accommodated by most languages is
whether something is material or not. In particular, the material status of resources is
often defined in a conceptually ambiguous way. For example, in TROPOS, resources are
stated to be “physical or informational entities”, which makes it difficult to know whether
a modeled resource is the actual ‘object’ (e.g., some information) or its representation (e.g.,
a collection of paper and ink blobs that represents that information). It is important to
be aware of this distinction as this has consequences for the way in which the resource
can be interacted with, and in what way it can be manipulated, and possibly consumed.
For example, if we have a process in which a human actor performs a certain task for
which they need clear instructions, we can see those instructions as being a vital resource.
Modeling them as the physical representation – a paper printout of the instructions –
means that this specific resource is only available to one actor. On the other hand, if we
model it as the actual informational object, it is available to more than just one actor
at a time. Furthermore, when a resource is material, it also has the possibility of being
consumed. For example, when we model the process of baking a pizza, some of the
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resources involved (i.e., the ingredients) are consumed. It is important to be aware of
this, as that means it is necessary to keep track of stock levels, and perhaps optimization
thereof via e.g., system dynamics models.
Finally, a conceptual distinction that is not explicitly accommodated by many languages
is whether an actor is a human being or not. BPMN was the only language we analyzed
which explicitly supports it by having a notional element ‘Human Performer’ which is only
used for human actors (albeit called a resource in BPMN jargon). Apart from this some
languages could be argued to offer partial, or implicit support, like for example ArchiMate
having certain assumptions that are only valid for specific layers, such as acting entities
not being machines or resources in the business layer. It is important to be aware of this,
especially when responsibility comes into play, which is for instance done in KAOS models,
by making some agent responsible for some goals. However, the actual responsibility for
any given thing cannot, from a legal and social perspective be placed on a non-human
entity. At the end of the day (or chain of responsibility), there is always a person held
responsible (and accountable) for some given action. In the case of software engineering,
for example a programmer is held responsible for the downtime caused by bugs, in the
case of a building collapsing after a summer breeze the architect is held responsible for not
properly analyzing the environmental and soil conditions, and so on. When responsibility
is modeled, it thus seems prudent to know whether an actor is the actual responsible party
or whether it defers its responsibilities to a different, human entity. Another important
aspect of human beings is that they are not necessarily rational and reliable. Thus, when
a given task or process depends on a specific human actor, it is quite possible that the
process is not performed as well as needed, or at all. As such, knowing that a process
involves human actors, a certain level of fault tolerance and redundancy would be needed.
Conflating human actors with non-human actors makes it far more difficult to know where
this is necessary, and could thus lead to models (and predictions made with them, e.g.,
efficiency or execution time of a process) not holding true to the real world situation.
7.3.3 Additional implications and their potential solutions
The overall lack of explicitly accommodated conceptual distinctions (of which there might
be more than just those we discussed) in many modeling languages are especially relevant
for enterprise modeling. It makes it much more difficult to ensure that integrated models
are valid (or complete) representations of the semantics intended by the original modelers,
as sometimes these modelers simply lack the notational elements to express important
semantics. While it is possible to ‘simply’ denote this information by annotating the
models with extra text, it would be a more ideal solution if modeling languages supported
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these distinctions. Furthermore, while some languages do offer explicit notational support,
their specification or meta-model does not necessarily enforce correct use of these elements
(e.g., ArchiMate does not enforce correct distinction between composite and singular
actors). There are many languages we analyzed which have an implicit interpretation of
some of the conceptual distinctions, sometimes specific (e.g., i*’s handling of agents as
having a concrete physical manifestation) sometimes vague (e.g., TROPOS’ handling of
resources), which further complicates matters, as this interpretation of the language might
not be the interpretation a modeler wishes to take for a given context. The fact that some
languages have semantics which are considered to remain vague (e.g., GRL (Heymans
et al. 2006), i* (Lo´pez et al. 2011)) only adds to this. Most languages seem to have a well-
defined and formalized semantics of the syntax, while lacking much, if any, formalization
of the semantics of the elements of meaning themselves (e.g., EPC, Kindler 2004).
Thus, it seems necessary to stimulate a move towards more explicit focus on (formaliza-
tion of) the semantics of the elements of meaning of modeling languages. The lack of
coverage for some of the distinctions shown in Table 7.2 makes it clear that more work is
needed on extending the specification of relevant languages with the ability to explicitly
distinguish between these different conceptual understandings. This could, and perhaps
should, be done in accordance with the actual practitioners in the field, by investigating
what conceptual distinctions are important for them, and what they need to be able to
explicitly model, instead of solely relying on analyzing languages with pre-existing ref-
erence material like Bunge-Wand-Weber or UFO, which are more useful for analyzing
the overall ontological and semantic quality of a language. However, to ensure that a
modeling language reflects the conceptual needs and desires of the people in the field we
cannot rely solely on such reference materials because by their nature they cannot take
each and every (potentially significant) personal difference into account. It is important
to not do this just once, but keep up to date with the changing conceptual distinctions
that the practitioners and stakeholders have in order for our modeling languages to stay
relevant and capable of representing the real world. Given the existence of a large num-
ber of different dialects of modeling languages sometimes only differing slightly (e.g., i*,
GRL, TROPOS for goal modeling), it seems that supporting many different conceptual
distinctions in a single notation would be welcomed by many. An argument made for the
research needed for this is given in Chapter 9.2.3.
It is necessary to nuance this call for an increased amount of semantically distinct con-
structs in languages somewhat, as it would not do for any and all modeling language to be
maximally expressive, as doing so would increase cognitive load, and thus the complexity
of both using and interpreting the language and its produced models too much. Moody
(2009) also found such relations between multiple quality aspects, where the increase of
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one aspect would have a negative effect on others. Instead, languages used for specific
aspects should be optimized in such a way that the conceptual distinctions important to
them (e.g., the hard/soft goal dichotomy in goal modeling) are explicitly accommodated,
but other things can be left implicit. For languages used for multiple aspects or wider
domains, one can take inspiration from, for example, the ArchiMate language which has
a guiding principle, elaborated on in Lankhorst et al. (2010), of keeping the language as
simple as possible, by ensuring that 80% of a domain can be modeled with 20% of the
language’s available constructs. Furthermore, even though we found some conceptual dis-
tinctions that were barely supported in existing modeling languages (e.g., distinguishing
between alethic and deontic restrictions), this does not say anything about whether such
distinctions are actually desired by the users of the language, and would thus end up being
used in practice. The moral here is to strike a good balance between the complexity of
the language and the amount of semantics that can be explicitly expressed by it.
Apart from being more adaptive to different conceptualizations people have in the model-
ing process, we can also ensure that our modeling languages are inherently more suited to
explicitly deal with them. A possible strategy to deal with this could be to ‘upgrade’ the
concept of view as used in e.g., the field of Enterprise Architecture (cf. The Open Group
2012) or systems and software engineering (cf. IEEE 2011). Traditionally, a view provides
a model of a domain from a specific (set of related) concern(s). This could be extended
with an articulation of all the expressed (and preferably shared) understandings of the
modeling concepts used in the view. Even more, one should consider the joint creation (by
a group of stakeholders or modelers) of a view as the joint creation of a model of the do-
main and the meta-model of the modeling concepts used in that view. This is essentially
a form of domain/purpose specific modeling language. When modeling a single domain
in terms of a ‘swarm of views’, where each view is modeled by a specific group, from the
perspective of a (set of related) concern(s), an integrated or joined model of that domain
could then be constructed as a shared (and traceable) understanding among the different
views. Such approaches to constructing models by integrating views can be found in (e.g.,
Dijkman et al. 2008b, Brandt and Hermann 2012). At first this might sound as a laborious
task. However, as our research has indicated, when we do not respect the group-based
and personal understanding of modeling concepts and or domain concepts, there is a risk
of (implicit) misunderstandings. Such misunderstandings can have severe adverse conse-
quences in an enterprise and information systems engineering context. Thus, a certain
level of cost/benefit tradeoff for ensuring these misunderstandings are prevented should
be kept in mind.
Furthermore, it would be useful to know how specific domain or purpose-specific modeling
languages really need to be, and on the other hand, how general-purpose modeling lan-
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guages can be while not conflicting with people’s conceptualizations. This correlates with
the (limits of) someone’s semantic flexibility, which can be investigated by testing the
limits of their conceptualizations. This likely affects their ability to easily use languages
that do not accommodate their needed distinctions (e.g., a modeler who typically only
uses the concept of human actors). This can be investigated, for example, through valida-
tion by instantiation testing to see to what degree people can accommodate non-matching
uses of their conceptualizations as defined in a language’s specification.
7.4 Reflection on creating and using models
From the moment when we model (whether in informal discussions or with the aid of a
properly selected modeling language), we communicate and interact with many people.
Given this inter-subjective nature, many potential communication errors and terminolog-
ical mismatches are bound to occur. Anything that helps us find potential weak spots
where such events are likely to occur before committing models to paper would be a useful
venture. Doing so can prevent far more costly rectifications in later stages, when models
cannot simply be amended (e.g., when a business process has actually been implemented,
when a software program has been made, when specific domain experts or stakeholders
have moved on and are no longer available).
Our findings into the conceptual understandings that people have of the studied meta-
concepts can thus be used practically for steering the communication in the modeling
process. What we can take from the studies discussed in this dissertation is that indi-
vidual modelers all have different conceptual understandings of the concepts they use to
model elements from a domain with. The actual core of these conceptual understand-
ings, i.e., the most conserved features, come to be so by a lifetime of experience, and are
unlikely to just change during a single session in which people communicate and share
their understandings. This is corroborated by findings from other studies, like Recker and
Dreiling (2007) who performed a study on how people deal with picking up a new process
modeling language without being formally taught them. In this study it was shown that
if someone was familiar with one particular language, the threshold to go to a different,
similar one was very low (e.g., switching from one goal modeling notation to another). As
many of such similar languages often have a strong overlap in their conceptual make-up,
people who are strongly familiar with one can easily pick up the others because it matches
their conceptual understanding, even if they have not yet mastered its specific syntax or
visual notation.
While the categorization judgments we make are often of a graded nature (for example
something being an actor to a certain degree), meaning that there is a certain amount of
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flexibility between people holding different conceptual understandings, it should be clear
that it is worthwhile to investigate just what these typical understandings for people are
as to preemptively avoid terminological or conceptual mismatches. As the most often
found kind of feature in our datasets were those of an alethic or and structural nature,
people seem to identify concepts very often by what they actually are for them. This
implies strongly the benefits of using ontologies during modeling work, especially when
those ontologies are actual reflections of the understanding involved people have of the
domain (Guarino 1995), for which studies like these can give valuable input. Such on-
tologies are often useful to define the specific fine-grained semantics modelers hold of the
concepts they use for a particular task, which is especially useful given that most often
languages like ER and UML are used (Davies et al. 2006), in which we need to stereotype
and define these detailed semantics in order to properly document them.
7.4.1 Implications for the way we model
The results we have presented in earlier Chapters (see e.g., 6.3 and 6.4) have implications
for the creation and use of models. As it is clear that there are some common type-feature
combinations amongst the people we investigated (while the total amount of conceptual
diversity is far greater than that), we should reflect on the way we model in order to deal
with the effects of these different conceptual understandings.
While the data presented and discussed reports on average and shared conceptualizations,
the conceptualizations that individual people have can vary wildly. It is important that
we take a moment in the modeling process before we start creating models to deal with
these differences. A way to do so is by looking at the types that are needed to model the
domain under investigation, and then discuss whether certain features (and combinations
thereof) apply to it. This can be done by taking known lists of features that have proven
to be a source for disagreements and conceptual misunderstandings, such as the features
reported on in this work. For example, when we model the process of baking pizzas, we
might focus on the resources for a moment. We can then take some time before creating
actual models to discuss what we find conceptually valid resources and what we do not
(i.e., what we would rather not be possible to express in the model). From such discussions
we gain a clearer understanding of how people see such a process and want to model it,
which helps us to focus (e.g., by abstracting from such potential resources as time, only
modeling material things as resources). By doing so the semantics of the created model
are shared and well understood by all the people involved in the process, not just those
who are intimately familiar with the specification of the used modeling language.
Such discussions can go into more detail feature wise as the focus on what to model
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becomes narrower. For example, when there is already a strong focus on processes, the
types most relevant to a process (e.g., processes and restrictions) can be explored more
closely by looking at more relevant features in greater detail. For instance, a process model
might benefit from having a level of traceability on the restrictions in it (Plataniotis et al.
2012), which requires us to discuss whether restrictions are always made by specific people,
or departments, and whether that implies that restrictions carry responsibility with them.
These aspects require a more fine-grained characterization of the process type than if it
is used in a general way. Equally so, when the focus is on modeling value exchanges, then
the focus can be on, for instance, characterizing types like resource and actor more clearly
by investigating more detailed features (e.g., value exchanges can be analyzed from an
ethical point of view, and thus require actors to be moral agents).
Others have proposed different ways of modeling that are in line with what we have dis-
cussed about our fundamental findings, such as for example using a process modeling
approach which is centered around the typical examples of processes (i.e., specific instan-
tiations) as used, not their abstract descriptions. The notion of prototypes and graded
conceptual validity we found for the structure of the meta-concepts supports this as a
likely effective way to reason about models, given how close it is to how people actually
conceptualize the concepts from those models. In their proposal for a different way of
doing business process modeling, Hofer (2011) described a way of not looking at processes
as algorithms, but by focusing on exemplary process instances, which also reduced the
total amount of information that has to be captured to a more manageable amount.
7.4.2 Implications for what we use to model
Applicability of our findings
Based on the findings from our categorization study as discussed in Chapter 4 we see also
a number of implications for model creation and use, most relevant to domain-specific
languages. With the plethora of domain-specific languages (e.g., ArchiMate, BPMN,
e3Value, i*, ITML, ADeL) in active use today all with their own focus (e.g., enterprise
architecture, processes, value exchanges, goals, IS implementations, IS deployments) our
findings could have consequences for many modeling efforts. The consequences we discuss
should thus be taken to be most relevant for domain-specific modeling languages like these
and any artifacts based on the models created with them.
When it comes to the modeling languages and models that are affected by our findings,
we see a number of different possible effects depending on the purpose of the models:
146 | Chapter 7: Accommodating Conceptual Understandings
1. models used to communicate between, and with different modelers and stakeholders
(e.g., conceptual models)
2. models used to formalize information from a given domain, for whatever purpose
(e.g., ontologies, models as documentation)
3. models used to transform by non-human systems (e.g., compiled source code)
This list is not intended as a taxonomy of models, nor as an exhaustive list of the different
kinds of models that are affected by graded category structures. It is merely a starting
point to reason about the different consequences we see our work having for different kinds
of models. We furthermore do not mean to imply that these kinds are mutually exclusive
(e.g., that models used to communicate are never used to formalize or transformed into
executable models).
Models used to communicate
Models used to communicate involve conceptual models of many possible purposes (e.g.,
capturing a domain, models used to guide decision making). As we have shown that the
categories used by modeling languages are likely of a graded nature, the models created
by them necessarily also contain categories of a graded nature. The most important
consequence here is that an instantiation of a model is not just simply valid or invalid, but
will display degrees of validity as well. If the category goal is seen as a graded structure,
with some things being better goals than others, it is thus possible to instantiate a model
that contains some goal type with two different cases that are both valid, but not equally
so. As the formal semantics of most modeling languages do not explicitly support such
degrees of validity, it is important that we are clear about the limits of conceptual validity
of our models. In other words, to ensure people read and use models in a similar way,
we need to ensure that we provide clear examples of possible valid instantiations, and
perhaps more importantly, clear examples of that which we consider invalid as well.
For example, while ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ are both considered partial members (by at
least the experienced modelers in our study) of the category actor, the exact degree to
which they are both considered so is something that is likely different for different (groups
of) people. If we are creating a model used for the implementation of an information
system, which would likely incorporate such terms for the things that act to support and
execute business activities, we need to be clear to what degree they can both be seen
as actors. For instance, the modelers or stakeholders might envision the hardware as
the actual acting part, with the software providing the instructions for doing it so, and
thus find a model where ‘hardware’ is said to act out a business function more valid than
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where ‘software’ does so. However, others might disagree and see ‘software’ as the actual
thing that acts. As these interpretations can be different from group to group, it is thus
important to involve explicit discussions about the degrees of validity for different things
we use in our models during model creation.
Models used to formalize
Models used to formalize are for instance models that capture knowledge about a certain
domain and attempt to formalize it in order to reduce the amount of ambiguity. A
formalization involving graded categories needs to ensure that membership requirements
are not discrete, and more importantly, take into account the relevant properties of a
graded category (e.g., centrality and typicality of members). There is work in the field
of ontology engineering that strives towards explicitly supporting these structures, (e.g.,
Aime´ et al. 2008) and explicit modification of ontology formalizations to incorporate the
noted features (Yeung and Leung 2006; 2010), and critiques and extensions of proposed
work, (e.g., Cai and Leung 2008). If such formalizations are not used, and instead a
classical approach based on discrete judgments is used, much semantic information about
the domain and the judgments from the original modelers is lost. This can lead to
misinterpretations by other readers and users of the model if there is no communication
between them and the original modelers anymore. For instance, someone might consider
a horse as a vehicle (albeit an atypical one) and thus consider it to be somewhat of a
valid vehicle in their created ontology. However, when this is formalized discretely, any
other member of the vehicle category (e.g., a car) would be considered on equal footing
with the horse, which a large number of people would likely disagree with. As such,
the formalization can no longer be considered a correct representation of the real world
and loses a lot of its value. Given our findings it thus seems important to choose the
right formalization for the job so as to have the ability to correctly reflect the intended
semantics. This further strengthens the importance and relevance of the research into
ontology formalizations by e.g., Yeung and Leung that we have mentioned.
Models used to execute
Models used to execute are for instance source code which is run by an interpreter, or
compiled (i.e., transformed) and then executed. Other options are models interpreted by
model provers, expert systems, or ontologies used for automated reasoning and so on.
For example, a model used by an expert system to check for a number of possible cases
(e.g., a medical advice system) might need graded structures and judgments in order to
correctly reason with the real-world information. A number of formalizations for e.g.,
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descriptive logics have been proposed to incorporate graded features like typicality and
centrality (Britz et al. 2009, Giordano et al. 2008, Freund et al. 2004). These models are
affected in a similar way to the ones used to formalize, meaning that their formalizations
need to support any graded structures found in them. This is all the more important to
ensure here, as executable models are often no longer read and interpreted by people, and
thus any errors or oversights in them are less likely to be corrected.
A common solution given for the problems we have discussed here is to ‘simply’ define
the terminology in detail beforehand. Such definitions are expected to avoid issues with
ambiguity and possible different interpretations. However, the act of defining terminology
for such purposes is far from trivial, requiring a level of detail that one cannot know
beforehand. It is difficult to know which details are or become important in order to
discuss and define them. Insights into the categorization habits of modelers themselves
can be complementary to such processes, and aid them. They can do so by pointing out
areas that require more attention (i.e., categories with high partial member judgments,
terms that receive many partial member judgments) and thus guide modelers to points
of attention that should be discussed in detail before a definition is decided on.
7.5 Summary & outlook
In this chapter we have discussed implications of some of our fundamental findings for
the more practical aspects of conceptual modeling. Specifically, the importance of ex-
plicitly modeling conceptual distinctions and analyzed a number of modeling languages
to investigate what kind of distinctions they support. We showed that, while some con-
ceptual distinctions are explicitly supported by relevant modeling languages, there are
still a large amount of potentially relevant distinctions that are not accommodated, or
implicitly interpreted in a specific way by modeling languages. In doing so we have found
an answer to our research questions centering around “to what extent modeling languages
allow for people to express their particular conceptual understandings of meta-concepts.
We proposed that research on active practitioners should be done regularly to keep up
to date with conceptual distinctions deemed relevant and important by modelers and
stakeholders alike, especially if such data would be used to infer which modeling language
would be best suited to use for a particular task. Furthermore, we discussed implications
for the way in which models are created and used in communicative settings, and their
underlying support structures. One consequence of our research into personal semantics
which has been left implicit so far is the potential for predicting what kind of typical
personal semantics a person would exhibit. As a final step, we will report on a study
about this in the next Chapter.
CHAPTER 8
Attributing Identity to Conceptual Understandings
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Abstract. In this chapter we discuss the use and challenges of identifying communi-
ties with shared personal semantics. People tend to understand meta-concepts (i.e., a
modeling language’s constructs or types) in a certain way and can be grouped by this
understanding. Having an insight into the typical communities and their composition
(e.g., what kind of people constitute a semantic community) can make it easier to predict
how a conceptual modeler with a certain background will generally understand the meta-
concepts they use, which is useful for e.g., validating model semantics and improving the
efficiency of the modeling process itself. We have observed that in practice decisions to
group people based on concept use are often made, but are rarely backed up by empirical
data demonstrating their supposed efficacy. We use data from two studies discussed ear-
lier in Chapter 6 involving experienced (enterprise) modeling practitioners and computing
science students to find such communities. We also discuss the challenge that arises in
finding common real-world factors shared between their members to identify them by
and conclude that there is no empirical support for commonly used (and often implicit)
grouping properties such as similar background, focus and modeling language.
The content of this chapter is based on work published as:
Dirk van der Linden, Stijn J.B.A. Hoppenbrouwers: Challenges of Identifying Com-
munities with Shared Semantics in Enterprise Modeling. In: Proceedings of
5th IFIP WG8.1 Working Conference on the Practice of Enterprise Modeling
(PoEM2012), Rostock, Germany, 2012
Dirk van der Linden, Stijn J.B.A. Hoppenbrouwers and Henderik A. Proper: On the
identification of modeler communities. In: International Journal of Information
Systems Modeling and Design (IJISMD), vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 22-40, IGI Global,
2014
8.1 Background
As we have argued in previous Chapters, to deal more effectively with the issue of mis-
understandings and terminological mismatches in the modeling process it is necessary to
have an insight into the conceptual understanding of the people involved in the mod-
eling process; in particular, how they understand the meta-concepts (i.e., the modeling
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concepts). However, to do so one cannot realistically be expected to look into each indi-
vidual modeler’s semantic idiosyncrasies. Instead, a generalized view on how people with
a certain background typically understand the common meta-concepts could be used to
infer, to some degree, the outline of their conceptual understanding. Such (stereo)types
of modelers could be found by identifying communities of modelers that share similar
semantic tendencies for given meta-concepts and analyzing whether they have any shared
properties that allow us to treat them similarly. A community in this context is noth-
ing more than a group of people who can be seen to share certain things, in this case
their understanding of a modeling language and its (meta-)concepts. As language, or
any means of communication, is inherently bound to a community using it (Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969) (regardless of whether that community is bound by geogra-
phy, biology, shared practices and techniques (Wenger and Snyder 2000, Meyerhoff 2008),
like-minded people (Alani and Shadbolt 2002), used and shared information (Bishr et al.
1999), cognitive strengths and weaknesses (Wilmont et al. 2012) or simply speech and
natural language (Gumperz 2001, Hoppenbrouwers 2003)), it seems safe to assume that
there are communities which share a typical way of understanding modeling language
concepts. This is not to say that such communities would be completely homogeneous
in their semantics, but merely that they show enough overlap to be able to be treated
as belonging together during a process which integrates models originating from their
members without expecting strong inconsistencies in the final product.
Finding such communities based on, for example, empirical data is not a difficult mat-
ter in itself. However, the difficulty lies in going from simply finding communities to
understanding them and generalizing them, i.e., being able to predict, on the basis of
empirical data or prior experience, that communities of people sharing certain properties
will typically use certain semantics. To do so it is necessary to find markers – properties
that are shared between the members of a community. These markers (e.g., dominant
modeling language, focus on specific aspects) are needed to be able to postulate that a
given modeler, with a given degree of certainty, belongs to some community and thus
likely shares this community’s typical understanding of a concept.
8.2 The real world situation
Between 2010 and 2012 several collaborative modeling workshops were organized in the
context of the Agile Service Development (ASD) project1 (Lankhorst 2012). With the
1The ASD project (www.novay.nl/okb/projects/agile-service-development/7628) was a collab-
orative research initiative focused on methods, techniques and tools for the agile development of business
services. The ASD project consortium consisted of Be Informed, BiZZdesign, Everest, IBM, O&i, PGGM,
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partners involved in these workshops, who themselves are involved in different kinds of
(collaborative) domain modeling (e.g., enterprise modeling, knowledge engineering, sys-
tems analysis), we have found that there are a number of common markers that modelers
are typically (and often implicitly) grouped by. That is, on the basis of these proper-
ties they are often assigned to collaborate on some joint domain modeling task. These
properties are, for example, a similar background, education, focus on what aspects to
model (e.g., processes, goals), in what sector they do so (e.g., government, health care,
telecommunications), and modeling languages used. Thus it seems that in practice, it is
assumed that when people have similar backgrounds, use similar modeling languages and
methods, etc., they will share a similar enough conceptualization of the involved modeling
meta-concepts, and will thus be able to effectively collaborate.
In this chapter we will test whether the premise (that people with similar backgrounds,
using similar languages and methods and so on, will share a similar conceptualization of
modeling meta-concepts) of this assumption holds, as it is so rarely tested or backed up by
empirical data. To do so we hypothesize that commonly used properties (e.g., modeling
language used, modeling focus, operating sector) should be reflected in communities that
share a similar semantic understanding of the common modeling meta-concepts. To test
this we will investigate the personal semantics for practitioners and students alike (whereas
other work on finding such communities and their conceptualizations often focuses on
analysis of their produced texts or models (Flake et al. 2002, Recker and Dreiling 2007)
instead of the modelers themselves). We will then group them by shared semantics and
investigate whether they share the expected, or indeed, any amount of properties. If
this is found to be so, then the ‘naive’ grouping procedure commonly used already in
practice might have some merit. Furthermore, it could lead to predictive theories that,
to a certain degree, predict what (the range of) understanding is that a modeler has for
a given concept.
The specific focus of the study presented in this chapter is thus to investigate and test
whether this common assumption made in modeling practice can be backed up by em-
pirical investigations. In terms of the types of theories in information systems research
described by Gregor (2006), we strive to analyze and describe in detail the modelers’
conceptual understandings, and whether that analysis challenges any held assumptions.
It is thus out of the scope of this particular study to propose an approach stipulating how
to more effectively ‘do’ the act of modeling, nor is it our intention to describe in elaborate
detail how existing methods for particular modeling efforts (e.g., TOGAF, ADM in the
context of enterprise modeling) might be adapted to fit with our findings. Instead, we
RuleManagement Group, Voogd & Voogd, CRP Henri Tudor, Radboud University Nijmegen, University
Twente, Utrecht University & Utrecht University of Applied Science, TNO and Novay.
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will discuss the more fundamental implications our findings have (be they bad or good),
and what steps could be taken both by practice and research in order to deal with them.
8.3 Experimental parameters
8.3.1 Limitations
While the amount of participants in each study might seem low compared to other scien-
tific studies with different goals and methodologies, both of our studies are large enough
to produce useful results for our purposes. As we will test our hypothesis by attempting
to falsify it, we need only counter-examples to the practice of naive grouping we described
in the introduction. We are confident that accepting the hypothesis is not unrealistic as
it is grounded in empirical observations, and its rejection would also not be a trivial mat-
ter. Thus, it is most efficient for a first enquiry into the problem matter to use only as
many people as deemed necessary to find a counter-example. Given that the practice we
described seems to be widespread, it should thus be found in relatively small samples of
participants.
Even though there is more difference (of opinion and interpretation) to be found when it
comes to domain concepts than the meta-concepts we focus on in this dissertation, these
meta-concepts are more interesting to look at for this study’s purposes. As we wish to
compare a number of modelers in order to establish whether they can be grouped or not,
the concepts we investigate should be shared amongst them. This is definitely the case
for the meta-concepts, as they are shared by most languages and methods, whereas the
highly specialized domain concepts might not be shared amongst them.
8.3.2 Method
Materials: This community identification study is based on data from the semantic dif-
ferential studies shown and discussed in Chapters 6.3 and 6.4. They investigated
the understanding participants have for the meta-concepts from Table 3.2 (actors,
events, goals, processes, resources, restrictions and results) on the
dimensions from Table 3.3 (natural, human, composed, intentional, necessary, ma-
terial and vague).
Materials – markers: We use markers to analyze whether groups found in the results
of our study reflect commonly used grouping approaches by practitioners. These
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markers originate from workshop sessions with practitioners and companies as de-
tailed in the introduction. They are the following: what modeling languages and
methods people use, what sector they operate in, what the focus of their modeling
efforts is, and what kind of stakeholders they interact with during the modeling
process.
Participants: The practitioner study as reported on in Chapter 6.3 (n=12, see Table 8.1
for detailed marker information) was carried out in two internationally operating
companies that focus on supporting clients in (re)designing organizations and enter-
prises. Apart from the semantic differential, we explored what modeling languages
and methods they use, what sector(s) they operate in, what they model, and what
kind of people they mostly interact with in order to see whether these could be
used as identifying factors for semantic communities. The student study (n=19 at
the original time of this analysis) was an ongoing longitudinal study into the (evo-
lution of) the understanding computing and information systems science students
have of modeling concepts. We explored their educational (and where applicable,
professional) background, their knowledge of modeling or programming languages
and methods, their interests, and career plans. While these students will likely not
offer any particularly interesting insight compared to the practitioners, we include
them in order to verify whether the phenomena we investigate occur in other groups
than just experienced modelers.
Procedure: To find communities of people that shared a certain amount of semantics
(i.e., score similarly for given concept-dimension combinations) we initially analyzed
the results from the semantic differential studies using repeated bisection clustering.
However, we found it not feasible to investigate the existence and borders of commu-
nities with this approach, as it was not sensible to a priori estimate parameters like
optimal cluster size and similarity cutoffs (i.e., how similar people should score in
order to be considered part of the same community), given that we had no realistic
prior data. For this reason we used principal component analysis (PCA) and the
visualizations of it in order to generate a more manageable way of investigating the
communities and the rough semantic distance between them. These PCA results
and their visualizations (see Figs. 8.1 and 8.2) demonstrate (roughly) the degree to
which people share a semantically similar understanding of the investigated concepts
and can thus be grouped together. It has to be stressed that this ‘unit’ of distance
is dimensionless and thus should not be used as an objective measure on its own.
Instead, it can be seen and used to distinguish groups from groups, while not saying
necessarily in detail how objectively far they are from each other. Combining this
data with the information we have gathered about the participants (i.e., the mark-
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ers) we can investigate whether the structure of the found clusters (i.e., semantic
communities) reflect what would be expected from the naive grouping commonly
performed in practice.
Table 8.1: Participants in the practitioner study and the markers relevant for identifying them
as being a particular kind of modeler. ‘Proprietary’ languages are not publicly available modeling
languages or suites, often developed in-house.
No. Used languages Sector Focus Interacts with
1 Proprietary,
RDF, OWL,
UML, ERD
Financial, Gov-
ernment
Context, domain
knowledge, pro-
cesses, data
Operational man-
agers, Senior man-
agers, Domain experts
2 Proprietary Government Knowledge sys-
tems, processes
Managers, domain ex-
perts
3 Proprietary Financial, Gov-
ernment
Knowledge rules,
processes, data
Analysts, modelers
4 OWL, UML,
BPMN
Government,
Public, Health-
care, Finance
Knowledge rules,
decisions
Domain experts,
project managers,
IT engineers, busi-
ness and enterprise
architects
5 UML, Propri-
etary, Protos
Financial, Gov-
ernment, Non-
profit
Application-
specific knowl-
edge, process
knowledge,
knowledge data-
banks
Domain experts and
IT departments
6 Meta-modeling,
ontologies, tax-
onomies
Spatial planning,
environment
Processes Domain experts, ana-
lysts, architects
7 Proprietary,
UML, Java
Government,
spatial planning
Business pro-
cesses, process
structure, supply
chain
Domain experts, IT
specialists
8 UML, OWL,
RDF, Mindmap,
Rulespeak, Pro-
prietary
Government,
Healthcare
Rules Business profession-
als, policymakers,
lawyers
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9 Proprietary Government,
Financial
Rules, legislation,
policy, processes
Domain experts
10 Proprietary,
XML, XSLT
Government,
finance
Processes, rules,
object definitions
for systems
Domain experts, java
developers
11 ArchiMate, UML,
ORM, ERD,
BPMN, Amber,
‘improvisational’
– Enterprise-wide
architectures,
strategic con-
text, change
organization
(senior) line man-
agers, architects,
domain experts,
process owners
12 ArchiMate 2.0,
Amber Architect,
Proprietary
Government,
Healthcare, Fi-
nancial, Telecom
Business pro-
cesses, work
processes, in-
structions, enter-
prise architecture
Domain experts and
managers, ‘normal’
workers
8.4 Data
Most importantly, the results support the idea that people can be clustered based on their
personal semantics. As shown in Figs. 8.1 and 8.2 there are easily detectable clusters (i.e.,
communities) for most of the investigated meta-concepts, although they vary in terms of
their member size and the semantic difference between the members (i.e., the variance
within the clusters).
8.5 Discussion
While there are both clusters of people that share a semantic understanding for practi-
tioners and students alike, they do differ somewhat. Internal variance for a number of
concepts is greater for students, i.e., the semantics are more ‘spread out’ (see Table 8.2).
This may be explained by practitioners having more exposure to specific interpretations of
some concepts, causing a lower spread of measurable semantics. Nonetheless, both prac-
titioners and students are still easily divided into communities based on their semantic
differences.
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Figure 8.1: Visualization of the principal component analysis for the investigated meta-
concepts (and average overall understanding) in the practitioner sample. The visualizations
represent (roughly) the distance between understandings which individual participants have.
The further away two participants are on both axes (i.e., horizontal and vertically different co-
ordinates), the more different their conceptual understanding has been measured to be. Colored
boxes and circles are used to highlight some interesting (potential) groups of participants that
are discussed in more detail.
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Figure 8.2: Principal components found in the data of concept-specific understandings for
students. The visualizations represent (roughly) the distance between understandings which
individual participants have. The further away two participants are on both axes (i.e., horizontal
and vertically different coordinates), the more different their conceptual understanding has been
measured to be.
8.5.1 Finding communities
To demonstrate the existence and structure of the found communities, we will discuss
some of the clusters we found for the understanding practitioners and students have of
goals, processes, resources and restrictions. The immediately obvious difference
between the practitioners and students is that, where there are clusters to be found
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Table 8.2: Comparison of variance for each concept in the investigated data samples. Wilcoxon-
testing on the variance to test whether one sample had a lower spread was negative (V=8,
p=0.1875). While overall variance is not significantly different, a number of meta-concepts (i.e.,
actor, event and goal) do display potentially interesting disparities.
sample actor event goal process resource restriction result
practitioner 0.38 0.57 0.68 0.93 0.73 0.94 0.92
student 0.66 0.77 1.01 0.93 0.82 0.83 0.81
amongst the practitioners, they differ mostly on one axis (i.e., component), whereas the
students often differ wildly on both axes. Of particular interest to testing our hypothesis
are participants 3 & 8, and 2, 7 & 10 from the practitioner data sample. The first
community clusters together very closely for their understanding of restrictions (and
goals, albeit to a lesser degree) while they differ only slightly for most other concepts.
This means one would expect them to share some real-world properties. Perhaps they are
people specialized in goal modeling, or share a typical way of modeling restrictions
in a formal sense. The second community (participants 2, 7 & 10) cluster together very
closely for resources, fairly close for goals and restrictions, while being strongly
different when it comes to their understanding of processes.
One could expect this to mean that they have some shared focus on resources, either
through a language they use (e.g., value-exchange or deployment languages) which are
often strongly connected to goals (as either requiring them, or resulting in their cre-
ation). Conversely, one would not necessarily expect there to be much overlap between
the participants with regard to processes, as they are grouped with a wide spread.
For the students, there are several potentially interesting communities to look at. Par-
ticipants 4 & 8 differ strongly for several concepts (e.g., their strong differentiation on
two components for resources, and for processes and restrictions), but they have
an almost exactly similar understanding of goals. One would expect that some kind of
property shared between them might be used to identify other participants that cluster
together for goals, but not necessarily share other understandings. Participants 3, 6 &
19 also cluster together closely for one concept – resources – but differ on their under-
standing of the other investigated concepts. As such, if (some) experience in the form of
having used specific programming and modeling languages is correlated to their concep-
tual understanding, one would expect to find some reflection of that in the clusterings of
these students.
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8.5.2 Identifying communities
However, when we add the information we have about the participants (see Tables 8.3
and 8.4) to these clusters, we run into some problems. It is often the case that communities
do not share (many) pertinent properties, or when they do, there are other communities
with the same properties that are far removed from them in terms of their conceptual
understanding. For instance, consider participants 2, 7 & 10 (highlighted with a gray oval)
from the practitioner data sample. While they share some properties, (e.g. operating in
the same sector, having some amount of focus on processes, and interacting with domain
experts), when we look at other communities it is not as simple to use this combination of
properties to uniquely identify them. For instance, participants 3 & 8 (highlighted with a
black rectangle) cluster together closely in their own right, but do share some overlapping
properties (both operate in the government sector). Thus, merely looking at the sector a
modeler operates in cannot be enough to identify them.
Table 8.3: Comparison of some practitioners based on investigated properties. The proprietary
language is an in-house language used by one of the involved companies.
No. Used languages Sector Focus Interacts with
3 Proprietary Financial, Gov-
ernment
Knowledge rules,
processes, data
Analists, modelers
8 UML, OWL,
RDF, Mindmap,
Rulespeak, Pro-
prietary
Government,
Healthcare
Rules Business profes-
sionals, policy-
makers, lawyers
2 Proprietary Government Knowledge sys-
tems, processes
Managers, domain
experts
7 Proprietary,
UML, Java
Government,
spatial planning
Business pro-
cesses, process
structure
Domain experts,
IT specialists
10 Proprietary,
XML, XSLT
Government,
finance
Processes, rules,
object definitions
for systems
Domain experts,
java developers
9 Proprietary Government,
Financial
Rules, legislation,
policy, processes
Domain experts
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Another interesting observation is the fact that while participants 2, 7 & 10 cluster to-
gether closely for a number of concepts (e.g., goals, resources and restrictions),
they do not appear to have a similar understanding of what constitutes a process, even
though they all share a strong focus on modeling processes. Looking at the combination
of sector and focus is not enough either, as under these conditions participant 8 and 10
should be grouped closer together because they both have a focus on rules. When we fi-
nally look at the combination of sector, focus and interaction we have a somewhat higher
chance of uniquely identifying communities, although there are still counter-examples.
Participant 9 (highlighted with a gray rectangle), for example, shares all the properties
with participants 2, 7 & 10, but is conceptually far removed from all others. The dataset
shows a similar trend for most other participants, providing both examples and coun-
terexamples for most of these property combinations, making it generally very difficult,
if not impossible to identify communities.
We face the same challenge in the student data sample, although even more pronounced
on an almost individual level. There are participants that share the same properties while
having wildly varying conceptual understandings. There seems to be some differentiation
on whether participants have prior experience, but even then this sole property does not
have enough discriminatory power. Take for example participants 4 & 8 (highlighted with
a black rectangle) and participants 3, 6 & 19 (highlighted with a gray oval). Both these
communities cluster closely together for a specific concept, but then differ on other con-
cepts. One could expect this has to do with a small amount of properties differing between
them, which is the case, as there is consistently a participant with some prior experience
in programming and scripting languages amongst them. However, if this property really
is the differentiating factor, one would expect that on the other concepts the participants
with prior experience (4 & 6) would be further removed from other participants than the
ones without experience are, which is simply not the case. It thus seems rather difficult
to link these properties to the communities and their structure.
This challenge could be explained by a number of things. First and foremost would be
a plain lack in the amount of properties (or their granularity, as might be the case in
the student data sample) to identify communities by, while it is also possible that the
investigated concepts were not at the right abstraction level (i.e., either too specific or
too vague), or that the investigated concepts were simply not the concepts people use to
model. We will discuss each of these possibilities.
The simplest explanation is that the properties we attempt to identify communities by are
not the right (i.e., properly discriminating) ones. It is possible (especially for the student
data sample) that some of the properties are not necessarily the wrong ones, but that they
are not discriminative enough. For example, knowing what modeling languages someone
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Table 8.4: Comparison of some students based on investigated properties. Profiles are stan-
dardized packages of coursework students took during secondary education, nature being natural
sciences, technology a focus on physics and health a focus on biology.
No. Study Profile Prior experience
4 Computing Science Nature & Technology &
Health
Some programming and
scripting experience
8 Computing Science Nature & Technology None
3 Information Systems Nature & Technology None
6 Computing Science Nature & Technology Programming experience
19 Information Systems Nature & Health None
uses could be described in more detail because the language could have multiple versions
that are in use, and it is possible (indeed quite likely) that a language used is not the same
as the ‘official’ language. However, this line of reasoning is problematic for two reasons.
The first being that these are properties that are used by practitioners to (naively) group
modelers together, the second that there is no clear-cut way to identify reasonable other
properties that are correlated to the modeling practice. If these properties are not useful,
we would have to reject the hypothesis on the grounds of them being a ‘bad fit’ for
grouping people. Other properties that could be thought of could include reflections of
the cultural background of modelers. However, these are less likely to be of influence
in our specific case as the Enterprise Modelers we investigate are all set in a Western
European context and there is little cultural diversity (or granularity, as might be the
case in the student data sample) in this sense.
Another explanation could be that the meta-concepts we chose are not at the right ab-
straction level (i.e., concept width), meaning that they are either too vague or specific.
For example, some modelers could typically think on near-instantiation level while others
think more vaguely. If concepts are very specific, one would expect to find differences
much faster (as the distance between people’s conceptual understanding can be expected
to be larger), which thus makes it easier to find communities. If they are (too) vague
though, people would not differ much because there are not enough properties to differ
on in the first place. However, the way we set up our observations rules out the vagueness
possibility, as participants were given a semantic priming task before the semantic dif-
ferential task of each concept. What we investigated was thus their most typical specific
understanding of a concept. For this reason it is unlikely that the abstraction level of the
concepts was the cause of the challenge of identifying the communities.
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Finally, the most obvious explanation could be a flaw in our preliminary work, namely
that we did not select the right meta-concepts, irrespective of their abstraction level.
Considering the meta-concepts were derived from an analysis of conceptual modeling
languages and methods used for many aspects of enterprises, and that there simply does
not seem a way to do without most of them, we find it very unlikely this is the case. The
unlikely option that what we investigated was not actually the modeling concept, but
something else entirely (i.e., someone considering their favorite Hollywood actors over a
conceptual modeling interpretation of actor) can also be ruled out as the priming task
in our observation rules out this possibility. It is therefore unlikely that these potential
issues affected our analysis, leading us to conclude that the identification of communities
of modelers based on the investigated properties is not feasible.
While we had admittedly hoped that these observations would yield a positive result to
the hypothesis, the lack of support we have shown means that a theory of predicting how
modelers understand the key concepts they use, and thus what the additional ‘implicit’
semantics of a model could be (as alluded to in the introduction) is likely not feasible.
Nonetheless, the observations do help to systematically clarify that these different personal
understandings exist, can be measured, and might be correlated to communication and
modeling breakdown due to unawareness of linguistic prejudice.
8.5.3 Consequences
If we wanted to simply discount the possibility of these properties being good ways to
identify communities that share a semantic understanding of some concepts with, we
would now be done. But as noted in the introduction, the rejection of this hypothesis
carries with it certain consequences, especially as these properties are being used to
identify communities and group people together in practice (e.g., the earlier discussed
workshops within the ASD project Lankhorst (2012)). Our findings are thus of direct
relevance to groups like model facilitators and enterprise modelers as they can use these
kind of findings to support them in determining good and effective modeling strategies
(e.g., by having more of an insight into the basic ‘kinds’ of modelers, being more aware
of common differences). More generally, the consequences of our findings are not simply
that we should stop grouping modelers together in a naive fashion, but that we should
strive to gain a better understanding of why we do so, what else we might do in its stead,
and what avenues of research should be explored to deal with the consequences.
Like the studies presented in Chapter 6, this study thus again re-iterates the need that
before actually modeling a domain, whether with modelers or stakeholders, it would be
prudent to discuss the understandings the involved parties have of the (meta-)concepts to
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be used. This should not be relegated to a purely abstract discussion of the types (meta-
concepts) used in the modeling language, but should rather focus on exploring what in
the universe of discourse needs to be modeled, and as a result, what types are needed for
this. As a consequence, one can focus on elaborating how the people involved understand
those meta-concepts. For example, when modeling a specific universe of discourse which
entails the necessity to model rules and the way they affect people, it can easily be derived
that some meta-concept for rules or restrictions is necessary. We can then move towards
a discussion concerning what kind of properties this meta-concept should at least be able
to distinguish between, e.g., that some rules are logical conditions that cannot be violated
(alethic), while some other ones are moral conditions that can, but ought not be violated
(deontic). As a result of having done this, we now know before actually starting to model
what the modeling language as such should accommodate.
This study furthermore stresses the point that a ‘model’ should not just be regarded solely
in terms of its graphical or textual representation. Instead, we need to understand that
the actual model underlying whatever form it is represented in contains more information
than the representation itself. This includes, for example, the personal understanding
that people have of the concepts and meta-concepts, and in particular, the (joint) under-
standing of the meta-concepts used by the model. To ensure that one does not leave out
these personal understandings and their possible effects during the model creation and
use, a number of practices can be applied during the modeling process.
However, we should not focus exclusively on attempting to solve the issue by looking only
at the conceptual aspects. Attempts to understand more clearly the reasons and challenges
in the modeling process as discussed could be undertaken in, for example by understanding
why people become part of a community (in our case, of shared semantics) could help to
deal with their conceptualization processes by understanding more clearly how the group
dynamics affect them. Several drivers (e.g., economical, political and cultural) could
drive people to become part of such communities and have received attention already (see
e.g., Huang et al. (2002) or recent work in EA by Niemietz (2013)), and is a worthwhile
angle of investigation to extend our understanding of such group dynamics.
To summarize, we have shown that the often implicit assumption that “people have
strongly comparable semantics for the common modeling meta-concepts if they share an
expertise in certain sectors, modeling focus or used languages” cannot be backed up by our
empirical investigation. While not an exhaustive disproof of the hypothesis by any means,
it casts enough doubt on it that it would be a considerate practice for those involved in
(collaborative) modeling efforts to be more careful and double-check their assumptions
when modeling together with, or using models from, others practitioners.
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8.6 Summary & outlook
In this chapter we have shown a way to discover communities that share personal se-
mantics through analysis of psychometric data and discussed the difficulties in identifying
them through shared properties between their members. On the basis of this we have
rejected the hypothesis that modelers with certain shared properties (such as used lan-
guages, background, focus, etc.) can be easily grouped together and expected to share
a similar understanding of the investigated meta-concepts. While this offers support for
one of our main research questions, “Can particular (kinds of) conceptual understandings
of certain meta-concepts be attributed to a community?”, it more importantly gives a
negative answer to the follow up question of whether those attributions can be used to
predict a person’s typical understanding of a language construct simply by finding their
community membership. Furthermore, we have discussed the consequences of these find-
ings for the modeling process and elaborated on what avenues of research might prove
fruitful with these consequences.

Part IV
Closing

CHAPTER 9
Conclusions and Further Research
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Abstract. This chapter discusses the conclusions reached in this thesis and provides
directions for further research. First, a summary of the answers for each of the research
questions is given and briefly discussed, which substantiates the contributions that this
work has made. Second, some aspects that can be studied in more detail and other issues
still left open are described as potential avenues for further research.
9.1 Answers, summarized
While the main findings and conclusions of each study are discussed in detail in their
own Chapters, we will briefly summarize the answers to each of the individual research
questions here.
9.1.1 Fundamental part
1. What are the meta-concepts (i.e., language constructs) shared between modeling lan-
guages used in enterprise modeling? We derived a number of meta-concepts common
to conceptual modeling languages through an analysis of modeling language notations.
These meta-concepts are actor, event, goal, process, resource, restriction,
and result. Chapter 3.3 goes into more detail on the derivation process and the meaning
of these meta-concepts and what exemplars fit into them. Furthermore, we also derived a
number of dimensions which can be used to distinguish the different interpretations peo-
ple have of these meta-concepts (e.g., for person x an actor is a natural, human thing,
while for person y it is a non-natural, non-human, material thing). These dimensions can
be found in Table 3.3.
2. What is the conceptual understanding that people have of these meta-concepts? The
conceptual understanding that people have of these constructs widely diverges from per-
son to person. In Chapter 6 we have presented the results of two semantic differential
studies that measured the conceptual understanding enterprise modelers and comput-
ing/information science students have of the meta-concepts. It did so by finding how
well the derived dimensions related to each meta-concept (i.e., whether a resource is a
material thing, a human thing, and so on). The main finding of both studies was that
there is a wide range of different conceptual understandings held from person to person.
However, some aspects do seem to be shared between people, as well as over the course of
the longitudinal study. These are for example that the meta-concepts are conceptualized
as (having to be) non-vague things, and many of the meta-concepts being of an intentional
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nature (e.g., goals are formulated for a reason, resources are specifically listed for some
purpose, results are intentionally created). Further details can be found in the discussion
of the study among practitioners (see Section 6.3), and the study among students (see
Section 6.4). However, even though there are some common aspects of the conceptual
understanding of the meta-concepts, we should keep in mind the strong individual dif-
ferences between the way people see each meta-concept, and attempt to understand how
these individuals involved in a modeling effort understand the used meta-concepts.
2.1 To what extent do the categories for these meta-concepts more resemble a graded or
discrete structure (e.g., artifactual or natural)? The categories for the meta-concepts are
likely of a graded nature (that is, some of their members are considered better members
than others), as these categories reflect artifactual benchmark categories and contain many
members (i.e., terms) that are judged to be partial members. As a result, the validity
of instantiations of models containing these meta-concepts should be considered to be
a graded affair as well. While a model can have several valid instantiations in a given
domain, some of them might be more conceptually valid than others. The data used to
support this conclusion is given and discussed in Section 4.3.2.
2.2 To what extent do conceptual understandings differ on key points between different
people (e.g., different sets of features, typicality)? With the feature listing study pre-
sented in Chapter 5 we found that there is a wide variety of different typical views held
about what the meta-concepts are to people. As the participants listed their most typical
features for the meta-concepts, it is easier to pinpoint what is shared between people’s
conceptual understandings, instead of pinpointing what is different. Outside of these con-
served features shared by many people there are strong differences from person to person
in how they see each meta-concept, and thus also how they differ in their conceptual
understanding. As discussed in Section 5.4, we can see for the meta-concepts that there
are conserved feature aspects such as e.g., the ability and capability of an actor to act,
events being triggers for things, resources being identified by their nature (e.g., material
or immaterial).
3. Does a person’s conceptual understanding of a meta-concept change over time? A per-
son’s conceptual understanding can be observed to change over time, as we have discussed
for the longitudinal semantic differential study performed with students in Section 6.4.
On the one hand, most of the measured conceptual understandings changed over time,
even if only slightly, during the course of the study. However, the way in which they
changed (sometimes moving back and forth from a specific understanding) was difficult
to characterize, to such a degree that it is difficult to attribute these changes to any ex-
ternal factors. On the other hand, the ‘average’ conceptual understanding taken of all
participants is more stable, with no particularly significant (or systematic) changes occur-
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ring over time for the general trend. As can be seen in Fig. 6.2, for most meta-concepts
the dimensions natural, human, and vague remain negative, while for the dimensions nec-
essary and intentional they stay positive. Thus, taken on average there does not seem to
be a significant switch of polarity occurring over time.
3.1 If so, does training in particular languages or techniques affect these base conceptual
understandings? There do not seem to be any significant correlations between the way the
the conceptual understandings we measured changed, and the kinds of educational stimuli
that the students received (i.e., the courses they took, modeling language and techniques
they learned). Thus, while training in a particular language or technique might affect
the base conceptual understanding someone has of the meta-concepts we study, it would
be difficult to pinpoint what the effect would be. Because of this, it is difficult to know
what to teach people in order to affect their conceptual understanding in a meaningful
way (e.g., ensuring people trained in a particular value modeling technique conceptualize
resources in the same way).
9.1.2 Practical part
4. To what extent do modeling languages allow for people to express their particular
conceptual understanding of meta-concepts? As detailed in Chapter 7.1, the degree to
which existing modeling languages allow one to express their particular conceptual un-
derstandings varies. We used the meta-concepts and dimensions to investigate whether
combinations of them were accommodated by a modeling language’s specification (e.g.,
“Is it possible to model an actor element as a human being?”), and did so for a number
of meta-concept and dimension combinations. Of these, around half of the meta-concept
and dimension combinations we investigated were not accommodated by any investigated
modeling language. Thus, it does not seem to be the case that modeling languages are
inherently semantically expressive, even for those conceptual distinctions that we have
found to be particularly salient among enterprise modelers. Furthermore, some common
ways of conceptualizing things were found to have no support at all, such as making an ex-
plicit distinction between the necessity of goals exhibited with Clegg and Barker (1994)’s
MoSCoW technique. However, nuances to this should also be added, as accommodating
each possible different conceptualization of a meta-concept would increase the complexity
of a modeling language to such a degree that it would become nearly impossible to use
the language in a practical setting. These findings and issues are discussed in more detail
in Section 7.3.1.
4.1 Do modeling languages make a distinction between explicitly or implicitly allowing
them to do so? From language to language there are differences as to whether those con-
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ceptual distinctions that are accommodated by the notational elements from the language
are done so explicitly (i.e., having their own distinct notational elements), or implicitly.
By implicit accommodation we mean the case where language constructs are defined in
such a way that they assume a particular conceptual understanding (e.g., actor elements
are human beings), while this interpretation is not necessarily clear from the notation
itself. In such a case it can be difficult to infer the exact semantics of a model without
knowledge of (or access to) the specification of the language. Some languages used vari-
ations in the visual elements for their meta-concepts which denoted these differences as
well, such as the ArchiMate notation using stick puppets for actor elements to denote
they represent people.
4.2 Can particular (kinds of) conceptual understandings of certain meta-concepts be used
to infer which modeling language or notation is best suited for a specific modeler? While it
is possible to look at individual people and their conceptual understanding of the common
meta-concepts to infer which language accommodates most of what is important to them,
a modeling language is rarely ever used by one person. Given that we have discussed the
strong amount of differences between how people understand the meta-concepts, it is thus
difficult to choose a ‘best’ modeling language in terms of how many important conceptual
distinctions are accommodated. Instead, one can opt to use a language which allows for
the explicit modeling of these distinctions (e.g., by virtue of its notation allowing people
to easily discriminate between differences, such as with the stick puppet example used
in ArchiMate). Doing so, and avoiding languages for which the semantics include many
specific interpretations of meta-concepts (e.g., actors are human things, resources are
material things) ensures that for a modeling effort with many different people involved the
different conceptual understandings they have can all be captured and more importantly,
explicitly presented to one another.
5. Can particular (kinds of) conceptual understandings of certain meta-concepts be at-
tributed to a community (of discourse, practice, etc.)? In Chapter 8 we discussed the
results of a study that aimed to discover communities with shared conceptual under-
standings, and then, based on their members’ real-world properties (e.g., what these
like-minded people share in terms of professional background, focus, used modeling lan-
guages) investigated whether predicting community membership based on such real-world
properties was feasible. While this study found that it was possible to find groups of peo-
ple that shared similar conceptual understandings, attributing them to a particular set
of real-world properties (e.g, a community of discourse or practice) was more difficult.
The individuals grouped together in the clusters often did not have a significant overlap
of real-world properties, or in the cases where that did happen, there were individuals
outside of the cluster who shared these same properties and should have thus been in the
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same cluster, if the conceptual understanding of a meta-concept was to be attributed to
these properties.
5.1 Can this be used to predict a person’s typical conceptual understanding of a meta-
concept by finding their community membership? Given that we found that particular
kinds of conceptual understandings of meta-concepts cannot be attributed easily to some
combination of real-world properties, we also rejected the idea of predicting conceptual
understandings of an individual based solely on their community membership.
9.2 Proposals for further research
9.2.1 Group and context differentiation
Most of the studies we have performed in this thesis used non-specialized groups of par-
ticipants. That is, we sought out people with experience in enterprise or conceptual
modeling, people working in conceptual modeling, students studying relevant topics and
so on. Doing so led to many interesting findings, but makes them general in terms of what
kind of ‘conceptual modeler’ they are valid for. It can be expected that within different
domains (e.g., telecom, government, finance, law) there are particular ways of looking at
the world, just as well as one could still expect that modelers focused on some partic-
ular aspect (e.g., business processes, value exchanges, architecture, rules) might have a
particular way of looking at the world.
For several of the things we investigated (i.e., category structure, feature listing, concep-
tual understandings) it might be interesting to repeat these studies with more strongly
differentiated groups of people. Doing so could lead to interesting insights into what dif-
ferent domains and aspects look at, and what is important to them. On the other hand,
given the findings from our last study into detecting communities with shared personal
semantics, and the difficulty we had in attempting to find coherent groups of similar peo-
ple (e.g., sharing real-world properties) that also had similar personal semantics, these
group and context differentiated studies might also not necessarily yield results specific to
their aspect. However, even if that is the case, more data which either corroborates earlier
findings (for example, that of the meta-concept categories being of a graded nature), or
expands and builds further on them (for example, by eliciting more lists of features for
meta-concepts) would still be valuable enough to justify the research effort.
The studies we have performed on modeling concepts and terminology were performed in
isolation. That is, we investigated how people thought about and conceptualize modeling
concepts and terminology, but presented these concepts and terms out of their logical
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context (i.e., in an actual model). While this has obvious advantages, such as that of
easily managing the complexity of stimuli and having some control over not introducing
unwanted information, it can have an effect on the results (or the amount of it). The
more context that is available to a person about a given concept, the more specific their
understanding will likely be. Thus, if we were to do, say, a feature listing study where
we did not simply ask what someone thought of some term with a small description, but
provided them with a number of (visual) models and examples of the use of the concept
we wish to study, more detailed information could potentially be elicited.
9.2.2 Quantitative determination of feature typicality
The feature listing study we have performed has a limited amount of quantitative infor-
mation about the typicality of the elicited features. By counting the amount of times
participants listed a (similar) feature an occurrence score was computed. However, this
cannot be used to compare how typical each feature is, as simply assuming that features
listed more often are more typical is incorrect. People might not have listed features
because they did not know about them, regardless of how typical they might be for them.
Incorporating an explicit quantitative survey in which we investigate how typical each
feature elicited earlier on is (e.g., on a Likert scale) would result in a dataset from which
the relative typicality of these features could be computed. With such data gathered,
a ranking list of what kind of conceptual distinctions must, should and ideally would
be supported by a modeling language can then be systematically produced. Performing
such work for different specialized groups (e.g., business process modelers, goal modelers)
as argued above, and repeating it on regular intervals should lead to a situation where
we do not only have useful methods to ensure that a modeling language is conceptually
complete, but that they can be based on tried relevant personal insights as well.
9.2.3 Determination of important distinctions
One of the more important things that should also be done is to ensure a more detailed
insight into what distinctions are conceptually relevant and important to actual users of
modeling languages (i.e., modelers) and a created model’s end-users (i.e., stakeholders).
We should focus on doing empirical work based on finding out what entities (and with
which properties they manifest themselves) are vital to modelers and stakeholders for the
typical domains they model, and in doing so determine what the conceptual needs are
for domain-specific languages for particular domains (e.g., that goal modeling languages
need to at least explicitly distinguish between hard and soft goals, goals that have to be
achieved versus goals that ought to be achieved, and so on).
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In this thesis we have derived the meta-concepts and dimensions through an analysis of
modeling languages. However, more dimensions should be found by investigating what
conceptual distinctions are important to modelers. This could be done with more in-
depth qualitative work, exploring the aspect that a modeler works on, and trying to elicit
as much information about what is important to them in this domain. Interviews with
a number of enterprise modelers could yield a large amount of text to analyze for such
potential conceptual distinctions, which can then be tested for their importance in simpler
surveys, for instance by asking a large group of modelers how important some dimension
is for their focus.
Finally, it is important to be aware of the constantly changing conceptual landscapes that
modelers and stakeholders operate in. The concepts that become important to modelers
and stakeholders can appear and change much more quickly. For this reason alone we
should also focus our efforts on a repeating empirical effort to elicit such conceptual needs.
9.3 Closing remarks
In this thesis we have made a number of contributions (see Section 1.5.3) to the state
of knowledge on how individual people conceptualize modeling language constructs (i.e.,
meta-concepts), and what implications these different personal understandings have for
both the process of modeling (e.g., more explicitly focusing on the clarification of meta-
concepts during communication about models, using modeling languages, grouping mod-
elers), as well as the things used for it (e.g., what kind of formalizations are necessary
to capture particular kinds of understandings, what modeling languages accommodate
some conceptual understandings). First, we have derived a number of common meta-
concepts shared between modeling languages used in enterprise modeling, and a number
of semantically distinct dimensions on which to distinguish between different conceptual
understandings of these meta-concepts. With these inputs we have performed several
studies that have shown, amongst others, that the category structure for these meta-
concepts is of a graded nature, what typical features for these meta-concepts are, what
typical conceptual understandings are and how these affect to what degree a model’s
instantiation is conceptually valid, that these conceptual understandings are not always
accommodated by modeling languages, and finally, that grouping people together based
on similar conceptual understandings is no simple task.
These contributions do not directly solve the larger issue of it being difficult to a posteriori
create an integrated conceptual model of an enterprise and ensure that it is reflective of
all the involved people’s conceptual understandings. However, the presented insights into
how people understand the meta-concepts, and how we can measure and make them
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explicit are valuable for modeling efforts in practice to make them more aware of the fact
that people have different personal semantics. Our main hope is that with the findings
presented in this thesis more people in practice become aware of how different people can
understand these core modeling meta-concepts. If they as well acknowledge that people
can have different, valid understandings of the world and their modeling languages, and
that the only way to ensure correct models is to constantly talk to one another about
the way we understand not only our domain, but the meta-concepts we use to model as
well, the quality and consistency of models and their integrationss should be, even if only
slightly, more guaranteed.
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Summary
The focus of this thesis is the personal semantics people have of concepts used to model:
meta-concepts. That means, how they typically view those concepts, how they categorize
them, what their semantic structure is, and so on. Our reason for investigating this, and
the objective we hope to achieve, is to make practitioners and academics more aware
that there can be significant differences in the way people interpret meta-concepts. It
is not our intention to propose yet another method or way of doing things to deal with
these differences, or create yet another series of pictures and models, but instead focus
on the knowledge questions that underlie them. In doing so we hope to stimulate other
researchers in the field of conceptual modeling to perform more empirical work, grounding
their designs and statements in real world observations, and for practitioners to be able
to use such insights in their daily practice.
We first introduce the issues to do with personal semantics in our specific research context:
Enterprise Modeling (EM). The goal of EM is to create models that correctly and coher-
ently describe the structure and function of all interconnected aspects of an enterprise,
such as, for example, its processes, design decision making, deployment and management
of IT artifacts, goals & motivations, value exchanges. These models can then be used to
reason about the enterprise’s structure and behavior, and when and where relevant, pro-
pose changes to it. As the models describing such different aspects are typically written
in different modeling languages, often by different people, personal differences in the way
people interpret not only the concepts from the domain, but also the concepts used for
modeling themselves can lead to a host of problems. To elaborate on this we go into more
detail on the conceptual modeling done for such aspects, what concepts are from a cogni-
tive point of view, and how personal differences affect them. We conclude by discussing
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the research objectives, the questions we aim to answer, and the contributions we hope
to make.
As we perform several empirical studies to investigate personal semantics, in Chapter 2
we will go into the way we will perform these studies and how we use them to answer the
research questions. We then give an overview of the methods and how we have adapted
them to be relevant to the context of (conceptual) modeling, and where available show
an example of experimental implementation. Amongst the methods we have used are
semantic differentials, which we have implemented according to existing quality criteria
for use in Information Systems research, term categorization experiments adopted from
psycholinguistic studies for several features such as typicality and centrality, and feature
listing studies.
Because it is important to know what to investigate the personal semantics of, we will
use Chapter 3 to discuss the framing of our empirical work. This pertains to the meta-
concepts we investigate (e.g., actors, goals, resources), on what dimensions we
investigate them (e.g., their physical status, composition, intentionality), and what ele-
ments of concept structure are relevant to look at. We give an overview of the analysis
we have performed on a number of (specifications of) conceptual modeling languages and
notations that are used to represent, or reason about different aspects of enterprises. Re-
sulting from this is a high level categorization of their core terms which we use throughout
the course of our research. On the basis of this we also deduced a number of discrimina-
tory dimensions on which terms commonly differ. We elaborate on the materials used for
the semantic differentials, that is, the terms we piloted, selected and ended up using to
describe the found dimensions by.
On basis of the selected meta-concepts, we discuss the results of several fundamental
studies in Chapters 4 through 6. Combined, they present an overview of the personal
semantics that people have of the meta-concepts and give us more insight into their
structure. The main findings discussed are that many of the meta-concepts are likely of
a graded nature. That is, some things are considered to be better members than others,
which can have an effect on the semantics of models and their derivatives. Given that
these meta-concepts are judged in a graded way, instantiations of such models likely should
be too, leading to different degrees of conceptual validity for different instantiations of
the same model. Furthermore, there are many kinds of features that people attribute
to these meta-concepts, as well as these features being of different kinds (e.g., alethic,
deontic, temporal, mereological). Some features re-occur quite often, and are thus likely
to be shared between many people. However, many features unique to individuals can be
found as well. Such features can be used to figure out how people identify meta-concepts,
and also what aspects are important to them. Finally, the conceptual understanding that
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people have of these meta-concepts can be differentiated on different semantic dimensions.
Measuring them in such a way shows that there is often a strong variety in these kinds
of understandings. Some understandings are shared between many people such as most
meta-concepts being considered to have to be non-vague, but people are, like the earlier
findings from the feature listing study corroborates, unique individuals that cannot be
easily generalized. Furthermore, these understandings change over time as well, although
it is difficult to find systematic patterns in how the cores of such personal semantics
changes, or what affects them.
Using the findings from the prior studies we investigate to what degree existing modeling
languages accommodate conceptual distinctions. That is, whether they allow for the
modeling of specific interpretations of a meta-concept (for example, a human actor), and
whether they do so explicitly by providing clear distinct notational elements, or implicitly
by assuming a particular interpretation in the specification of the language. In Chapter
7 we discuss in more detail whether modeling languages should optimally be capable of
doing so for all possible conceptual distinctions, and what kind of common distinctions are
lacking support, as there are still several potentially relevant conceptual distinctions that
are either left unaccommodated or left implicit (e.g., explicit encoding of the necessity of
goals, regardless of their satisfaction criteria). Furthermore, we argue that we should keep
up to date with the conceptual needs of modelers and stakeholders in practice in order to
ensure that our modeling languages (and notations) are supportive of their needs.
Afterwards, we turn our attention towards discovering groups of people that share personal
semantics through analysis of their conceptual understandings. Apart from merely finding
such groups, it would be useful to be able to predict what kind of personal semantics
people have based on some real-world properties, such as what kind of background they
have, and what languages and techniques they are experienced in. In our experience
many modeling efforts assume such a link between real-world properties and the personal
semantics of their modelers, which we put to the test in Chapter 8. Based on data
from semantic differential studies we have used clustering methods to find such groups,
and attempted to predict a conceptual modeler’s personal semantics based on real-world
properties. However, in our studies we were unable to find support for this, casting doubt
on whether this assumption from practice that people with similar real-world properties
have similar personal semantics is valid.

Samenvatting
De focus van dit proefschrift is de persoonlijke semantiek die mensen hebben van concepten
die ze gebruiken om te modelleren: meta-concepten. Daarmee bedoelen we, hoe ze deze
concepten zien, hoe ze ze categoriseren, wat hun semantische structuur is, enzovoort. Onze
reden voor dit onderzoek, en wat ermee hopen te bereiken, is om andere onderzoekers en
de praktijk meer bewust te maken van het feit dat er significante verschillen kunnen zijn
in de manier waarop mensen meta-concepten interpreteren. Het is niet onze bedoeling om
een zoveelste methode voor te stellen, of enkel een lading plaatjes en modellen te maken,
maar om onszelf te richten op de onderliggende kennisvragen bij deze kwestie. Hiermee
hopen we andere onderzoekers in het gebied van conceptueel modelleren te stimuleren om
ook meer empirisch werk uit te voeren, hun ontwerpen en uitspraken in observaties van de
echte wereld te aarden, en dat mensen uit de praktijk zulke inzichten kunnen gebruiken
in hun dagelijks werk.
We introduceren eerst enkele kwesties gerelateerd aan persoonlijke semantiek in onze
specifieke onderzoekscontext: Enterprise Modellering (EM). Het doel van EM is om
modellen te maken die een correct en samenhangend overzicht geven van de structuur
en de functie van alle verschillende aspecten van een Enterprise (bijvoorbeeld zijn pro-
cessen, ontwerpbesluitsvorming, inzet en management van IT artefacten, doelen & mo-
tivaties, waardeuitwisselingen). Deze modellen kunnen vervolgens gebruikt worden om
te redeneren over de structuur en het gedrag van de Enterprise, en waar relevant, om
suggesties te geven voor aanpassingen aan die structuur. Omdat de modellen van de
verschillende aspecten vaak in verschillende modelleertalen geschreven zijn, vaak ook nog
door verschillende mensen, kunnen persoonlijke verschillen in hoe mensen de domein- en
modelleerconcepten interpreteren tot een lading aan problemen leiden. We gaan hierom
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meer in op het conceptuele modellering wat gedaan wordt voor zulke aspecten, wat de
‘concepten’ die we modelleren zijn van een cognitief gezichtspunt, en hoe persoonlijke
verschillen die concepten be¨ınvloeden. We concluderen door onze onderzoeksobjectieven,
onderzoeksvragen, en de hopelijke bijdragen te beschrijven.
Omdat we meerdere empirische studies uitvoeren om persoonlijke semantiek te onder-
zoeken, gaan we in Hoofdstuk 2 in op de manier hoe we deze studies uitvoeren, en hoe
we ze gebruiken om onze onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden. Vervolgens geven we een
overzicht van de methoden en hoe we ze aangepast hebben om relevant te zijn in onze
context van (conceptueel) modelleren. Waar mogelijk geven we ook (een voorbeeld van)
een experimentele implementatie. De methoden die we gebruikt hebben zijn onder andere
semantische differentialen (ge¨ımplementeerd aan de hand van bestaande kwaliteitscrite-
ria voor het gebruik in Informatie Systemen onderzoek), term categorisatie experimenten
(voor meerdere eigenschappen zoals bijvoorbeeld typicaliteit en centraliteit), en eigen-
schapselicitatie studies.
Omdat het belangrijk is om te weten waarvan we de persoonlijke semantiek onderzoeken,
bediscuss¨ıeren we in Hoofdstuk 3 de inkadering van ons empirisch werk. Dit heeft be-
trekking op de meta-concepten die we zullen bestuderen (bijvoorbeeld uitvoerders,
doelen, bronnen), op de dimensies waar we ze op onderzoeken (bijvoorbeeld hun
fysieke status, compositie, intentionaliteit), en welke elementen van conceptstructuur rel-
evant zijn om naar te kijken. We geven een overzicht van de analyse die we uitgevoerd
hebben over een aantal (specificaties van) modelleertalen en notaties die gebruikt worden
voor verschillende aspecten van Enterprises. Het resultaat hiervan is een categorisatie van
de belangrijkste termen die we voor de rest van ons onderzoek gebruiken. Op basis van
deze categorisatie hebben we ook een aantal onderscheidende dimensies afgeleid waarop
deze termen onderscheiden kunnen worden.
Op basis van de geselecteerde meta-concepten bediscuss¨ıeren we de resultaten van meerdere
fundamentele studies in Hoofdstuk 4 tot en met 6. Samengenomen geven deze hoofd-
stukken een overzicht van de persoonlijke semantiek die mensen hebben van de meta-
concepten en geven ze ons meer inzicht in hun structuur. De voornaamste vondsten zijn
dat veel van de meta-concepten van een gegradeerde aard zijn (daarmee bedoelen we dat
sommige dingen betere voorbeelden van een meta-concept zijn dan anderen), wat een
effect can hebben op de semantiek van modellen en hun derivaten. Hierdoor moeten in-
stantiaties van modellen waarschijnlijk ook op een gegradeerde manier bekeken worden
wat betreft hun validiteit, waardoor er verschillende niveaus van conceptuele validiteit
ontstaan voor meerdere instantiaties van hetzelfde model. Bovendien zijn er vele soorten
eigenschappen die mensen toeschrijven aan de meta-concepten, en zijn deze eigenschap-
pen van meerdere soorten (bijvoorbeeld aletisch, deontisch, tijdelijk en mereologisch).
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Sommige eigenschappen komen vaak voor, en worden dus waarschijnlijk gedeeld door
veel mensen. Echter, veel eigenschappen zijn ook uniek voor bepaalde individuen. Zulke
eigenschappen kunnen gebruikt worden om erachter te komen hoe mensen meta-concepten
identificeren, en welke aspecten belangrijk voor ze zijn. Ten slotte kan de manier waarop
mensen de meta-concepten zien gedifferent¨ıeerd worden op meerdere semantische dimen-
sies. Door ze zodanig te meten blijkt dat er vaak een sterke variatie is in de manier
hoe mensen deze meta-concepten zien. Sommige van deze zienswijzen zijn gedeeld door
meerdere mensen (bijvoorbeeld dat veel meta-concepten gezien worden als dingen die niet
vaag moeten zijn), maar mensen blijken over het algemeen toch unieke individuee¨n te zijn
die niet makkelijk gegeneraliseerd kunnen worden. De manier waarop mensen deze meta-
concepten zien verandert ook over tijd, alhoewel het moeilijk is om hier systematische
patronen in te vinden, of te achterhalen wat deze veranderingen be¨ınvloedt.
Met behulp van de bevindingen uit de voorgaande studies onderzoeken we in welke mate
bestaande modelleringstalen conceptuele onderscheidingen ondersteunen. Dat wil zeggen
of ze het modelleren van specifieke interpretaties van een meta-concept (bijvoorbeeld een
menselijke uitvoerder) ondersteunen, en of ze dit expliciet doen door middel van specifieke
elementen in hun notatie, of impliciet door een bepaalde interpretatie in hun specificatie
aan te nemen. In Hoofdstuk 7 bespreken we dit in meer detail, door in te gaan op de vraag
of modelleertalen alle mogelijke conceptuele onderscheidingen zouden moeten onderste-
unen, wat van voorkomende onderscheidingen vaak niet ondersteund worden. Verder
pleiten we dat we constant moeten blijven onderzoeken wat de conceptuele benodigdhe-
den zijn van modelleurs en hun belanghebbenden uit de praktijk om ervoor te zorgen dat
onze modelleertalen (en notaties) deze benodigdheden ondersteunen.
Hierna richten we onze aandacht op het ontdekken van groepen mensen die persoonlijke
semantiek delen door middel van analyse van hun zienswijzen. Behalve zulke groepen
te vinden, zou het handig zijn om te kunnen voorspellen wat van persoonlijke semantiek
mensen hebben, bijvoorbeeld op basis van eigenschappen uit de echte wereld zoals hun
achtergrond, kennis van talen, enzovoort. In onze ervaring wordt dit in de praktijk vaak
aangenomen dat er zo een dergelijke link is tussen deze eigenschappen en persoonlijke
semantiek. In Hoofdstuk 8 stellen we deze aanname op de proef. Gebaseerd op gegevens
van de semantische differentiaal studies hebben we clustermethodens gebruikt om zulke
groepen te vinden, en vervolgens geprobeerd om de persoonlijke semantiek van een mod-
elleur te voorspellen gebaseerd op eigenschappen uit de echte wereld. Echter, in onze
studies konden we hier geen steun voor vinden, wat een twijfel oproept over deze aan-
name in de praktijk.
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Part V
Appendices

APPENDIX A
Categorization Data
The categorization data is presented in the following tables. They contain, respectively,
the number of terms that are full, partial or non-members, followed by the proportion of
full, partial and non-members.
A.1 Actor
Table A.1: Categorization data for actor
full partial non p.full p.partial p.non
unit 17 13 10 0.43 0.33 0.25
requirement unit 10 9 21 0.25 0.23 0.53
actor 38 1 1 0.95 0.03 0.03
role 15 4 21 0.38 0.10 0.53
collaboration 1 5 34 0.03 0.13 0.85
player 36 4 - 0.90 0.10 -
infrastructure component 10 12 18 0.25 0.30 0.45
organizational component 14 11 15 0.35 0.28 0.38
device 17 10 13 0.43 0.25 0.33
application software 16 10 14 0.40 0.25 0.35
organizational unit 22 9 9 0.55 0.23 0.23
position 6 5 29 0.15 0.13 0.73
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perspective 1 3 36 0.03 0.08 0.90
market segment 6 8 26 0.15 0.20 0.65
hardware role 12 9 19 0.30 0.23 0.48
software role 11 6 23 0.28 0.15 0.58
hardware 13 12 15 0.33 0.30 0.38
software 15 12 13 0.38 0.30 0.33
organizational role 14 6 20 0.35 0.15 0.50
environment agent 28 9 3 0.70 0.23 0.08
software agent 28 11 1 0.70 0.28 0.03
A.2 Event
Table A.2: Categorization data for event
full partial non p.full p.partial p.non
event 40 - - 1.00 - -
behavior 11 8 21 0.28 0.20 0.53
function 7 7 26 0.18 0.18 0.65
interaction 24 6 10 0.60 0.15 0.25
activity 22 7 11 0.55 0.18 0.28
task 12 8 20 0.30 0.20 0.50
business rule 1 - 39 0.03 - 0.98
service task 11 10 19 0.28 0.25 0.48
transaction 24 9 7 0.60 0.23 0.18
start event 36 3 1 0.90 0.08 0.03
intermediate event 34 4 2 0.85 0.10 0.05
value activity 10 11 19 0.25 0.28 0.48
value interface 4 4 32 0.10 0.10 0.80
value offering 10 5 25 0.25 0.13 0.63
connection 21 5 14 0.53 0.13 0.35
move 32 3 5 0.80 0.08 0.13
contribution 11 8 21 0.28 0.20 0.53
correlation 4 8 28 0.10 0.20 0.70
dependency 1 4 35 0.03 0.10 0.88
means-ends 5 3 32 0.13 0.08 0.80
control 12 8 20 0.30 0.20 0.50
goal refinement 12 4 24 0.30 0.10 0.60
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monitor 8 7 25 0.20 0.18 0.63
operation 20 7 13 0.50 0.18 0.33
operationalisation 15 6 19 0.38 0.15 0.48
performance 2 4 34 0.05 0.10 0.85
operation 20 9 11 0.50 0.23 0.28
initiatives 15 8 17 0.38 0.20 0.43
A.3 Goal
Table A.3: Categorization data for goal
full partial non p.full p.partial p.non
goal 40 - - 1.00 - -
hard-goal 33 5 2 0.83 0.13 0.05
soft-goal 32 8 - 0.80 0.20 -
business goal 39 1 - 0.98 0.03 -
achieve goal 30 6 4 0.75 0.15 0.10
assignment 8 10 22 0.20 0.25 0.55
avoid goal 23 5 12 0.58 0.13 0.30
cease goal 30 5 5 0.75 0.13 0.13
expectation 6 16 18 0.15 0.40 0.45
maintain goal 30 3 7 0.75 0.08 0.18
requirement 14 12 14 0.35 0.30 0.35
consumer needs 20 10 10 0.50 0.25 0.25
belief 6 8 26 0.15 0.20 0.65
value 11 5 24 0.28 0.13 0.60
target 30 6 4 0.75 0.15 0.10
A.4 Process
Table A.4: Categorization data for process
full partial non p.full p.partial p.non
organizational service 23 11 6 0.58 0.28 0.15
infrastructure service 22 9 9 0.55 0.23 0.23
information service 22 10 8 0.55 0.25 0.20
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other service 20 11 9 0.50 0.28 0.23
service 21 13 6 0.53 0.33 0.15
IT service 21 11 8 0.53 0.28 0.20
process 40 - - 1.00 - -
sub flow 23 9 8 0.58 0.23 0.20
business flow 27 6 7 0.68 0.15 0.18
process flow 23 9 8 0.58 0.23 0.20
business process 38 1 1 0.95 0.03 0.03
dependency path 7 8 25 0.18 0.20 0.63
game 22 9 9 0.55 0.23 0.23
task 17 10 13 0.43 0.25 0.33
A.5 Resource
Table A.5: Categorization data for resource
full partial non p.full p.partial p.non
artifact 18 10 12 0.45 0.25 0.30
location 14 9 17 0.35 0.23 0.43
hardware 32 4 4 0.80 0.10 0.10
cpu 30 5 5 0.75 0.13 0.13
hd 19 6 15 0.48 0.15 0.38
memory 34 4 2 0.85 0.10 0.05
software 31 6 3 0.78 0.15 0.08
value 16 8 16 0.40 0.20 0.40
data object 25 10 5 0.63 0.25 0.13
business object 17 13 10 0.43 0.33 0.25
object 24 12 4 0.60 0.30 0.10
node 10 9 21 0.25 0.23 0.53
network 29 6 5 0.73 0.15 0.13
network device 28 8 4 0.70 0.20 0.10
representation 6 7 27 0.15 0.18 0.68
meaning 4 5 31 0.10 0.13 0.78
device 31 6 3 0.78 0.15 0.08
computer hardware 33 5 2 0.83 0.13 0.05
machine resource 34 3 3 0.85 0.08 0.08
environmental data 26 4 10 0.65 0.10 0.25
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data input 21 9 10 0.53 0.23 0.25
input 21 8 11 0.53 0.20 0.28
value object 19 10 11 0.48 0.25 0.28
information 32 5 3 0.80 0.13 0.08
resource 39 1 - 0.98 0.03 0.00
content 21 8 11 0.53 0.20 0.28
value port 10 8 22 0.25 0.20 0.55
A.6 Restriction
Table A.6: Categorization data for restriction
full partial non p.full p.partial p.non
interaction 9 7 24 0.23 0.18 0.60
contract 28 6 6 0.70 0.15 0.15
interface 11 10 19 0.28 0.25 0.48
message 7 3 30 0.18 0.08 0.75
catching 7 10 23 0.18 0.25 0.58
throwing 7 10 23 0.18 0.25 0.58
boundary 31 4 5 0.78 0.10 0.13
rule 30 5 5 0.75 0.13 0.13
decomposition 8 8 24 0.20 0.20 0.60
belief 15 9 16 0.38 0.23 0.40
priority 26 8 6 0.65 0.20 0.15
license 26 9 5 0.65 0.23 0.13
boundary condition 34 2 4 0.85 0.05 0.10
conflict 15 10 15 0.38 0.25 0.38
domain property 24 6 10 0.60 0.15 0.25
permission 27 4 9 0.68 0.10 0.23
value 9 5 26 0.23 0.13 0.65
policy 31 6 3 0.78 0.15 0.08
trust 19 8 13 0.48 0.20 0.33
non-interrupting 16 8 16 0.40 0.20 0.40
interrupting 18 8 14 0.45 0.20 0.35
strategy 16 12 12 0.40 0.30 0.30
measure 9 9 22 0.23 0.23 0.55
strategic objective 16 14 10 0.40 0.35 0.25
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A.7 Result
Table A.7: Categorization data for result
full partial non p.full p.partial p.non
product 33 5 2 0.83 0.13 0.05
human output 32 5 3 0.80 0.13 0.08
material output 33 3 4 0.83 0.08 0.10
service output 35 3 2 0.88 0.08 0.05
data output 35 5 - 0.88 0.13 0.00
outcome 37 - 3 0.93 0.00 0.08
end event 16 10 14 0.40 0.25 0.35
payoff 24 11 5 0.60 0.28 0.13
APPENDIX B
Feature Listing Data
B.1 Actor
has a name, has permissions, has a role, is a role, has skills, has capabilities, can perform
an action, performs an action, stops an action, relaunches an action, schedules an action,
cancels an action, belongs to a group, participates in a process, has a responsibility, can
execute a task, can invoke a service, is assigned to a role, performs a task, performs an
activity, has an assigned goal, uses resources, is responsible for tasks, initiates actions, is
a responsible agent, can execute actions, can monitor the execution of actions, is capable
of proactive action, is socially capable, is capable of assuming different roles, can perform
actions, can receive information, can sense, is proactive, is deliberative, is an automatic
thing, has responsibilities, can perform tasks, has access to a resource, can control a
resource, can contribute to the fulfillment of goals, is composed of parts, performs actions,
is human, is technical, can react to events, has to work under constraints, has rights, has
access to resources, can fulfill multiple roles, carries knowledge, carries culture, is an active
entity, is physical, displays behavior, can be human, can be a machine, carries out work,
can carry responsibility, can receive responsibility, has an identity, has wishes, has desires,
has competence, can act autonomously, executes work, requests work, is independent, uses
services, uses active structures, is a person, is an organization, is responsible for a business
function, is responsible for a business process, can trigger actions, administrates vision and
principles, realizes vision and principles, realizes a goal, carries out actions, is non-human,
is responsible, is accountable, is autonomous, is identifiable, is a computer, is a machine,
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is part of a business function, receives triggers, receives service requests, delivers a desired
or agreed upon service, participates in a collaboration, is a company, is a person with a
role in a company, has a concern, is a stakeholder, has a contractual relation, has relation
to other actors, is a thing, does things, fulfills a role, has properties, acts in a context,
is someone active in a context, is responsible in a context, has influence on a system, is
reactive, can act, ensures the achievement of a result, is active, reacts to actions, makes
decisions, always has an input, always has an output, has a quality level, has a role of a
person, has a role of a machine, acts, can be a department, can be an organization, can
be a user, can be a system, can be a consumer of services, can offer services, has tasks, is
absolute, has an intention, has an objective, has a goal, relates to a use case, relates to a
scenario, relates to a function
B.2 Event
has a trigger, can be caught by something, has a related objective, is related to an actor,
has a description, started on some time, started by some thing, has a precondition, has
a postcondition, has a duration, has a cost, is recursive, has a cause, has consequences,
has a beginning, has an end, is triggered by something, can be temporal, has a name, can
trigger an action, defines a transition from some state to some state, occurs in a process,
has to be monitored, triggers a task, triggers a process, is atomic, is finite, is short, can
cause a change, can be recognized by an actor, is unique, is identifiable, is instantaneous,
is an occurrence, has some phenomena, is composed, is a change of state, occurs during an
interval in time, is limited in time, can be planned, can be spontaneous, happens, triggers
a business process, triggers a function, triggers a transformation, involves at least one
subject, is executed by at least one subject, can be observed, results from a change, does
not have a duration, has conditions, impacts other things, has a source, is a process end,
is measurable, has relevance to business, triggers something, is the change of the state of
an object, is related to a process, is related to a result, can trigger actions, is a fact, does
not happen, is repeatable, can trigger a reaction, is predictable, occurs in the real world,
can be anticipated upon, is a trigger, results in a case, is generated by a source, may be
notified to listeners, is reported by an actor, report of an event is received by an actor,
has a type, has a frequency, occurs at a specific time, triggers an action, has properties,
influences a process flow, can disrupt a process, is caused by something, causes something,
is unpredictable, can trigger a process, can occur spontaneously, has a timespan, triggers
change in a situation, is spontaneous, can be caused by an action, is immutable, has an
external cause, has an internal cause, occurs in the business layer, can trigger an activity,
can be triggered, has a date, has a time
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B.3 Goal
has a time, has a result, has a related objective, is related to an actor, has a description,
has a precondition, has a postcondition, has a cost, is defined by someone, has a name,
has a type, has a relationship with a subgoal, has a relationship with an actor, is based
on a need, is based on an objective, has to be reached during a process, is subjective,
is relevant to someone, may be quantifiable, is agreed upon, is formulated according to
the S.M.A.R.T. standard, is a desired state, is not currently the case, is an intention of
an actor, has properties, has to be fulfilled, can be refined into a subgoal, can conflict
with a goal, can be satisfied, has a property, is desired by an actor, is an objective, is
clear, has a limited scope, can be reached, is challenging, sensibility of which is attested by
human ACTORS, can be supported by a person, is temporally valid, is a guideline, can be
described quantitative, can be described qualitative, is formulated to be achieved in the
middle-long-term, is delimited, has a related stakeholder, describes a desired outcome,
implies change, is the S.M.A.R.T. formulation of an aim, has a related actor, can be
achieved, has a condition, has a purpose, gives direction, is thoughtful, is measurable, is
owned by a stakeholder, should address a driver, becomes an evaluation criteria for future
accomplishments, can be abstract, can be concrete, is future oriented, describes a desired
state, describes a desired change, has value for an actor, can be quantitative, can be
qualitative, has a source, is a desired future state, supports an organization, is formulated
to support the strategy, fits within a broader framework, represents the directions given by
something, is realizable within some time, is desired, is a future state, can be formulated
according to the S.M.A.R.T. standard, has a timespan, has a KPI, is on some governance
level, is tangible, is the desired result of an action, has to be achieved, is a reason for
the existence of something, is a desired result, gives direction to an actor, describes a
situation, is in the future, can be achieved in multiple ways, is planned, requires action
to be achieved, makes strategy concrete, requires controlled actions to be achieved, is a
state, has implications, can have subgoals, can have a strategy, can be broken down into
parts
B.4 Process
can be an instance of a method, is composite, groups tasks, has an endpoint, is executed
atomically, is created by a modeler, has an input, has an output, is defined through its
components, is executable, is pauseable, is stoppable, is rewindable, is formally defined,
is written in a modeling language, is bounded, is executed for a specific purpose, is a
succession of actions, can be a chemical reaction, can be a corporate process, has steps,
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has a timeline, has related actors, has input, has output, is a set of related actions, reaches
a goal, may involve roles, uses resources, has operating conditions, has a trigger event, may
trigger another process, may depend on another process, can be owned, can be measured,
has a trigger, is intangible, is composed of some tasks, has a sequence, has concurrency,
is abstract, is detailed, has a start, has an end, has steps which are connected, can be
conscious, can be passive, is specific to a problem, is specific to a solution, is not generic,
is specific
B.5 Resource
has features, has characteristics, can be available, needs permission for use, is used by an
actor, has a related objective, has a description, has an owner, has a value, is composed,
may be decomposed, is consumable, has an expiration date, satisfies a precondition, is
material, is immaterial, is a person, is finite, is countable, has a name, has a label, has a
type, can be human, can be material, is used for something, carries data, carries technol-
ogy, carries knowledge, is used for actions, is used for behavior, has utility, has operational
utility, has financial utility, has a benefit to something, can be abstract information, can
be a representation of information, can be decomposed, can be accessed, can be con-
trolled, can be software, can be hardware, is active, is passive, may be the realization
of an EA artifact, classifies a resource, is scalable, is scarce, is exchangeable, is used by
something, is valuable, has to be protected, has a capacity, has costs, is in a specific form,
has a source, has a target audience, has a creation date, has a modification date, has a
version, access is controlled, has a volume, is core, is non-core, is skilled, has structure,
has boundaries, requires management, can be scarce, is a means to execute actions, is a
means to initiate behavior, is transformed into a product, is consumed in a process, has
a life cycle, is useful for some goal, has a price, is of a specific kind, exists in itself, has
an availability, is human, is money, is input, is needed to realize output, is a means to
perform an activity, can be a machine, is a quantity of human capacity, is a machine, is
some amount of machine capacity, is needed for an activity, is optional, is required, has
properties, is needed to achieve a goal, has availability, is difficult to manage, is a means
of support for an actor, can have alternatives, is required for an activity, costs money,
has a quality level, uses something, is an employee, is used up, has to be refilled, can be
quantified, can be measured
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B.6 Restriction
is defined, is verifiable, has a type, has an owner, restricts something, limits something, is
valid from some time, is valid until some time, is invalidated by someone, is cancelled by
someone, has conditions, may have consequences, is defined by rules, has a name, is part of
a policy, limits an actor’s privileges, prevents an action, sets a precondition for an action,
sets a postcondition for an action, sets a condition for an action, limits the permissible
value range for an object, can be expressed numerically, is a regulation, is a limitation,
is natural, is artificial, limits possible solutions, originates outside of its applicable area,
is owned, needs to be discussed, has to be made explicit, should be formulated according
to S.M.A.R.T., is a contribution of an actor to a result, is common, is measurable, is
quantitative, can prevent an action, can limit possible solutions, has a source, is not
allowed, is forbidden, has a source which is authoritative, has an operation domain, needs
to be met during some period of time, can be temporal, can be determined by something,
restricts the way something can be done, is a consequence of a higher principle, limits the
behavior of an actor, has a motivation, violation may result in some punishment, has a
level of generality, something might be compliant to a restriction, limits choices, may be
represented as business rules, is a forbidden choice, is stipulated by others, is stipulated
by the environment, limits a resource, can be absolute, limits an activity, is temporal, is
situational, can influence a goal, can influence an event, is dogmatic behavior, is concrete,
limits choice of scenarios, limits time, limits budget, limits available knowledge, is specific,
is applicable to something, supports the realization of a goal, can have a quantitative value
B.7 Result
has a state, has data, has a related objective, has a related event, has a postcondition,
has a precondition, satisfies a precondition, is measurable, has a name, is the output
of a service, is the outcome of an action, meets a goal, is produced by an actor, is
observable, can have an effect on something, is the consequence of an event, is output,
is an outcome, can be aimed for, follows an action, is achieved by specific actions, can
be described quantitatively, can be described qualitatively, is temporal, has value for
someone, is delimited, is complete, has a quality, has related process, has a description,
has a related actor, has a purpose, is the result of behavior, can affect a structure, is valued
by a stakeholder, can be evidence of success, can be quantitative, can be qualitative, is
achieved, is not achieved, exists after its achieving, is clearly described, is material, is
immaterial, is a planned outcome of a process, can be part of a KPI, achievement can be
monitored, is realized, is desired, achieving it can be a goal, has a type, is based on input
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values, is a product, is a service, has a form, has content, has volume, has a frequency,
is a KPI, results after a process step, results after a process, can be composed, required
to result from something, results from an action, enables other actions, results from an
actor, is clear, can be input for an actor, contributes to a goal, has a property, has a
benefit, has a value, results from a clear process, has a related value, has costs, is related
to an activity, is a state of something, can be part of a process, associated with a process
APPENDIX C
Semantic Differential Data
C.1 Adjectives used in the semantic differentials
natural: natuurlijk, organisch, ontworpen, gemaakt, intrinsiek
human: menselijk, heeft gevoelens, is zelfbewust, heeft verlangens, is een machine
composed: unit, heeft onderdelen, atomair, geheel, totaal
necessary: noodzakelijk, essentieel, nodig, fundamenteel, moet opgevolgd worden
intentional: opzettelijk, spontaan, willekeurig, toevallig, geformuleerd
material: solide, fysiek, stoffelijk, echt, aanraakbaar
vague: exact, concreet, gedefinieerd, voorspelbaar, dubbelzinning
C.2 Raw data
The data given here are the raw, non-normalized results of the average adjective score
for each meta-concept dimension combination. Rows represent respectively the meta-
concepts actor, event, goal, process, resource, restriction, result. The
columns represent respectively the dimensions natural, human, composed, necessary, in-
tentional, material, vague.
C.2.1 Practitioners
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PARTICIPANT 1
1.60 1.40 2.60 2.00 2.60 2.00 3.00
3.00 3.40 2.60 1.40 2.40 3.40 4.20
3.60 3.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.60 5.00
3.40 3.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.60 5.00
2.60 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.20 2.00 4.40
3.80 3.40 3.40 1.00 1.40 2.60 5.00
4.00 4.20 1.40 1.00 1.00 2.60 5.00
PARTICIPANT 2
2.60 3.60 2.40 3.40 2.00 3.40 3.40
4.20 4.20 2.00 1.60 1.20 3.60 4.60
3.40 4.40 3.20 2.00 2.20 3.40 3.40
4.20 4.20 2.20 1.40 1.20 4.00 4.80
4.20 4.20 2.60 2.60 1.20 3.00 4.40
4.20 4.40 3.40 2.00 1.20 4.00 5.00
4.20 4.40 2.20 1.60 1.20 3.60 4.80
PARTICIPANT 3
3.00 2.20 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.80 4.20
3.60 3.40 3.00 2.00 3.40 3.80 3.20
3.20 3.60 3.40 1.60 1.80 3.60 3.40
3.20 3.20 2.40 2.20 2.80 3.60 2.00
3.20 2.80 3.00 2.40 3.00 2.60 2.80
3.00 3.40 3.20 2.80 2.00 3.00 3.60
3.60 3.60 3.20 2.60 2.00 3.40 3.80
PARTICIPANT 4
3.40 2.80 2.60 2.40 2.00 2.20 3.80
3.00 3.40 2.80 2.00 2.80 3.60 3.20
3.00 2.80 3.00 3.00 3.20 2.40 3.40
2.60 3.40 3.00 3.00 3.20 3.20 3.40
3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
PARTICIPANT 5
3.00 2.40 2.40 1.40 1.80 3.00 3.80
4.00 3.40 2.00 1.00 2.00 4.20 4.60
3.40 2.60 3.00 1.40 2.60 4.00 3.60
4.20 3.40 3.20 1.60 2.00 4.20 3.80
2.80 3.00 3.00 2.20 3.20 3.40 2.60
4.20 3.80 3.20 1.80 1.00 3.60 5.00
3.80 4.20 2.60 1.80 1.40 4.20 4.40
PARTICIPANT 6
3.00 2.80 3.00 2.00 2.60 2.80 3.60
3.60 3.20 3.00 3.40 2.60 3.20 3.80
3.20 3.60 2.80 2.00 2.60 3.40 4.60
3.60 3.00 3.40 3.80 3.00 3.40 3.80
3.20 3.40 3.60 3.60 2.60 2.60 3.60
3.80 3.60 2.80 3.00 2.60 3.60 4.20
3.20 3.40 3.20 3.00 2.60 3.40 4.00
PARTICIPANT 7
2.80 2.60 3.40 1.80 2.20 3.00 3.60
3.20 4.60 3.20 2.80 2.80 4.00 3.60
3.20 4.00 3.20 2.20 1.80 3.20 4.00
3.00 3.80 1.40 2.00 2.00 3.20 3.00
4.00 4.80 3.20 2.60 1.80 2.20 4.20
4.40 4.40 3.40 2.00 2.00 3.80 3.80
3.40 4.20 3.40 2.40 1.60 3.60 4.00
PARTICIPANT 8
2.40 3.40 2.80 1.60 2.40 3.00 3.40
3.00 3.80 2.40 2.40 3.20 4.20 3.40
3.20 3.80 2.60 1.60 2.80 3.80 3.20
3.40 3.40 2.60 3.00 3.00 4.20 2.40
2.60 2.00 3.20 2.20 2.80 2.00 3.40
3.20 4.00 3.00 2.20 3.00 3.40 3.00
3.40 4.20 3.00 1.60 2.00 3.00 3.60
PARTICIPANT 9
2.40 2.20 3.60 2.00 3.20 2.20 2.80
2.80 2.80 3.40 2.40 3.60 2.60 2.60
2.40 1.80 3.60 1.60 3.60 3.20 2.20
2.60 2.20 3.40 2.60 3.40 2.80 2.60
2.60 2.80 3.80 2.00 3.40 3.00 1.80
2.40 2.20 3.80 2.40 3.40 3.60 2.80
2.60 2.40 3.60 3.80 3.80 2.00 3.20
PARTICIPANT 10
3.20 2.60 2.80 2.80 1.60 1.80 3.80
2.60 3.60 3.00 2.40 3.20 3.80 3.80
3.20 3.40 3.20 2.40 1.60 4.40 4.20
4.60 4.20 3.20 2.20 1.40 5.00 3.80
4.60 4.20 3.80 1.40 1.60 2.00 4.40
4.60 4.20 2.80 2.00 1.00 4.20 5.00
4.40 4.20 2.60 3.00 2.00 3.60 4.00
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PARTICIPANT 11
3.20 2.80 2.60 1.80 2.60 3.20 3.20
2.60 2.40 2.80 2.40 3.00 2.60 2.80
3.20 2.80 3.00 2.40 1.80 2.80 3.40
3.00 2.80 2.20 1.80 1.80 2.20 4.40
3.20 3.40 2.60 1.40 2.40 2.80 4.00
3.60 4.40 2.80 2.00 2.60 2.00 3.80
3.60 3.40 2.80 1.60 1.80 2.40 4.00
PARTICIPANT 12
2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.80 2.40 2.40
3.20 3.00 3.00 3.20 3.00 2.80 2.80
3.00 3.00 3.40 3.20 3.00 2.80 3.00
3.20 3.40 3.80 3.60 3.80 3.40 3.60
3.60 3.80 4.20 3.80 4.00 4.40 4.40
3.60 3.60 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.40 3.60
3.60 3.60 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.40 3.60
MEDIAN OF ALL
2.80 2.60 2.80 2.00 2.40 2.80 3.40
3.20 3.40 3.00 2.40 3.00 3.60 3.60
3.20 3.40 3.20 2.00 2.20 3.40 3.40
3.40 3.40 2.60 2.20 2.00 3.40 3.80
3.20 3.40 3.20 2.20 2.60 2.60 4.00
3.80 3.80 3.20 2.00 2.00 3.60 3.80
3.60 4.20 3.00 2.40 2.00 3.40 4.00
SD OF ALL
0.14 0.21 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.28 0.21
0.28 0.28 0.21 0.42 0.28 0.35 0.49
0.07 0.35 0.14 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.21
0.21 0.28 0.49 0.49 0.64 0.42 0.64
0.35 0.35 0.21 0.21 0.35 0.28 0.28
0.28 0.28 0.14 0.21 0.49 0.14 0.42
0.14 0.28 0.28 0.57 0.42 0.21 0.28
C.2.2 Students
Phase 1
PARTICIPANT 1
3.40 3.60 2.60 2.20 2.80 3.00 3.40
2.60 3.60 3.20 3.60 3.40 3.40 2.60
4.20 3.60 2.60 3.40 1.40 3.60 4.00
3.60 4.60 2.40 2.00 1.60 3.20 4.00
2.60 4.20 3.00 2.40 2.60 2.20 3.00
3.80 3.80 3.20 3.00 1.60 2.80 3.80
3.80 4.00 2.60 2.20 2.20 2.00 4.40
PARTICIPANT 2
3.80 3.40 2.80 1.80 2.40 2.40 4.00
3.20 3.80 2.40 2.60 2.00 3.60 3.60
3.00 3.40 3.00 1.40 2.80 2.60 4.60
2.60 3.80 2.40 1.80 2.20 2.00 3.80
3.00 3.60 3.20 2.20 2.00 2.40 4.00
3.60 3.40 2.80 1.80 2.20 3.20 3.60
3.80 3.40 2.20 2.20 1.80 2.20 4.00
PARTICIPANT 3
3.60 4.20 2.60 2.20 1.20 2.80 4.00
4.00 4.80 3.20 1.20 2.80 3.20 5.00
4.00 4.20 1.80 1.20 2.00 3.60 3.40
4.00 4.40 2.60 1.80 1.40 3.60 4.40
2.40 3.80 3.60 2.60 2.20 3.60 2.00
3.80 4.00 3.60 4.60 1.00 4.20 4.20
3.20 3.80 1.40 2.40 2.80 3.00 3.20
PARTICIPANT 4
3.40 3.80 2.60 1.80 2.60 2.80 4.00
3.80 3.80 4.00 2.80 3.00 4.00 2.80
3.00 4.00 3.20 2.20 1.80 2.80 3.80
3.60 4.20 2.20 2.20 1.60 3.40 3.20
3.20 4.20 2.40 2.20 3.00 3.80 3.40
3.00 3.60 3.00 2.40 3.20 2.00 4.00
2.80 3.80 2.80 2.80 2.00 2.00 4.00
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PARTICIPANT 5
4.00 4.20 1.80 1.60 1.20 4.00 4.20
4.40 4.80 2.60 1.40 2.40 3.40 5.00
4.20 3.80 1.80 1.20 2.80 2.60 4.20
4.20 4.80 1.60 1.20 2.00 3.60 4.40
4.20 4.80 1.20 1.40 1.80 3.00 5.00
4.20 4.00 1.80 1.40 1.60 3.00 4.20
4.20 4.60 1.60 2.00 2.40 3.20 4.00
PARTICIPANT 6
2.20 2.00 3.20 2.40 3.20 2.20 2.80
4.00 4.00 3.00 2.40 2.60 4.20 3.80
3.80 3.80 3.00 2.40 2.40 4.00 2.80
3.00 3.60 2.60 2.40 2.20 3.00 2.80
4.00 4.60 2.80 2.40 2.40 2.20 3.80
3.00 3.40 2.60 2.20 2.20 3.20 3.60
3.40 4.00 2.40 2.20 2.60 3.40 3.60
PARTICIPANT 7
3.00 3.00 2.80 2.40 2.80 3.00 3.80
3.00 4.20 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.60 3.00
3.60 4.20 2.80 2.40 2.20 2.80 3.60
4.00 4.20 2.40 3.00 2.80 2.80 3.40
2.80 3.00 3.20 2.60 3.00 2.40 3.20
3.40 3.80 3.00 2.80 2.00 2.80 4.20
3.20 3.00 2.80 2.60 2.60 2.60 3.20
PARTICIPANT 8
3.80 4.20 3.40 3.80 2.60 3.60 4.20
3.40 3.20 4.40 1.60 3.00 2.00 3.60
3.20 3.60 4.00 2.20 1.40 2.00 4.20
2.60 3.40 1.40 2.40 1.80 2.60 3.60
2.40 4.00 2.00 1.80 1.60 1.40 3.20
3.40 3.20 4.20 3.00 1.80 4.00 3.40
2.00 3.60 3.00 3.00 2.20 2.60 2.60
MEDIAN OF ALL
3.50 3.70 2.70 2.20 2.60 2.90 4.00
3.60 3.90 3.10 2.50 2.90 3.40 3.60
3.70 3.80 2.90 2.20 2.10 2.80 3.90
3.60 4.20 2.40 2.10 1.90 3.10 3.70
2.90 4.10 2.90 2.30 2.30 2.40 3.30
3.50 3.70 3.00 2.60 1.90 3.10 3.90
3.30 3.80 2.50 2.30 2.30 2.60 3.80
SD OF ALL
0.21 0.35 0.07 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.14
0.28 0.21 0.21 0.49 0.14 0.28 0.49
0.35 0.14 0.21 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.21
0.35 0.28 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.28
0.28 0.28 0.28 0.14 0.28 0.28 0.28
0.21 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.21 0.21 0.21
0.35 0.14 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.35 0.28
Phase 2
PARTICIPANT 1
3.00 3.00 3.60 3.00 4.00 3.80 2.60
2.40 2.00 3.60 3.60 3.40 3.00 2.00
3.80 4.00 2.80 1.80 1.00 2.80 4.60
3.20 3.60 2.60 2.20 2.00 3.80 3.00
4.00 4.60 2.80 3.00 2.00 2.20 4.00
4.40 4.40 3.00 2.00 1.00 3.40 4.60
3.80 3.80 2.20 2.40 1.20 2.60 4.60
PARTICIPANT 2
3.40 4.00 3.40 2.40 2.60 2.20 4.00
3.40 4.20 3.00 2.60 2.40 3.40 3.80
3.80 4.40 2.40 2.00 1.80 2.60 3.60
3.00 4.00 2.80 2.00 2.60 2.60 3.20
3.00 4.20 3.20 2.00 2.40 2.60 3.60
3.60 4.00 3.40 2.00 2.20 3.40 3.40
3.60 4.00 2.40 2.20 2.40 2.20 4.00
PARTICIPANT 3
2.20 1.20 2.00 1.60 2.60 1.20 3.00
4.00 4.20 2.20 2.60 2.80 3.40 3.00
3.80 3.60 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.20 4.40
3.80 4.00 3.40 2.00 2.00 3.80 3.60
2.00 4.20 3.20 2.40 3.40 4.20 3.40
4.60 4.20 3.60 2.20 1.00 3.60 4.40
4.00 4.20 3.40 3.60 1.60 3.40 4.40
PARTICIPANT 4
2.40 2.80 2.80 2.00 2.60 3.00 2.80
3.40 4.00 4.60 3.20 3.60 4.40 3.20
3.20 3.00 2.40 1.80 1.60 2.20 4.00
3.00 2.80 2.60 2.00 2.00 4.20 3.00
2.80 4.40 3.00 2.40 2.00 1.60 4.00
3.20 4.00 3.00 2.40 3.40 3.40 4.40
2.80 3.40 2.60 3.00 3.20 2.80 4.00
Raw data | 227
PARTICIPANT 5
3.20 2.80 2.40 1.80 2.00 1.80 4.80
3.60 3.60 2.80 2.00 1.80 2.60 4.60
4.40 4.20 2.40 2.60 3.60 3.40 3.60
2.80 2.80 2.20 1.60 2.00 2.20 5.00
3.00 3.40 2.00 1.20 3.40 1.20 4.00
3.40 4.00 2.60 2.20 1.60 2.00 4.40
3.60 4.00 2.40 2.20 3.00 2.40 3.80
PARTICIPANT 6
1.60 1.00 3.00 2.80 3.20 1.60 3.00
3.80 3.80 3.00 2.20 2.60 3.40 3.80
4.00 3.80 3.00 2.20 2.80 3.40 4.00
3.80 3.40 3.00 2.80 2.40 3.60 3.80
3.40 4.80 2.40 2.00 2.40 2.60 3.60
3.80 4.20 2.40 2.00 2.00 3.20 3.40
3.80 4.20 2.60 2.20 1.60 2.80 3.20
PARTICIPANT 7
3.00 3.00 3.20 3.00 3.40 3.00 3.00
3.00 3.00 3.00 3.20 3.00 3.20 2.80
3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.20 3.20 2.80
3.40 3.00 2.60 3.00 2.80 3.00 3.20
3.20 3.40 2.80 3.00 2.80 3.00 3.40
3.00 3.00 3.00 2.60 3.00 3.00 3.00
3.20 3.40 2.80 3.00 2.80 2.80 3.00
PARTICIPANT 8
3.20 2.00 3.60 1.60 3.40 2.40 2.60
3.60 4.60 3.80 4.00 2.40 3.20 3.60
2.60 3.20 2.00 1.80 1.40 2.00 4.20
3.40 3.40 3.60 3.00 2.60 4.20 2.60
3.00 3.20 1.80 1.80 3.40 1.40 2.00
2.80 3.60 1.80 3.00 1.60 1.80 3.80
3.80 3.60 1.20 2.40 1.60 2.40 3.60
MEDIAN OF ALL
3.00 2.80 3.10 2.20 2.90 2.30 3.00
3.50 3.90 3.00 2.90 2.70 3.30 3.40
3.80 3.70 2.40 2.00 1.70 2.70 4.00
3.30 3.40 2.70 2.10 2.20 3.70 3.20
3.00 4.20 2.80 2.20 2.60 2.40 3.60
3.50 4.00 3.00 2.20 1.80 3.30 4.10
3.70 3.90 2.50 2.40 2.00 2.70 3.90
SD OF ALL
0.21 0.35 0.28 0.42 0.28 0.49 0.21
0.14 0.21 0.28 0.35 0.21 0.07 0.28
0.28 0.35 0.28 0.14 0.42 0.35 0.28
0.21 0.35 0.14 0.21 0.14 0.35 0.21
0.14 0.35 0.28 0.21 0.42 0.49 0.21
0.28 0.14 0.28 0.14 0.42 0.14 0.28
0.07 0.21 0.14 0.14 0.42 0.14 0.28
Phase 3
PARTICIPANT 1
3.00 3.20 2.60 1.80 2.00 2.40 4.00
3.60 4.00 2.60 3.00 2.40 3.80 4.00
4.00 4.00 2.60 2.00 1.60 3.40 4.00
3.60 4.00 2.20 2.20 2.80 3.40 3.60
4.00 4.00 2.60 2.60 2.20 2.40 4.00
3.80 4.00 3.00 1.80 1.60 2.80 4.60
3.60 4.00 2.20 2.80 3.00 2.80 4.00
PARTICIPANT 2
3.00 2.20 3.00 2.20 2.80 2.00 3.80
3.40 2.80 2.40 2.20 3.00 2.60 3.80
3.20 3.60 2.60 1.40 2.40 2.20 4.00
2.80 3.40 2.60 2.00 3.00 2.20 3.80
2.40 2.80 3.00 2.00 2.60 2.20 3.60
3.00 3.60 3.00 2.20 2.00 2.40 3.80
3.00 3.80 2.40 2.00 2.60 2.00 3.80
PARTICIPANT 3
2.40 2.40 3.60 2.00 2.60 2.00 3.80
4.00 4.40 4.00 2.00 2.20 4.00 4.00
4.20 3.80 2.40 2.60 1.00 3.40 3.80
3.60 3.60 3.80 2.00 2.00 4.40 3.40
4.40 4.20 2.80 1.80 1.80 3.20 3.60
4.00 4.00 3.80 3.40 1.80 3.60 4.20
4.00 4.20 2.60 3.60 2.40 2.40 3.40
PARTICIPANT 4
2.40 2.00 2.20 2.00 2.80 2.20 3.40
3.20 3.60 4.20 3.20 3.20 4.40 4.00
4.20 3.60 1.40 1.60 1.60 3.60 4.40
2.60 3.00 2.00 2.20 2.00 2.80 3.00
2.60 3.40 3.40 2.20 2.00 1.80 4.00
3.60 3.20 4.20 1.80 1.20 3.40 4.20
2.60 3.80 2.40 2.20 1.80 2.40 4.00
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PARTICIPANT 5
3.00 2.00 3.00 1.80 2.80 2.40 3.00
3.20 5.00 3.40 2.80 2.60 4.00 2.80
3.20 3.80 2.40 1.80 3.00 3.00 2.40
2.60 4.00 3.60 2.20 3.40 2.40 2.60
2.60 3.60 2.40 2.40 3.00 2.40 2.40
2.80 3.40 3.60 2.60 3.00 3.20 2.40
3.00 4.00 2.40 2.20 3.20 2.20 2.40
PARTICIPANT 6
3.20 3.00 2.40 2.20 3.20 2.80 3.00
3.40 4.20 2.80 2.60 2.80 3.80 3.60
3.60 4.00 2.80 2.60 2.20 3.60 3.60
3.80 4.20 2.40 2.80 2.00 3.80 4.00
3.60 4.40 3.00 2.00 2.60 3.40 3.80
3.40 3.80 3.00 2.00 2.20 3.40 3.80
3.80 4.20 2.80 2.00 2.60 3.00 3.40
PARTICIPANT 7
3.20 3.00 3.40 3.00 2.20 2.20 3.80
3.20 4.20 2.80 2.20 3.00 4.20 3.20
3.20 4.20 2.80 1.80 1.80 2.80 3.80
3.00 4.20 2.20 2.80 2.80 3.00 3.40
3.00 4.40 4.00 2.20 1.80 2.00 3.80
3.00 4.20 4.00 2.00 1.60 3.60 3.60
3.40 3.80 2.60 2.40 2.60 2.60 3.40
PARTICIPANT 8
2.60 2.40 3.00 2.00 2.80 2.20 3.20
4.20 3.80 3.80 2.80 3.00 4.00 3.40
3.40 3.60 1.60 2.00 1.80 3.60 4.40
3.60 4.00 1.60 2.80 1.40 3.00 3.00
3.20 3.80 3.00 2.40 1.80 1.60 3.60
3.00 3.40 3.20 2.20 1.40 3.00 4.20
3.40 4.20 3.80 2.40 2.00 4.00 3.80
MEDIAN OF ALL
3.00 2.40 3.00 2.00 2.80 2.20 3.60
3.40 4.10 3.10 2.70 2.90 4.00 3.70
3.50 3.80 2.50 1.90 1.80 3.40 3.90
3.30 4.00 2.30 2.20 2.40 3.00 3.40
3.10 3.90 3.00 2.20 2.10 2.30 3.70
3.20 3.70 3.40 2.10 1.70 3.30 4.00
3.40 4.00 2.50 2.30 2.60 2.50 3.60
SD OF ALL
0.14 0.28 0.28 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.21
0.14 0.21 0.42 0.28 0.14 0.14 0.21
0.21 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.14 0.14
0.28 0.14 0.21 0.14 0.28 0.35 0.28
0.35 0.28 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.28 0.07
0.21 0.21 0.28 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.14
0.28 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.14
Phase 4
PARTICIPANT 1
3.00 3.20 2.60 1.60 2.20 3.40 3.80
3.60 4.20 2.00 2.40 2.40 3.60 3.60
4.40 4.00 2.00 1.60 1.20 3.80 4.60
3.60 4.40 2.40 2.00 1.40 3.40 4.20
3.80 4.20 2.40 2.60 2.20 3.40 4.20
4.60 4.20 3.00 1.80 1.00 3.80 4.80
4.00 4.20 2.20 2.40 1.20 2.80 4.60
PARTICIPANT 2
2.80 2.60 2.60 1.60 2.40 2.20 3.80
2.80 3.40 2.80 2.20 3.40 3.00 3.40
3.00 3.00 2.40 1.80 2.20 2.00 4.00
3.00 3.60 2.40 2.00 2.40 2.00 4.00
2.40 3.40 2.80 2.20 2.60 2.20 3.00
3.20 3.40 2.80 2.00 2.20 2.20 3.60
3.60 3.80 2.20 2.20 2.40 2.00 4.00
PARTICIPANT 3
2.80 2.00 2.40 2.00 1.80 2.00 3.20
3.60 4.20 4.20 1.60 1.80 4.40 4.40
3.80 4.20 1.60 2.80 1.00 3.60 4.40
3.80 4.60 4.20 2.00 1.60 4.80 3.80
4.00 4.80 4.20 1.40 1.20 2.00 4.00
3.60 4.20 4.00 2.40 1.40 3.20 3.80
3.40 4.20 2.20 2.40 1.20 3.80 3.80
PARTICIPANT 4
2.80 1.80 2.80 2.00 3.20 2.00 3.60
2.80 3.60 3.60 3.40 3.40 3.80 4.00
2.60 2.80 3.80 2.00 1.60 2.20 3.60
3.00 3.60 1.60 2.00 2.00 2.40 3.60
2.60 3.00 3.60 2.00 3.20 1.80 3.20
2.40 4.00 4.20 2.00 1.80 2.80 4.20
3.00 3.60 2.80 2.20 2.20 2.00 4.00
Raw data | 229
PARTICIPANT 5
3.80 3.40 2.40 1.40 1.80 2.00 4.60
4.80 4.60 3.00 2.40 1.80 2.60 4.00
4.00 4.20 2.20 2.20 1.40 3.20 4.00
5.00 4.60 1.60 1.00 1.40 3.60 4.80
4.00 5.00 2.40 1.40 1.80 2.20 5.00
4.20 3.80 2.20 2.00 1.60 3.00 4.80
4.20 3.60 1.80 1.60 1.20 1.80 3.80
PARTICIPANT 6
3.00 2.80 2.80 2.40 2.60 2.80 2.60
3.40 4.00 2.80 2.00 2.80 3.80 3.40
3.80 3.80 2.80 2.00 2.20 3.40 4.00
3.40 3.80 2.60 2.00 2.20 2.80 3.60
3.00 4.00 2.80 1.60 2.20 2.80 3.60
3.00 4.00 3.00 1.80 2.20 3.00 4.20
3.40 4.00 2.80 1.60 2.00 2.80 4.20
PARTICIPANT 7
3.00 3.20 3.40 2.60 2.20 2.80 4.00
3.80 3.40 3.40 2.60 2.40 3.40 3.80
3.60 4.20 3.40 2.00 1.60 2.80 4.20
3.20 4.60 2.40 2.20 2.00 3.20 3.80
2.80 3.20 3.00 1.60 2.20 2.60 3.60
2.80 3.00 3.80 1.80 2.80 3.00 3.80
3.40 3.00 2.40 1.80 2.20 2.40 3.80
PARTICIPANT 8
2.60 2.40 3.20 4.00 3.20 2.00 2.60
4.00 4.00 3.60 4.20 3.00 3.60 4.00
3.00 3.60 1.80 1.60 1.40 2.40 3.40
3.00 3.60 1.60 2.80 1.80 2.60 3.20
2.60 3.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 1.80 3.00
3.00 3.20 2.00 2.40 1.40 2.80 3.60
3.80 4.00 1.60 3.00 2.00 2.80 4.20
MEDIAN OF ALL
2.90 2.70 2.70 2.00 2.30 2.10 3.70
3.60 4.00 3.20 2.40 2.60 3.60 3.90
3.70 3.90 2.30 2.00 1.50 3.00 4.00
3.30 4.10 2.40 2.00 1.90 3.00 3.80
2.90 3.70 2.80 1.80 2.20 2.20 3.60
3.10 3.90 3.00 2.00 1.70 3.00 4.00
3.50 3.90 2.20 2.20 2.00 2.60 4.00
SD OF ALL
0.07 0.35 0.14 0.28 0.28 0.07 0.28
0.21 0.21 0.28 0.21 0.42 0.14 0.14
0.35 0.21 0.35 0.14 0.14 0.42 0.21
0.21 0.35 0.35 0.00 0.21 0.35 0.14
0.28 0.35 0.28 0.28 0.14 0.28 0.35
0.28 0.21 0.57 0.14 0.28 0.14 0.21
0.14 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.14
Phase 5
PARTICIPANT 1
3.40 3.20 2.60 2.40 1.40 3.20 4.40
3.40 4.20 2.20 2.40 2.60 4.00 4.00
4.60 3.60 2.00 1.60 1.20 5.00 5.00
3.40 4.40 2.60 2.20 2.00 3.40 4.40
4.00 4.00 2.60 2.40 1.60 3.00 4.20
4.40 4.20 3.00 2.00 1.20 3.80 4.60
3.80 4.20 1.80 1.80 1.60 2.80 5.00
PARTICIPANT 2
2.80 2.20 2.40 2.40 2.60 2.00 4.00
3.20 3.40 3.00 2.00 2.80 2.60 3.80
3.60 4.40 2.40 2.00 2.00 1.80 4.20
3.20 3.60 3.00 2.20 3.00 2.20 3.60
2.80 3.60 3.20 2.00 2.60 2.60 3.00
3.40 3.60 3.40 2.20 2.40 2.00 3.40
3.80 3.80 2.40 2.20 2.60 2.00 3.80
PARTICIPANT 3
4.20 4.20 3.00 3.80 2.20 4.20 4.00
3.80 4.00 3.80 2.80 3.60 3.80 3.40
3.60 4.00 3.60 4.20 1.60 3.40 4.00
3.20 4.20 3.00 2.00 1.80 3.80 3.20
4.00 4.40 3.80 2.40 1.80 2.00 3.60
3.40 4.20 3.80 3.60 2.00 3.40 4.40
3.60 4.20 3.40 3.00 2.60 2.80 3.40
PARTICIPANT 4
3.40 1.60 2.80 2.40 3.20 2.00 3.60
3.60 4.20 3.40 3.40 3.60 3.40 3.60
3.20 3.00 2.40 1.60 1.40 3.20 3.80
3.00 4.00 2.40 1.60 1.60 2.60 3.60
2.20 2.80 2.60 2.60 3.00 2.00 3.60
2.60 2.60 2.80 2.60 2.00 3.20 4.00
2.80 3.80 2.40 2.20 2.40 2.40 4.20
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PARTICIPANT 5
4.60 2.40 2.00 1.40 1.60 2.80 4.60
4.00 4.60 2.60 1.00 1.20 2.20 4.80
4.40 4.20 2.00 1.20 1.60 3.00 4.60
2.80 2.80 3.00 1.20 3.60 4.00 2.60
4.60 4.40 1.80 1.00 1.00 1.60 5.00
3.80 3.20 2.60 2.00 1.00 2.00 4.40
3.40 4.20 3.60 1.00 1.80 2.60 4.80
PARTICIPANT 6
2.80 3.20 3.00 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.00
3.20 3.80 3.00 2.80 3.60 3.40 3.40
4.00 4.20 2.80 2.00 2.00 3.80 3.40
3.60 2.80 3.00 2.60 2.40 3.60 3.80
3.80 4.00 2.80 2.20 2.40 2.60 3.00
3.60 4.00 3.20 2.40 1.60 4.00 4.40
3.40 4.40 2.80 1.40 1.60 3.00 3.40
PARTICIPANT 7
3.00 3.00 2.80 3.00 2.60 2.60 3.00
3.00 4.20 3.20 2.80 2.60 3.60 3.20
3.40 3.80 3.20 2.20 2.20 2.80 3.80
3.60 3.60 3.60 3.00 2.40 3.60 3.40
3.20 3.00 3.60 1.60 2.40 2.40 3.60
3.60 3.60 2.80 2.80 2.40 2.80 3.80
3.20 3.60 3.00 2.40 2.00 2.80 3.60
PARTICIPANT 8
2.40 2.40 4.00 3.00 3.60 1.80 2.60
3.40 4.20 4.60 3.20 3.20 3.20 4.20
2.80 3.20 2.00 1.80 1.60 3.00 4.40
3.80 3.40 4.00 2.40 2.40 4.20 3.20
2.80 3.60 2.40 2.40 2.40 1.20 2.40
3.80 3.20 3.60 1.80 2.00 3.60 4.60
3.40 3.80 2.40 2.40 1.60 2.20 3.40
MEDIAN OF ALL
3.20 2.70 2.80 2.70 2.60 2.70 3.80
3.40 4.20 3.10 2.80 3.00 3.40 3.70
3.60 3.90 2.40 1.90 1.60 3.10 4.10
3.30 3.60 3.00 2.20 2.40 3.60 3.50
3.50 3.80 2.70 2.30 2.40 2.20 3.60
3.60 3.60 3.10 2.30 2.00 3.30 4.40
3.40 4.00 2.60 2.20 1.90 2.70 3.70
SD OF ALL
0.28 0.35 0.14 0.21 0.42 0.42 0.49
0.14 0.07 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.21 0.21
0.28 0.21 0.28 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
0.21 0.35 0.14 0.21 0.35 0.21 0.21
0.42 0.28 0.28 0.14 0.28 0.28 0.42
0.14 0.28 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.35 0.14
0.14 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.21
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C.3 Detailed polarity scores
Table C.1: Polarities of responses in phase 1 of the longitudinal study.
pol. nat hum com nec int mat vag avg.
actor
neg 40% 50% 0% 10% 0% 20% 60% 26%
neu 50% 40% 90% 20% 70% 60% 40% 53%
pos 10% 10% 10% 70% 30% 20% 0% 21%
event
neg 40% 70% 20% 10% 0% 30% 50% 31%
neu 60% 30% 70% 50% 80% 60% 50% 57%
pos 0% 0% 10% 40% 20% 10% 0% 11%
goal
neg 50% 70% 10% 0% 0% 30% 60% 31%
neu 50% 30% 70% 30% 40% 60% 40% 46%
pos 0% 0% 20% 70% 60% 10% 0% 23%
process
neg 50% 70% 0% 0% 0% 20% 50% 27%
neu 50% 30% 40% 30% 30% 70% 50% 43%
pos 0% 0% 60% 70% 70% 10% 0% 30%
resource
neg 20% 70% 10% 0% 0% 20% 30% 21%
neu 60% 30% 60% 40% 50% 30% 60% 47%
pos 20% 0% 30% 60% 50% 50% 10% 31%
restriction
neg 40% 50% 20% 10% 0% 20% 70% 30%
neu 60% 50% 70% 50% 30% 70% 30% 51%
pos 0% 0% 10% 40% 70% 10% 0% 19%
result
neg 30% 60% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 20%
neu 60% 40% 60% 50% 50% 70% 50% 54%
pos 10% 0% 40% 50% 50% 30% 0% 26%
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Table C.2: Polarities of responses in phase 2 of the longitudinal study.
pol. nat hum com nec int mat vag avg.
actor
neg 0% 10% 20% 0% 10% 10% 20% 10%
neu 70% 60% 60% 50% 80% 40% 80% 63%
pos 30% 30% 20% 50% 10% 50% 0% 27%
event
neg 40% 60% 30% 20% 10% 10% 40% 30%
neu 50% 30% 60% 60% 60% 90% 50% 57%
pos 10% 10% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 13%
goal
neg 50% 50% 0% 0% 10% 0% 70% 26%
neu 50% 50% 50% 40% 30% 70% 30% 46%
pos 0% 0% 50% 60% 60% 30% 0% 29%
process
neg 20% 30% 10% 0% 0% 50% 30% 20%
neu 80% 70% 80% 50% 50% 40% 70% 63%
pos 0% 0% 10% 50% 50% 10% 0% 17%
resource
neg 10% 50% 0% 0% 0% 10% 50% 17%
neu 80% 50% 70% 40% 60% 50% 40% 56%
pos 10% 0% 30% 60% 40% 40% 10% 27%
restriction
neg 40% 70% 10% 0% 0% 10% 50% 26%
neu 60% 30% 70% 40% 40% 70% 50% 51%
pos 0% 0% 20% 60% 60% 20% 0% 23%
result
neg 60% 60% 0% 10% 0% 0% 60% 27%
neu 40% 40% 60% 40% 50% 70% 40% 49%
pos 0% 0% 40% 50% 50% 30% 0% 24%
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Table C.3: Polarities of responses in phase 3 of the longitudinal study.
pol. nat hum com nec int mat vag avg.
actor
neg 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 40% 7%
neu 80% 50% 70% 30% 80% 30% 60% 57%
pos 20% 50% 20% 70% 20% 70% 0% 36%
event
neg 30% 70% 30% 0% 0% 70% 50% 36%
neu 70% 30% 60% 70% 80% 30% 50% 56%
pos 0% 0% 10% 30% 20% 0% 0% 9%
goal
neg 40% 80% 0% 0% 0% 30% 70% 31%
neu 60% 20% 60% 40% 30% 60% 20% 41%
pos 0% 0% 40% 60% 70% 10% 10% 27%
process
neg 40% 60% 20% 0% 0% 20% 30% 24%
neu 60% 40% 30% 50% 60% 60% 70% 53%
pos 0% 0% 50% 50% 40% 20% 0% 23%
resource
neg 30% 60% 10% 0% 0% 0% 70% 24%
neu 60% 40% 80% 30% 50% 40% 20% 46%
pos 10% 0% 10% 70% 50% 60% 10% 30%
restriction
neg 30% 50% 40% 0% 0% 20% 70% 30%
neu 70% 50% 60% 40% 30% 70% 20% 49%
pos 0% 0% 0% 60% 70% 10% 10% 21%
result
neg 30% 80% 10% 10% 0% 10% 40% 26%
neu 70% 20% 50% 30% 70% 50% 50% 49%
pos 0% 0% 40% 60% 30% 40% 10% 26%
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Table C.4: Polarities of responses in phase 4 of the longitudinal study.
pol. nat hum com nec int mat vag avg.
actor
neg 10% 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 50% 10%
neu 90% 70% 80% 30% 50% 50% 50% 60%
pos 0% 30% 20% 60% 50% 50% 0% 30%
event
neg 50% 60% 30% 10% 0% 50% 60% 37%
neu 50% 40% 60% 40% 60% 50% 40% 49%
pos 0% 0% 10% 50% 40% 0% 0% 14%
goal
neg 50% 60% 10% 0% 0% 20% 70% 30%
neu 50% 40% 40% 30% 20% 50% 30% 37%
pos 0% 0% 50% 70% 80% 30% 0% 33%
process
neg 30% 80% 10% 0% 0% 20% 70% 30%
neu 70% 20% 30% 30% 20% 60% 30% 37%
pos 0% 0% 60% 70% 80% 20% 0% 33%
resource
neg 30% 40% 20% 0% 0% 0% 50% 20%
neu 60% 60% 50% 30% 40% 50% 50% 49%
pos 10% 0% 30% 70% 60% 50% 0% 31%
restriction
neg 30% 50% 30% 0% 0% 10% 80% 29%
neu 60% 50% 50% 20% 30% 80% 20% 44%
pos 10% 0% 20% 80% 70% 10% 0% 27%
result
neg 40% 70% 0% 0% 0% 10% 80% 29%
neu 60% 30% 40% 30% 20% 50% 20% 36%
pos 0% 0% 60% 70% 80% 40% 0% 36%
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Table C.5: Polarities of responses in phase 5 of the longitudinal study.
pol. nat hum com nec int mat vag avg.
actor
neg 20% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 50% 17%
neu 70% 50% 70% 50% 60% 60% 50% 59%
pos 10% 40% 20% 40% 30% 30% 0% 24%
event
neg 30% 70% 20% 0% 30% 30% 50% 33%
neu 70% 30% 70% 70% 60% 60% 50% 59%
pos 0% 0% 10% 30% 10% 10% 0% 9%
goal
neg 50% 60% 10% 10% 0% 20% 70% 31%
neu 50% 40% 40% 20% 20% 70% 30% 39%
pos 0% 0% 50% 70% 80% 10% 0% 30%
process
neg 30% 50% 20% 0% 10% 50% 40% 29%
neu 70% 50% 70% 40% 30% 40% 60% 51%
pos 0% 0% 10% 60% 60% 10% 0% 20%
resource
neg 40% 60% 20% 0% 0% 0% 50% 24%
neu 50% 40% 60% 30% 40% 50% 40% 44%
pos 10% 0% 20% 70% 60% 50% 10% 31%
restriction
neg 50% 50% 20% 10% 0% 30% 70% 33%
neu 50% 50% 80% 40% 20% 50% 30% 46%
pos 0% 0% 0% 50% 80% 20% 0% 21%
result
neg 30% 80% 10% 0% 0% 0% 50% 24%
neu 70% 20% 50% 30% 40% 70% 50% 47%
pos 0% 0% 40% 70% 60% 30% 0% 29%
